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Foreign policy is a broad net*work of 
objectives) principles and faeans to attain them, 
that an independent and sovereign state pursues In 
order to meet the contingencies of i ts diplon^tic 
requirements* The architect of foreign policy tr ies 
to design i t in such a viay as to ful f i l the enlightened 
national interest in the light of the nation's permanent 
dcHBostic requirements and fluid and fast changing 
international situations* The principal problem i s 
the identification of the national Interest at a 
particular ttoe by i t s ruling e l i t e . A single man of 
eminence or a small cotorie of men at the appex of 
polit ical structure decide as to what i t ought to be 
at a given time* Attainment of independence in 1947 
raised a imiltitude of domestic problems like planning 
and economic development, restructuring of administration, 
adoption of parliamentary democracy, realisation of 
secularism and eradication of centrifugal forces such 
as linguisim, casteism and communal violence. Along 
with this mess of socio-economic and political 
problems, the problem of foreign policy was no less 
significant. As a developing country, India's ambition 
was far from being a mere quest for power. India had 
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to consolidate and project i t s image as a peace-
tnatcer to the antagonistic bipolar post-war world. 
India searched out in non-aligninent a panacea to a l l 
international i l l s . The crux of the problem for 
India was to reconcile the tv«N» leaderships of the 
non*aligned groups and Afro-Asian region. In order 
to accelerate the pace of economic advancement 
India has to enlarge the area of peace. Tranquil 
borders and amiable terms vrith the neighbouring 
countries were the t«^ pre-requisite to be achieved 
through the gimmicks of foreign policy. However, 
the border dispute with China happened to be an 
acid test to it* The tr ial to have negotiated peace 
utterly failed in the context of China. 
Nehru's leadership ^9^z the most remarkable 
factor in India's political l i f e . He held almost a 
monopoly over foreign policy raaking. Foreign policy 
of India became what Nehzu intended to make i t . 
India adopted parliamentary democracy which 
requires interdependence of the Executive and the 
Parliament. In fact the Executive is subordinate or 
subservient to Parliament. The Executive is constituted 
from the Parliament and i s responsible to the latter 
for a l l i t s functions* The foreign policy making 
and toplementation requires a proper liaison end 
intexdependence of the Executive and Parliament 
which is ensured through the parliamentary system* 
The crux of the problem is to allocate this 
responsibility between the legislature and the Executive 
with regazd to foreign policy* 
The present thesis i s an attempt to 
examine the main features of the foreign policy of 
India and the role of the Indian Parliament in shaping, 
controlling, directing, supervising and scrutinising 
it* instead of exploring a l l the aspects of foreign 
policy, i t is a special study of the Sino-Xndian 
Border Di8pute««l962« The first chapter deals with 
the Foreign Policy* i t s chief detesminants and tenets. 
It includes a detailed survey of Hational-Interest 
as the major determinant* Nehru happens to be the 
Chief Architect of India's policy. Guided by the 
ivestern realism and oriental idealism, Nehru designed 
the principles of foreign policy to meet the 
requirements of a developing country* 
The second chapter makes a broad analysis 
of the role of various agencies such as the cabinet* 
the External Affairs Ministry and the f4lnlster 
and Nehru as the dlfmavlrate combining In hln the 
twin offices of the Prime islnlster and the Minister 
of External Affairs. It also attempts to present 
the general organisation and functions of the 
Ministry of External Affairs* An attempt has been 
made to make an analytical study of all these agencies 
that can partake of the responsibility of formulating 
the foreign policy of India. As a matter of reference. 
It also studies the role of Parliament as the supreme 
legislative body in the Indian parliamentary set-up. 
The Cabinet «ihlch enjoys the confidence of the people 
ani the l^rllament gets an upper hand over the rest 
of the agencies. Moreover, one cannot Ignore the 
mlghtly presence of the 'gentle collosusS Nehru as 
the chief steersman of the cabinet* The overall 
analysis of the mode of work In the cabinet shows 
that Nehru*6 keen Insight In foreign affairs* his 
monopolistic nature, popularity and egoism In not 
consulting his cabinet colleagues in most of the 
matters made the cabinet a body subservient to his 
whims and caprices. Till Nehru was at the helm of 
affairs, no one had the guts to oppose him In the 
making of major policy decisions nor he was in the 
habit of consulting his colleagues* Absence of 
consultations had eclipsed the role of other agencies. 
The parliament Is not entrusted with the task of 
making foreign policy* consequently the most pertinent 
role Is played by Nehru. Ko^vever. the Parliament is 
entitled to aupervls© the entire machinery of 
administration. 
The third chapter makes an analysis of the 
processes of parliamentary control namely the Parlia-
Gttantary Questions, Ministerial Statements, various 
Motions such as the general resolutions approving or 
disapproving of the foreign policy, Mo«Confidence 
iiotions. Adjournment r.iotions and Debates. In a 
parliamentary system these are the instzuments through 
which the Parliament makes It obligatory over the 
Executive to account to It ultimately for all its 
activities. Through all these modes the implementation 
of foreign policy is brought to books, in a 
parliamentary system, the Executive is sensitive to 
parliamentary criticism. These Instruments of 
Parliamentary control are dealt at large with regard 
to the multitude of foreign policy problems. Measures 
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are suggested for the i r effective u t i l i s a t i on . 
These measurers provide to the raembers of i^rllament« 
the maxionisi opportunity to keep themselves informed 
of the la tes t developments In the foreign policy 
arena and international gietmlcks* 
Questions raised by the Members of 
Parliament efface the misunderstamiing from the i r 
minds. I t i s the l ive l i e s t and most brisk mode of 
imploring relevant scrutiny of the decisions taken 
by the Executive* Debates on foreign policy resolutions 
provide an opportunity for discussion and c r i t i c i sn 
with which the Executive can benefit i t se l f . The 
chapter also points out ^ e limitations of these 
ine t ru i^nts . 
The Fourth Chapter makes a comprehensive 
study of the impact of the Opposition in a parliamentary 
democracy* It is an attempt to highlight the need to 
have organised Opposition in the Parliament. No 
Government can function without the existence of an 
effective Opposition, in India where the multi-party 
system operates, the role of the Opposition ought to 
be more defined and relevant. The ultimate decision 
of the national Interest by the Government must be 
based on the broad concensus generated by the 
Opposition. The Opposition formulates healthy 
public opinion. Kowevert in the wake of independence 
in India, the Congress Party enjoyed the stream-
rol l ing majority and pol i t ica l preponderance over the 
r e s t of the par t ies . Nehru*s position in Parliament 
was undomitable. T i l l now, the Congress had an 
ovezwholming numerical majority • The variety of 
factors t t o t r^uced the Opposition to play a les t 
a r t i cu l a t e and pertinent role have been analysed. 
The Opposition was disjoined* disorganised. Ineffective 
and lacked unanimity. Nehru was less sensitive to 
i t . Hovsever, the reactions of Opposition were quite 
sharp over the deterioration of Sino-Indian re la t ions , 
the failure of the India's policy to meet the trend, 
withholding of information from the house and 
skirmishes a t the border In the l ight of Nehru's 
repeated assurances to have a peaceful border* Most 
of the cri t icism of the Opposition was wide off the 
mark. Measure are suggested to make i t more 
effective as to perform the role I t is destined to 
play In a parliamentary democracy like India. The 
problem under study Is the Sino-India Border Oispute. 
An attempt has been made to review the reactions 
and crltlclsffls of the major Opposition parties* 
Their val idi ty for the ruling party has been assessed. 
The Opposition should try to cult ivate unanimity« 
coalate on major Issues» should present concrete 
al ternat ives and avoid cri t icism for the sake of 
cr i t ic ism of merely to play to the gallery* The 
Part ies should not be organised on the basis of caste 
or religion and the i r nun^er should be reduced by 
law so as to give r i se to a unified and organised 
Opposition* The Government should evolve a policy 
to make more consuitatlons* 
The emergence of a more ar t iculate 
Opposition af ter the Slno*Xndia debacle i s a promising 
sigh. The r i se of a full fledged Opposition would not 
be a l i ab i l i t y but an asset to the bet ter development 
and success of parliamentary democracy in India, 
The V chapter is an attempt to give an 
insight into the history of the Sino*>Xndia re la t ions . 
I t probes into the genesis of the border dispute, 
legal i ty of the historical but imaginary McMahon Line 
and the cartographic aggression. I t peeps into the 
cordial phase of the Hindi Chlnl Bhai-Bhai, Panchsheel 
the Chinese refusal to accept that Sino-Indla 
border ^as settled* Tibetan revolt , recognition 
of the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet which finished 
the buffer s ta te bet««een China and India, granting 
of Pol i t ica l asylum to the Oalai Lama and the 
Increased Chinese expansionist designs, ttie 
White Papers are discussed at large and a t length* 
The host of factors led to deteriorate the relat ions 
to the extent that a full scale war occurred* India 
nt^edmi peaceful borders and amicable relat ions with 
the neighbours. But the situation ripened at the 
border In such a «(&y that a l l efforts to the amicable 
settlement of dispute, miserably failed and a direct • 
conforntatlon became Inevitable. Nehru had many 
misconceptions about the Chinese d«?slgni and moves* 
However the conflict betsireen India and China happened 
to be the f i r s t conflict between the Communist power 
and the non-aligned s t a t e . The lndla*Chlna war was 
an acid tes t to Indla*s foreign policy which made her 
assess the situations more r ea l i s t i ca l ly . The weakness 
in meeting the contingency make I t Incumbent upon the 
nation to shun the Idealism In foreign policy, increase 
defence preparations and not to remain complacent. 
10 
The VI chapter Is a case-study of the 
1962 debates — held in the Parliament over the 
Sine-India Border Dispute. I t describes the actual 
use made of the parliamentary proees&ea like the 
Quefition-Hour« General Debates, General and specific 
foreign policy Motions, No-Confldence and MJourninsent 
motions over tho Sino»India Border Dispute of 1962• 
An attempt has been made to study the problem In 
the l ight of tho behaviour of the members of the 
Parliament while speaking in the House. The study 
centres round tho Lo^^r House of Parliament, the 
Lok Sabha due to i t s popular nature, numerical 
strength and efficacy in a parliamentary system. 
Certain limitations to the role of Parliament have 
been pin-pointed, as are imposed upon i t by the 
parliamentary system i t se l f . During the crucial year 
of inva8ion*1962, the Members of Parliament did not 
demand to hold any discussion over the vriiite Papers. 
However, the i r occasional reference is found in 
abundance* The decline in health and popularity of 
Nehru, Increase in the prestige of Opposition 
incidentally helped the Parliament to gain a stature 
of eminence In the Indian Poli t ical system. 
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The VII Chapter io devoted to the 
detailed analysis o£ Parliacient, i t s constitutional 
position, nature of proceedings, loglslat ive control 
over foreign policy and foreign relations and the 
inevitable limltatlone on the (neasures of parliamentary 
control . The position of Parliament v*lth regard to 
the troatymaking i s also analysed. An attempt has 
been made to scrutinise the role of the Parllamentazy 
Committees, namely the Consultative Committee, i t s 
organisation and general functioning. It also discusses 
the financial control of the Parliament. th&. e is a 
host of factors both pol i t ica l and constitutional that 
l imit the role of Parliament in the field of foreign 
policy. The cruK of foreign policy i s negotiation, 
secrecy and urgency. The Members havo got the i r party 
a f f i l i a t i ons , to safeguasd the interes ts of the i r 
constituency and a pledge not to disclose information. 
The Committee vvorfes as mini* Pari lament* The need to 
take parliament more in confidence is emphasised to 
enable i t to set guide lines for foreign policy and 
make more concrete suggestions and programmes. I t s 
role as a registering authority is not suff icient . 
Though the i^arliament merely conducts the expost facto 
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enquiry* no ^overniaent can affoxd to ignore i ts 
directives. 
The conclusion highlights the Itoitations 
of Parliament In foreign policy domain. It suggests 
that the Members of Parliament should be given more 
information and the consultation with them should 
Increase* They should try to create more Interest 
in foreign policy problems so that a proper balance 
could be maintained in their interests. The problem 
of inter'-dependence of the Cabinet and Parliament 
has also been examined* A proper liaison should be 
maintained in parliamentary approval and the Executive 
pov/er, to initiate ami implement policy. In fact 
the control of foreign policy by the Executive i s 
equally democratic In spirit* However* parliamentary 
subservience is not a myth and a balance and coordination 
is to be maintained between these two significant 
branches of government. Foreign policy should not 
be lef t to the *generalists*, i t should be entrusted 
to the * experts*. f<ituch remains to be done to 
streamline the defects of our diplomacy in order to 
take more positive steps in the realm of foreign 
policy. Suggestions are also made to accelerate the 
t3 
the Committee work of Parliament in order to 
facilitate more parliamentary consultatlone* 
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P R E F A C E 
The foreign policy of India has assumed 
new dimensions especia l ly a f t e r the 1962 debacle, 
i t s study therefore warrants greater caut ion. Un-
doubtedly s izable l i t e r a t u r e has been produced on 
the various aspects of foreign policy, ever since 
India emerged as an independent en t i t y on the 
p o l i t i c a l map of the world. But very l i t t l e a t t en t ion 
has been paid t o the most c ruc ia l problem, i . e . 
the formulation of foreign policy and the ro le of 
Parliament in t h i s regard. To what extent does the 
Parliament influence, the decis ions , affects the 
negotiat ions and determines the policy formulation, 
has not been paid due a t t e n t i o n . The present work 
i s an endeavour to analyse and comprehend the ro le 
t h a t the Parliament can play in the ul t imate 
a n a l y s i s . The thes i s i s designed to deal f i r s t l y 
with the general aspects Oi the problem and then t o 
examine the Sino-India border d i s p u t e . 
With the help ot His tor ica l documents and 
on tne basis of d a y - t o - d a y analysis of the Parliamentary 
proceedings, I have t r i ed to make an unbiased and 
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judicious study of the various processes through 
which the Parliament in India can have a say and 
exert i t s influence in matters of foreign policy. 
However, the conclusions drawn about the ro le of 
Parliament are bas ica l ly guided by the cons t i t u t iona l 
provisions regarding the role of Parliament and a 
through analysis of the proceedings of the Parliament, 
covering a period of roughly twenty yea r s . Extensive 
use has been made of Parliamentary Debates, the 
cons t i t u t ion of India , the Le t t e r s , wotes and 
Memoranda exchanged between the Governments of India 
and the People's Republic of China, in the form of 
White Papers, Notes and comments in the various 
j ou rna l s , periodic or annual Reports of adhoc.^--'^ 
committees, the neports of the Ministry of External 
Affairs and the other Government of India Publications* 
Since wehru remains undisputedly the chief a r ch i t ec t 
of Indians foreign pol icy, his speeches both inside 
and outside the Parliament cons t i tu te the most 
dependable basis of Ind ia ' s foreign pol icy . 
The thes i s cons is t s of seven chapters and 
the conclusion. The f i r s t Chapter i s the ana ly t i ca l 
explorat ion of the various factors determining 
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India ' s foreign pol icy. Nehru•'s ideology, combining 
in him tjrie western realism and tj>e eastern idealism, Yh^^^^ 
h i s t o r i c a l legacy of Buddha, Asoka and Gandhi, geo-
p o l i t i c s and the various> Resolutions of the Indian 
National Congress, formulated in the pre-independence 
era which s t i l l cons t i tu te the cornerstone of foreign 
policy postulates* Some of the determinants being 
analysed are the p r inc ip le of nat ional i n t e r e s t , 
India*s geographical s i t u a t i o n , economic po t en t i a l , 
mi l i t a ry proweVs and h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n s . Non-
alignment happened to be the chief doct r ine of 
Nehruite foreign pol icy. Besides other fac tors 
influencing Indians foreign policy, i t s chief t ene t s 
v i z . , t i e s with the commonwealth of Nations, fa i th 
in peace and the United Nations, condemnation of 
apartheid and r a c i a l discr iminat ion and a n t i -
colonialism have a lso been dea l t with in d e t a i l * 
The Second Chapter i s an enquiry into the 
functioning and processes of re levant agencies tha t 
can partake of the r e spons ib i l i ty of making or 
unmaking of foreign policy namely the cab ine t , the 
Ministry of External Affa i rs , the Prime Minister 
and the Minister of External Affairs and the 
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Parl iament. Adequate a t t en t ion has been paid to 
the ro le tha t Nehru played as a duumu^^ate, combining 
in him the twin offices of the Prime Minister and 
the Minis ter of External Affa i rs . Consequently, 
Nehru occupies a unique posi t ion by v i r tue of his 
charismatic personali ty and o f f i c i a l capaci ty . The 
chapter a lso deals with the working of the Indian 
Parliament and i t s committees in t h i s regard. 
The Third Chapter gives an insight into the 
various instruments through which the Parliament can 
cont ro l the foreign pol icy . I t is a t t h i s stage 
t h a t the Parliament can shape and mould the foreign 
pol icy, when i t i s debated in i t s forums. The 
chapter discusses the instruments of parliamentary 
cont ro l - major Parliamentary Debates, Question Hour, 
d iscuss ions on Motions, Resolutions and Demands for 
Grants and the Min is te r ia l Statements^ 
The fourth Chapter makes a study of the 
impact of Opposition par t i es on foreign policy 
i s s u e s . The existence of Parliamentary Opposition 
as a correct ive to the riiling party i s one of the 
e s s e n t i a l ingredients and pre- requis i tes of the 
successful working of parliamentary democracy. 
VII 
The function of the Opposition ought to be no l e s s 
s ign i f ican t than tha t of the party-in-power. In 
India , the Opposition has been ra ther hopelessly 
d i s jo in t ed , weak and inef fec t ive . I t i s a chaotic 
multitude consis t ing of several heterogeneous 
groups. Numerically a l s o , i t i s quite unimpressive 
as compared to the thqflfping majority of the Ruding 
Ppirty. The Chapter also makes a thorough study of 
the various exis t ing Opposition partiesy^over the 
Sino-India border dispute* 
The f i f t h Chapter examines the v i c i s s i t u d e s 
through which the Sino-India r e l a t ions and the border 
d isputes have passed. I t analyses how the r e l a t ions 
de t e r io r a t ed , having passed through a long phase of 
c o r d i a l i t y and f r a t e r n i t y . The episode of the 
Dalai Lama fleeing from China and seeking p o l i t i c a l 
asylum in India, the Tibetan revo l t , Longju incident , 
minor skirmishes on the border and the Chinese 
refusal to hold discussions on the McMohon Line 
presented a dismal p ic tu re , culminating in the 1962 
Chinese aggression. The tragedy could have been 
averted i f sane consuls had prevai led . The arguments 
for and against the respect ive claims of the contending 
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pa r t i es to the dispute have been weighed as 
judic ious ly as possible under the circumstances 
on the bas is of avai lable information in Ind ia , 
The s ix th Chapter is a case-study of the 1962 
parliamentary Debates over the Sino-India border 
d i s p u t e . I t i s thoroughly based on the Debates, 
Question-Hour, Adjournment and Call ing-Attent ion 
Motions and Demands for Grants* The Lok Sabha 
Debates form the focus of the study, owing to i t s 
representa t ive charac ter , re f lec t ing a l e s se r 
c ross - sec t ion . Most of the problems, discussed in 
the Rajya Sabha, present dupl icat ion of the Lok Sabha 
proceedings, hence the avoidance of i t s m a t e r i a l . 
The case-study covers the year 1962, the most 
c ruc i a l and per t inen t , when the armed clash between 
the two erstwhile neighbours took place across the 
borders . I t makes an analysis of the various 
parliamentary processes, discussed in the th i rd 
Chapter. I t also attempts t o analyse the react ions 
of the Members, expressed through hect ic or uproarious 
scenes, in t e r rup t ions , occasional laughters , comic 
/ 
/ ges tures , undue applaud^or condemnation and purpose-
/ 
l ess walkouts. 
The seventh Chapter analyses the ro le tha t 
the Parliament has played. I t t r e a t s of the Parl iament 's 
cons t i tu t iona l posi t ion in t h i s regard v i s a v is the 
Executive branch of the government. I t s c ru t i n i s e s 
the Executive r e spons ib i l i ty in the l igh t of various 
parliamentary processes through which the Parliament 
i nd i r ec t l y influences or d i r e c t s the pol icy . 
Besides t h i s , the Chapter a lso takes in to account 
the measures and means which ensure parliamentary 
supervis ion. I t a lso deals with the ro le of Parliament 
in Treaty-making. I t t r i e s to analyse the fac tors 
and l imi ta t ions which ec l ipse the role of Parliament 
in t h i s regard. I t a lso sc ru t in i se s the ro le of 
Parliamentary Consultat ive Committees. I t suggests 
to improv^^s^the a c t i v i t i e s of the Ccmmittees. Other 
measures are suggested to improve the posi t ion of 
Parliament in the f ie ld of foreign policy-making* 
The Conclusion highl ights the need to increase 
parliamentary supervision and control of foreign policy* 
I t s committee-v;ork should be galvanised and speeded 
up . Trends should develop to overshadow Cabinet 
despotism and strengthen the work of Parliament* 
*tn* 
CHAPTER I 
INDIA'S K)RSIGN POLICY 
INTRODUCTION: 
The study of Ind ia ' s foreign pol icy i s invar iably the 
study of Nehru's foreign po l i cy , Jawaharlal Ifehru has been i t s 
chief "a rch i t ec t , engineer and the voice of h is country 's pol icy 
towards the outside world". The speeches of Kehru delivered 
by him at d i f ferent times and places give an a r t i c u l a t e 
expression to free Ind ia ' s foreign pol icy . "In Parliament and 
par ty caucus, within India and abroad, he has hammered on 
themes with remarkable consis tency". 
The major determinants and factors which underlie h i s 
pol icy are ancient Indian h i s to ry and culture,"^ her geographical 
%, Michael Brecher, Nehru^ A P o l i t i c a l Biography 
(abridged e d i t i o n ) , London, Oxford Universi ty P res s , 
1961, p . 216. Elsewhere, in the same vein , Brecher 
writes that Nehru almost held a "pr ivate monopoly" 
over foreign po l i cy . Also " India ' s Defence and Sbreign 
Policies"^ ed. A.B. Shah, Bombay, Manaktalas, 1966, p . 12 
2 . Elsewhere Nehru s a i d , "This policy i s not the product 
of any insp i ra t ion or a rb i t a r a ry choice but has i t s roots 
in the past h i s to ry and way of thinking as well as in 
fundamental nat ional exigencies" J . L . Nehru, "Changing 
India", Foreign Affairs , Vol. 4^-1, No.3, April 1963, p.^55, 
pos i t ion , ' ' mora l i s t ic t r a d i t i o n of Buddha and Ashoka, Gandhi's 
ideology of peace and non-violence, and Nehru's assessment of 
post war period marked by dominant conflagration of cold war 
which engulfed the globe and divided the world into two warring 
camps.-^ Ifehru had a vivid sense of power p o l i t i c s . In his f i r s t 
broadcast to the nation a f te r assuming office in 19^6, Eehru 
declared, "Wfe propose, as far as poss ib l e , to keep away from the 
power p o l i t i c s of groups, aligned against « one another , which 
have led in the past to world war and which may again lead to 
d i sas t e r on an even vas ter s c a l e " . 
1* Referring to Ind ia ' s geographical p o s i t i o n , Nehru said 
in the Parl iament, ,on March 17, 19^0, "Wfe are in a 
s t r a t e g i c part of Asia, s e t in the centre of Indian Ocean 
with int imate past and present connection with Western 
Asia, South-East Asia and Far Eastern Asia. Even i f we couM 
not want to ignore th i s f a c t . Now that a greater par t of 
Asia i s free from colonial ism, our minds go back to the old 
days and the re la t ionships with other countr ies in ifestern 
Eastern and South-Eastern coun t r i es" . T.A. Nizami, The 
Communist Par ty and Ind ia ' s ibreign Pol icy . New Delhi , 
Associated Publishing House, 1971, p . 2 7 ^ 
2 , Even in the Parliament, the pol ic j : of the C3overnraent was 
supported on th i s ground, Seth Govinda Das said that the 
pol icy i s based on Indian cul ture and c i v i l i z a t i o n and in 
accordance with Gandhi's idea l of peace, Lok Sabha Debates 
November 26, 1959, I I S e r i e s , No. 9 , Vol. xxxv, column 1925. 
Also see Frank Anthony's statement in the same debate i n 
t h i s regard, c o l . 1938. 
3 . K.P. Misra ( e d . ) . Studies in Indian Foreign Pol icy . New Delhi , 
Vikas Publ ica t ion, 1969, p . x i i . 
^ . Jawaharlal Nehru^ Ind ia ' s Foreign Policvt Selected speeches, 
September, 19^6 - Apri l . 1961, New Delhi , Publ icat ion Divis ion, 
Government of India , 1961, p . 2 , 
At some^^her-piace he sa id , that for the l a s t three 
hundred years , since the nation-states in the modern world, have 
emerged, nat ions have re l i ed for surv iva l on t h i s process of 
mobilized antagonisms. All these years , the nations of the world 
•i 
have been engaged in fu t i l e wars. In a phi losophical ve in , 
S, Radhakrishnan a lso said tha t he was conscious of power p o l i t i c s 
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and the p e r i l s of alignment. 
Such pronouncements of Indian leaders have reduced Indian 
foreign pol icy to "protest against power po l i t i c s . " -^ Under Nehru's 
s t e w a r ^ h i p , India attempted to •pla.y a quiet and persuasive role 
in easing down the cold war t e n s i o n s . In many a s i t u a t i o n , in 
1950's pa r t i cu l a r l y - h is e f for t s to iron out differences through 
discussion, conc i l i a t i on , and persuasion yielded many good re su l t s . 
At present the i rony of i t i s tha t i t i s not possible to decipher 
pin-pointedly Ind i a ' s r o l e , as many of the s t a t e papers are not 
open to public pe rusa l . 
1. J . L . Nehru's fontord to Victor H» Iw^llace, (ed . ) Paths to 
Peace, MelbournJ 1957, p . xv# 
2 . S« Radhakrishnan, Occasional speeches and IVritingSy 
October, 1952" January 1956, New Delhi , p . M-. 
3 . Indian Of f i c i a l , "India as a World Power," fbreign Af fa i r s , 
19^«'+9, Vol, XXVII, p . ^50. 
^•. K.P, Misra, op . c i t . . p . x i i i - i v . 
The immediate roots of Indian foreign pol icy are found in 
pol icy declara t ions of the A ^ India Congress Committee. This 
became a r t i c u l a t e a f te r the World War I , when Hehru was incharge 
of the newly created foreign off ice working under the invigora t ing 
leadership of Gandhi,^ A study of the resolut ions passed by the 
Indian National Congress from i t s inception throws l igh t on the 
fact tha t the Party took keen i n t e r e s t i n the ex te rna l affairs*- ' 
The meeting of All India Congress Committee in Delhi in 1921 
was a "landmark in the h is tory of Ind ia ' s foreign r e l a t i o n s " . 
K.P. Misra c i t e s K.V. Baj Kumar tha t the reso lu t ion of 1921 was 
important, since i t was the f i r s t s igni f icant declara t ion on the 
par t of na t i ona l i s t Ind ia . I t fur ther l a id down the cornerstone 
of independent Ind ia ' s foreign p o l i c y . The Congress Session in 
Madras in 1927 passed a reso lu t ion of protes t against the use of 
Indian tropps in China. In 1957 Nehru confirmed that the founda-
t ions of Ind ia ' s foreign policy were la id down at the Madras Session 
if 
of the Congress in 1927* 
1. Since i t s inception in 1885, the Congress always favoured an 
independent policy* The foundations of the pol icy of peade 
were l a i d by the Congress, when the Br i t i sh Government without 
consulting the Indian Legis la t ive Assembly sent Indian troops 
abroad on the out-break of the World War I I as quoted in f ra 
P. Trikamdas, "India and Empire" P o l i t i c a l Science Quarter ly. 
October- December I938, pp. 607-60B"T 
2 . Norman D. Palmer, "Jbreign Policy of the Indian National 
Congress before Independence, Indian P o l i t i c a l System. London, 
1961, p , 238. Also see , MJehrUyTp. c i t . . p . 8^. 
3 . Pbr d e t a i l s of resolut ions passed by the A.I.G.C. since I885, 
see N.V. Raj Kumar, ( e d , ) . The Background of Indian ED reign 
Policyy New Delhi, 1952, 
if. Palmer, on. c i t . . pp. 239-.'+0. 
NATIONAL INTEREST AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Natiohal i n t e r e s t i s the most s ign i f icant factor in 
determining the foreign pol icy of any country. Nehru sa id , 
"Every Gtountry»s foreign po l icy , f i r s t of a l l , i s concerned 
with i t s own secur i ty and with p ro tec t ing i t s own p r o g r e s s . . . , 
2 
secur i ty i s protected hy p o l i c i e s . . . . " and a de l ibe ra te 
po l icy of friendship with otLher countr ies goes fur ther in 
gaining secur i ty than almost anything e l s e . On ^th Dec. 19h7, 
in a speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legis la t ive) Nehru 
sa id , "Mhatever pol icy we may l a y down, the a r t of conducting 
the foreign pol icy of a country l i e s in finding out what i s 
most advantageous to the country, life may t a l k about i n t e r -
na t iona l goodwill and mean what we say. Vfe may t a l k about 
peace and freedom and earnes t ly mean what we say. But in 
the ul t imate ana lys i s , a government functions for the good 
of a country i t governs and no government dare do anything 
which in short or long run i s manifest^a^ to the disadvaJitage 
of t ha t country. Therefore, whether a country i s i m p e r i a l i s t i c 
or s o c i a l i s t or communist, i t s Foreign Minister th inks 
pr imar i ly of the i n t e r e s t s of t h a t country".-^ 
1. Adda B. Bozeman, " Ind ia ' s Foreign Policy Today: 
Reflections \ipon i t s Sources", K.P. Misra, OP. c i t . . p .37 
2. Nehru^ OP. c i t . . p . 28. JtLso see Dorothy Norman, 
Nehru: The F i r s t Sixty Years^ Vol. I I , Bombay, 1965,p.if73 
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Side by s i d e , a nations foreign policy ought to be a balanced 
-I 
blend of idealism and enlightened self- i n t e r e s t . G.S. Bajpai 
c i t e s Palraerstone's words to subs tan t ia te h is proposit ion tha t 
there are no e t e rna l friends or enemies but only e t e rna l 
i n t e r e s t s and that India ' s foreign policy has to some extent 
2 
combined idealism with na t iona l i n t e r e s t . 
To "curb any separa t i s t tendencies" and ""to assume the 
leadership of area"^ were the two main aims in the minds of 
k 
Indian foreign pol icy framers and Indian l e ade r s . (Obviously, 
there\ was a consciousness of I nd i a ' s heterogenous composition, 
i t s r e l a t i v e problems and existence and p a r t i t i o n ) . In laying 
down the main tene ts of foreign pol icy , Nehru emphasised 
non-alignment as a means to a t t a i n the goal of nat ional interest, 
1 . G.S, Bajpai, "Ethical Stand in WDrld I ssues : (Cornerstone of Indians Freign Pol icy ," i n K.P.Misra (ed . ) 
op« c i t . . . p«25* Also s e e , Nehru, op. c i t . . p . 28 where 
Jfehru says that "idealism alone would not do". 
2 . Ibid^ p . 26m Also s ee , B.H. Carr, Twenty Years' C r i s i s . 
London, 195S> P» 23^ . Where Garr points out that no 
r e a l i s t can wholly disregard the wider moral issues and 
pr inc ip les and no i d e a l i s t can become e n t i r e l y oblivious 
of se l f - i n t e r e s t " . 
3 . Werner Levi, Free India in ^si^^ Minneapolis, 1952, p . 5l« 
"Many times Nehru has appealed to h is countrymen for 
uni ty on the ground that the whole of Asia i s looking to 
India for leadership or he has assured them that because 
©f Ind ia ' s high p res t ige abroad, Asian Countries are 
looking to her for guidance, Dr, Radhakrishnan has pointed 
out that leadership in Asia i s open to India and tha t 
India ' s role wi l l be very important. Sardar Pat©l once 
remarked that India has the po ten t i a l to take over 
leadersh ip" , 
4-. Lat i f Ahmad Sherwani, India . China and Pakistan. Karachi, 
Council for Pakistan S tud ies , 1967, p . 6>+» 
This enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s the most important 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of non-alignment po l i cy . The pos i t ion of non-
alignment i s that of a means to achieve the aims. I t i s not 
1 
an end in i t s e l f . 
On the eve of the independence of Ghana, President 
KKrumah, made the following dec la ra t ion , c la r i fy ing h is main 
stand @n the basis of na t ional i n t e r e s t . He sa id , that in 
pursuing an independent pol icy iAe Ghana government wi l l have 
foremost regard, for the i n t e r e s t s of the people of Ghana, and 
t h e i r economic and soc ia l p rogres s . Every step in the government's 
povjer, i n t e r n a l l y as well as ex te rna l ly , would further the 
2 developments of the na t ion ' s resources for the coimion good. 
National i n t e r e s t of a country i s determined by "geopol i t ica l 
economic and other f ac to r s , obtaining at a p a r t i c u l a r point of 
t ime".^ 
1. A. Appadorai "The Jbreign Policy of India", i n J . E . Black 
and K.W. Thomson's ( e d s . ) , Foreign Pol ic ies in a Challenging 
ferld. New York, Harper and Row, 1963, p . ^5~. 
2 . Kwame NKrumah, I speak of Freedom; Statement of African 
Ideology, London, Heinemann, 1961, p . 98 . 
3 . Jbr geography as a factor in Ind ia ' s foreign po l icy , 
see Pradymna P. Karan, " India ' s fiole in Geopoli t ics", 
India Quarterly. Vol, 9, 1953, pp. 160-9. Also s e e , J . 
Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of Ind ia ' s Foreign Pol icy . 
JBombay, Allied Publ ishers , 1970, pp. 26-M-3. 
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I t i s because of i t t h a t , the elements of National i n t e r e s t 
change with the var ia t ions in the na t iona l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s i tua t ions J Kehru, who gave shape and content to I nd i a ' s 
foreign policy was ful ly convinced tha t i t serves Ind ia ' s 
na t iona l i n t e r e s t . The c r i t i c s , however, ever since the incept ion 
of India as an independent na t i on , c r i t i c i s e d and doubted the 
v a l i d i t y of foreign policy p r i n c i p l e , as a lso the yards t ick of 
2 
na t iona l i n t e r e s t , which i s always dif ferent to di f ferent persons . 
Michael Brecher has enunciated the " e l i t e " pr inc ip le in 
explaining foreign po l i cy . He h i n t s that the key to understand 
the foreign policy system i s , the world view of the small co te r i e 
of men in every s t a t e , who take foreign pol icy decisions in 
ul t imate analysis*^ Bsreign pol icy i s not the manifesto of 
cherished ideals and emotional preferences of a leader o r of 
na t ion , i t i s the a r t of reconci l ing the a t t i t u d e s with the 
if 
nat ional int e re s t • 
The c ruc ia l point i s , the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of nat ional 
i n t e r e s t at a pa r t i cu l a r time by t h i s ru l ing e l i t e . The na t iona l 
i n t e r e s t has to be an amalgam of constants and var iables . '^ 
1. K#P. Misra, op» c i t . . p , 96. 
2 . E d i t o r i a l l y , Dfeitional Herald, (Lucknow), 10.'+.69. 
3« Michael Brecher, India, and Iferld P p l i t i c s . London, Oxford 
University Press , 1968, p . v i i# 
k-. Devdutta, "Kon-Alignment and India" , The Indian Journal of 
P o l i t i c a l Science^ Vol. XXIII, No. if, Oct . - Dec. 1962, p.38? 
5« K.P* Misra, O P . c i t . ^ p . XV. 
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Their importance, to a large par t depends on the s e t t i n g 
•1 
of the instruments by which they are surveyed. Nehru, 
the re fore , emphatically declared, tha t he had t r i e d to look 
2 
to the i n t e r e s t s of India , as i t was his primary duty* 
Nehru was conscious of the objective of Ind i a ' s foreign 
pol icy• He declared that every i n t e l l i g e n t person sees that 
"a narrow na t iona l policy may exci te the multitude for the 
moment jus t as the communal cry had done, but i t i s bad for 
the nation and i t i s bad i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , as we lose s ight 
of the ult imate good and thereby endanger our own good. 
Therefore, we prefer to look a f t e r Ind ia ' s i n t e r e s t s in the 
context of World cooperation and Iferld peace, in so far as the 
•i 
world peace can be preserved",- ' In sho r t , Ind ia ' s foreign 
pol icy , l og ica l ly enough i s - "cognizant of and responsive to 
k 
the wider and broader i n t e r e s t s " of India as well as of the 
World, which i s based on conception and understanding of a less 
r e a l i s t i c an i d e a l i s t l ike Hehru* 
•National in te res t i s a lso wound up inex t r i cab ly with 
economic development and interest , ' '^ On December ^ , 19 -^7 in the 
1. Robert C, Good,"National In te res t and Moral Theory: The 
•Debate" among Contemporary Rea l i s t s , " in Roger Hilsman 
and Robert C. Good ( e d s , ) , gpreign Policy in S i x t i e s . 
Baltimore, I965, p . 271. 
2 . Dorothy Korman, Nehru: The Fi rs t Sixty Years ^ Bombay ^ 1 , 1965, 
No. 10, p . if73. 
3 . Nehru, oP. c i t . . p . 28. 
h» K.P. Misra, op. cit.. p. xvii. 
5. Adda B* Bozeman, op. cit.^ p. 38. 
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Constituent Assembly, Ifehru said that in ult imate analysis 
the foreign policy ought to be the outcome of the economic 
pol icy , as foreign policy w i l l be r a the r vague, inchoate, and 
groping, without being governed by economic pol icy . "Surviva l" 
and "Security'^had been the na t iona l i n t e r e s t of Ind ia . She 
wanted su rv iva l , external and i n t e r n a l s tabi l i ty_,otherwise , 
India had no empire to hold, no trade monopoly to pe rpe tua te , 
no ocean routes to safeguard, no i n t e rna t i ona l commitments or 
vested i n t e r e s t s ' to preserve except Kashmir and no ideology 
to s e l l , but somehow India l i ke other s t a t e s i s not engaged 
3 in quest for power. 
In shor t , i t i s a pol icy influenced by a v a r i e t y of 
If < 
f ac to r s . It, i s a v/ell "thought out" and "del ibera te policy"* 
"It i s a pol icy" , declared Nehru on December 9, 1958, in the 
Lok Sabha during the reply to debate on li^eign Affa i rs , "inherent 
in the circumstances of India , inherent in the past thinking of 
India , inherent in the circumstances of the World t o d a y . » . . " 
1, J«L* Nehru, Jiidependence and After . A co l l ec t ion of speeches, 
19^6-if9. New York, 1950, p . 201, 
2* For d e t a i l s in assessing "Security" as the basis of na t ional 
i n t e r e s t see , J* Bondyopadhyaya, O P . c i t . ^ pp. 9-l5» 
3 . Devdutta, op. c i t , . p . 388« 
k» Nehru, OP. c i t , . p , 197, (Jtom Speech in Rajya Sabha on a 
p r iva te members r e s o l u t i o n ' s on nuclear explosions, 
May 2if, 1957). 
5» Ibid.T p . 196,<^om Speech in the Lok Sabha on the Defence 
Ministers resolut ion on nuclear explosions, Kay 22, 1957^. 
6 . I b i d . , p . 80» 
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MAIN TENETS OF KiRBIGN POLICY 
I t i s c lear from the above that Ind ia ' s foreign pol icy 
i s the lapst important legacy of Nehru. I t i s h is most, ou ts tan-
ding contr ibut ion to India which made him the path finder of 
1 
the newly l i be r a t ed countries of east and west. South and North. 
Certain pr inciples are defined by Nehru which fonn the 
corner stone of Ind ia ' s foreign po l i cy . These pr inc ip les are 
not a matter of abstract de f in i t ions but of de f in i t e goaEs. 
Foreign policy can not be grandiose, uni ta ry or a comprehensive 
2 
algebraic formula in t h i s complex world. 
The pr inc ipa l source of Indian foreign a f fa i r s i s 
nei ther Hinduism, Buddhism, Gandhianism, the kfestern European 
t r a d i t i o n , nor a r a t i ona l analys is of r e a l i t y in terms of Ind i a ' s 
long range na t ional i n t e r e s t , but i t i s the complex biography 
If 
•i 
of Nehru.-• Apart from the predominant role of Nehru in 
determining i t , the role of o ther factors i s not inconsequent ia l . 
1 . P.G. J o s h i . "The Nehru Legacy", Mainstream I I I ,No . 39 
May 29, 1 9 D 5 , p . l8 
2 . J .D . Se th i , "National Secur i ty" , Seminar. No.77, Jan . 1966, 
p . 28. Also s ee , T.A. Nizaffii, "The Architect of Modern 
India" , Aligarh Muslim University Gazette. June 30, 196^ 
that Nehru's foreign pol icy was not a "S ta t ic Concept" but 
a "dynamic process" - "evolving, changing and upholding 
i t s e l f t© meet the exigencies of t ime", 
3 . Adda B. Bozeman, op. c i t . ^ p . 32 . Also see , K, Sadchidanand 
Murthy, " India ' s Bbreign Pol icy: Ideological Moorings", 
Indian Foreign Policy^ Calcut ta , 196^, pp . 1-8. 
^ . K.P. Misra, op. c i t . ^ E d i t o r ' s In t roduct ion, p . VI I I , 
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I t moans the inevi table determinants of the foreign pol icy 
namely h i s t o r y , geography, c u l t u r a l background, economic 
o 
po t en t i a l , s t r a t e g i c pos i t i on , mi l i t a ry pjwer and i t s t o t a l 
power pos i t ion also can not be overlooked. 
PRESEHVATION OF PEACE 
The preservat ion of p e a c e / i s the cen t r a l aim of Ind i a ' s 
po l icy . I t i s in pursuit of t h i s policy that India has chosen 
the path of non-alignment in any mi l i ta ry or l ike pact of 
a l l i a n c e . This preservat ion and the enlargement of peace 
formed the backbone of Ind ia ' s pol icy because^ for economic 
r econs t ruc t i on ,po l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and bringing up socialism 
in India , India needed t r anqu i l atmosphere within and without . 
Moreover, PEACE, has been the keyword in Indian cu l t u r e . Every 
prayer of an Indian ends in the desire for peace. Thus, the 
primary goal (of India ' s pol icy) has been the maintenance and 
p 
promotion of in te rna t iona l peace and s ecu r i t y , ou r present 
policy flows from the pas t , while inc iden ta l ly i t also helps 
1. Cited in J.W. Burton, In te rna t iona l Re la t ions . Cambridge, 
1965, p .206, Also see l e h r u , O P . c i t . ^ p . 220, where Kehru 
shows the concern of every nat ion in the pursui t of peace 
in a speech in the U.N. General Assembly, New York, Oct.3, 
i960. Also see p . 56, which enuncia tes , "If we can t i l t the 
balance towards peace, i t wi l l be a great service to the 
world". Also seei^The most outstanding effor ts in ensuring 
peace i s that 195^, Agreement on Tibet which enunciates the 
Five pr inc ip les of Panch Sheel.Aii a«cd, "By th i s agreement 
we ensure peace to a very large extent in a cer ta in area of 
Asia. I would earnest ly wish that t h i s area of peace, could 
be spread over the res t of Asia and indeed over the res t of 
the world". Nehru, op. c i t . j p . 30^-. (From speech during 
debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, May 15, 1951+). 
2 . M.S. Rajan, "Foreign Policy in Action, 195lf-56" India 
Quarterly , Ju ly -Sep t . , 196O, p.213. Also see , Jawaharlal 
Nehru's Speeches, - l^k-^-^^^ Second Impression, The Publicat ion 
Division, New Delhi, p . I67 
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the Baintenance of peace and the avoidance of war in the 
present day world. Peace i s a lso the main mantra for the 
so l i t a ry l eader ,^ Nehru who e x p l i c i t l y mentioned, "our main 
stake in world a f fa i r s i s peace • . . • " ^ fe want at l e a s t two 
decades of peace in order to be able to develop our resources . 
Nohru was very cer ta in of the fact that every one wants peace. 
The great power blocs and the t i n y developing na t ions , a l l want 
and t a lk of peace• I t i s a qua l i t y , i t i s a way, an approach 
and ob jec t ive , Nehru almost pass ionate ly wished "peace" for 
his "One World 
KOU-ALIGMENT 
1. 5 
The card ina l feature of I nd i a ' s foreign policy i s the 
policy of non-alignment. Nehru pioneered i t in the world of 
the developing na t ions , hence almost in every foreign po l icy 
1« I b i d . , p . 195 
2 , Michael Brecher, op, c i t . , p» l 5 l 
3 , Nehru, op . c i t . . p . ^ . Also s ee , Vijayalaxmi Pandi t , 
India ' s Bbreign Policy, "Foreign Affa i r s" , Vol. 3 ^ , No. 3 
Apri l 1956, p . ^33, where she speci f ies that t h i s approach 
of peace i s India ' s t r a d i t i o n a l phi losophical and 
h i s t o r i c a l outlook, 
h, Nehru, O P . c i t . . p . 56. Also see P. Trikamardas, "India 
and Empire", P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, Oct.-Dec. 1938 
pp. 607-8. 
5. Ibid.^ p . 11 , 
6, Jbr d e t a i l s see , Independence and After . A Collect ion of 
more Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru> Sopt. 19'4-6. 
Delhi 19'+9> p . 199• Also see , K.P. Misra, "The concept 
of Non-alignment: I t s Implications and Recent Trends", 
in K.P. Misra (ed.) op. c i t . . p . 9 1 . Nehru - Nasser and 
U Nu are cal led "high p r i e s t s of non-alignment. Ibid., p . 96, 
Ih 
speech by Mehru, there i s an i n s i s t en t proclaim and adorat ion 
for t h i s policy* On Sept, 7 , 19^6, in his f i r s t broadcast to 
the nation Nehru sa id , "we propose, as far as poss ib le , to 
keep away from the power p o l i t i c s of groups, aligned against 
one another , which have led in the past t o , world wars and which 
may again lead to d i sas te r s on an even vas ter scale 1' 
In the post war e r a , dreadful antagonism exis ted 
between the two great powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. . 
Nehru was ful ly conscious of t h i s v i t a l and menacing d i v i s i o n . 
The two blocs were a t daggers' dr%wn on every ma^or and minor 
issue that the world was confronted with* This gave b i r t h 
and sustenance to OOLD ^ K4R, which became the stayk r e a l i t y 
a f t e r the Wbrld-J«feir I I , East and the iffest formed two warring 
2 
camps. I t i s des i rab le , Kehru declared, "for a l l the countr ies 
not to i n s i s t , not to lay s t r e s s on separate groups and separate 
blocs".- ' The two blocs always appeared hos t i l e and on the verge 
of var , Nehru rea l i sed the adverse consaquencGs of cold-war 
phenomenon and concluded that i t i s ba. Ind ia ' s benefit and 
* U- lit 1"he» 
nat ional i n t e r e s t to remain aloof from bloc p o l i t i e s . 
1* Nehru, OP. c i t . . p . 2 
2 . Pbr d e t a i l s see , T.A. Nizarai, op» c i t . . p . 27. 
3 - Nehru op . c i t * . p . 11 , 
h» Jbr d e t a i l s see , K.P. Misra, "The Ooncept of non-alignment: 
I t s Implications and Recent Trends", in K.P. Misra (ed . ) 
OP. c i t .T pp, 95-97. 
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time of independence, India was economically under developed 
and p o l i t i c a l l y at sixes and sevens. Thus, for economic 
recohstruct ion and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , India needed economic 
and mi l i t a ry ass is tance from a l l quarters« Nehru v/as against 
a t taching India to any p a r t i c u l a r group,'' This ex te rna l 
i so la t ion has given to India ample opportunity to remain 
engaged in i n t e r n a l reconstruct ion against i n t e rna t iona l 
b ipolar isa t ion*^ I t was u t t e r l y r e a l i s t i c "for India to avoid" 
false step "of bloc - entanglement and Nehru did i t consciously. 
Thus Nehru was earnest in developing a dfefinite foreign po l i cy 
for the country in the l i gh t of f luid conditions of the world.^ 
Nehru wanted that India should become the world 's leading 
neu t r a l i s t power. Generally, the pursui t of peace, l i b e r a t i o n 
of subject peoples , e l iminat ion of r a c i a l discr iminat ion and 
furtherance of in t e rna t iona l peace and secur i ty are the object ives 
for a l l nations to pursue, India endeavoured to a t t a i n these 
objec t ives , not through ge t t ing aligned with the great power 
b locs , but through an independent approach, a pol icy of non-
alignment. I t caused a great dea l of misunderstanding in the USA. 
1* Nehru, O P . c i t , . p , 2?, (From speech in the Constituent 
Assembly, Dec. 4 , 19^A 
2 . I t i s not i so l a t ion as such but ju s t the pol icy of having 
an unjaundiced outlook, s e e , Vijayalaxmi, op . c i t . , p . ^33• 
3 . Ibid*, p . 29."Even a f t e r ten years of t h i s avowed po l i cy , 
the pol icy of non-alignment remained va l id . . . no 
responsible person has suggested remotely, tha t there should 
be a change in Ind ia ' s basic pol icy , the pol icy of peace 
and the pol icy of non-alignment? Statement by P^ank Anthony, 
Lok Sabha Debate Nov. 6, 1959» Second Se r i e s , No. 9 , Vol, 
XXXV, Gol. 1937* 
h-, Peter Lyon, "Neutralism as State Pol icy; The case for India" , 
K.P. Misra (ed. ) OP, c l t . f p . 89, 
5» B,N, Ghakravarti , India. Speaks to America^ Bombay, Orient 
Longmans, 1966, p . oT 
16 
The policy of non-alignment is- an a s se r t ion of independence and 
democratic r ight of freedom of ac t ion whereas n e u t r a l i t y or 
i so la t ionism, stems from ind i f fe rence . 
In India , non-alignment received applau^from almost 
a l l quar te r s , Nehru accepted non-alignment as a part of 
independence of judgement on the bas is of meri ts of an issue* 
He said that even from the point of view of opportunism and 
independent judgement, s t r a igh t forward and honest policy i s 
-I 
the "best po l i cy" . Clarifying what i s non-alignment Nehru 
asked, "What does joining a bloc mean? After a l l i t can only mean 
one th ing: give up your view about a p a r t i c u l a r question, adopt 
the other p a r t y ' s view on that question in order to please i t 
and gain i t s favour the question only a r i s e s when we are 
opposed to i t on that po in t , therefore we give up our view point 
p 
and adopt the o ther one in order to gain favour". Nehru was 
pa r t i cu la r to emphasise that non-alignment did not mean i s o l a t i o n . 
When he said that we should not a l i gn ourselves with any power b loc , 
*• I b i d . , p . 35 
2 . I b i d , , p . 36 
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i t does not amount to mean that we should not be closer in 
our r e la t ion with a l l coun t r i e s . 
Kon-alignment to Hehru was something p o s i t i v e , dyrtaiic 
and def ini te* I t i s not in ' i t s e l f a pol icy but i t was "a par t 
of pol icy" .^ I t was not " s i t t i n g on the fence"^ and i t was not 
sheer opportunism and wooing of the desired country. However, 
t h i s policy should not be confused with n e u t r a l i t y , as 
neu t r a l i t y operates during war. I t i s more r e s t r i c t e d in i t s 
impl icat ions , "We are only uncommitted to ce r t a in p r i n c i p l e s , 
k 
pol ic ies and ob jec t ives" . 
Ind ia ' s desire based on i t s na t iona l i n t e r e s t stems 
from the r e a l i s a t i o n of i t s own weaknesses-economic and 
military. '^ The other j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t s pol icy i s i t s 
s t r a t eg i c pos i t ion and geographical s i t u a t i o n , India cannot 
a l ign with Communist groups for the obvious reason of the 
presence of Pakis tan, her enemy number one and the Wfestern a l l y , 
in the same way. She cannot a l ign with the west for the mighty 
presence of China, the monster of blue a n t s , ° 
Jjidia's policy has not denied her the opportunity to 
pa r t i c ipa te f ree ly in world a f f a i r s . Our pol icy i s not a 
passive pol icy or a negative po l i cy , was Nehru's asser t ion in h is 
1, I b i d . , p . 1+7, Also s ee , M.M. Rehman, P o l i t i c s of 
Non^Alignment. New Delhi , Associatgd Publishing House, I969. 
2» Ibid.^ p . 79 
3 . I b id . , p . 80 
^m B.N, Ghakravarti, OP. cit.. p, 12. 
5. Ibid,y p . 13 , 
6, A. Appadorai, opy c i t . y p . U66 
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speech in the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 19'+8. In short, 
Kehru concluded it as follows, "It is positive, constructive 
policy deliberately aiming at something and deliberately trying 
to avoid hostility to other countries, to any country as far as 
2 
possible". 
Nehru was not i n s i s t en t on the point tha t India should 
play a dominant role in world a f f a i r s . India was not to acquire 
a predominant posi t ion* I f ever India was to play a part i n 
world a f fa i r s she should be mindful of her own s t r eng th , 
problems and country*s a f f a i r s* National i n t e r e s t can not be 
put a t s t ake . Nehru c l a r i f i ed tha t India did not want to 
in te r fe re in i n t e rna t iona l a f f a i r s , except where she fe l t tha t 
in tervent ion might help others or where something affected India 
directly*-^ Non-alignment has been Ind ia ' s dis t inguished mark 
through which worlds' a t t e n t i o n i s a t t r a c t e d towards Ind ia . 
1. Nehru, OP. c i t . . p . 32« Also s e e , p . lUBf where Nehru says 
that our pol icy i s not "escapism" those who think that "our 
policy i s inane . . • , are mistaken", (From reply to debate 
in the Constituent Assembly on India ' s decision to remain in 
the Coninonwealth of Nations, May 17, 19^9)• 
2* Ibid»y p . k-^0 The r i se of non-alignment in the i n t e rna t i ona l 
world i s compared with the r i s e of adult suffrage on the 
nat ional scene . In theory, any nat ion can adhere to non-
alignment but in practi^re, i t was l a rge ly confined to the 
emerging nations of Asia and Africa who had been and continue 
to be the weaker nations of the world, G.R.K. "Content of 
Non-Alignment", Mainstream , V. No.8, Oct . 22, 196^+, p . 9 
3 . Ibid.y p . 70 
h» Nehru, op. c i t . , p . 82 . (From Speech at the Bangalore Session 
of the Indian National Congress Sadasivnagar, Jan . 17, I960) , 
Also see Rajdoot, "Sunlight on the Summit or Sunset?" 
Mainstream, Vol. V, Ife, 8 , October 22, 196^, p . 15. Where the 
author maintained that in 1950's non-alignment played a big 
role as i t was sui ted to a bipolar world. I t s function v/as 
that of a "bridge" between the tv/o cold war camps. 
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India was also in teres ted in the Asian up l i f t with 
the resul t tha t the Asian Relations Conference was convened 
at New Delhi, on March 23, 19*+?, a t a time when the world was 
standing on the "threshold of a new i^iod of h i s to ry" and 
"dynamic Asia"^was to take new ventures* But India did not 
want to create a t h i r d power h l o c . " in the f i r s t place i t i s 
not feasible to create an effect ive t h i r d bloc strong enough 
in a mi l i t a ry sense , due to the fact that a l l the uncommitted 
countries would appear pygmy-like , compared to e i t h e r of the 
two g ian t s , secondly, such a bloc would be undesi rable , as 
i t would not serve the mighty cause of peace, , . , , n e x t , ' a 
policy of non-alignment implies non-alignment of the uncommitted 
countries with one another. 
Among the non-aligned, India occupies a posi t ion of 
eminence as India was one of the e a r l i e s t countries to adopt 
non-alignment and l a t e r , i t was regarded as the yard-s t ick to 
gauge independence of a new nation in i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs.-^ 
•^ * Ibid.^ p . 2 ^ , In an inaugural address at the Asian 
Relations Conference, New Delhi . March 23 , 19^7 where 
Nehru l a id down new idea ls for Asia and Asians and expected 
Asia "to function e f fec t ive ly in the maintenance of peace", 
page 251« He said that Asia should, "cooperate together 
for tha t l a rger i dea l ' of "one world", p . 252. 
2 . B.N, Ghakravarti . pp. c i t « . p . 1^ . 
3 . "The Problem, " SemingLr^  No. 11^ J an , 1966, p . 1 1 . 
Indian non-alignment i s often compared with the pol icy 
of non-entangling a l l i ances of l^feishington. Wferner Levi 
drew a t t e n t i o n to t h i s point of s t r i k i n g p a r a l l e l . 
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Nehru dreaded that alignment and pactomania had yielded 
undesirable r e su l t s to the world, in the l a s t few y e a r s . 
The spread of th i s policy to Asia has not added to the world 's 
s ecu r i t y . I t has deviated people from thinking on economic 
progress and developing minor s t rength and bols tered up 
countries by mi l i ta ry means which can only be temporary. I t 
had ra ther retarded the progress of a country. 
In f a c t , the s t r a t e g i c aims of a l l the non-aligned 
nations ought to arrange a detente between the two hos t i l e 
2 blocs and somehow India did i t . The p o l i t i c s of non-alignment 
i s the p o l i t i c s of peace, a s t a t e of m i l i t a r y as well as 
economic powerlessness and des i re for s u r v i v a l . Moreover,this 
policy was more a c t i v i s t i c and pa r t i c i pa t i ng than the 
independent and the peace-area approach. Undoubtedly, non-
alignment was developed as a measure to face the cold-war in 
the world. Miatever may be t r u e , the fact remains that for 
India the pol icy remained thoroughly unchanged,-^ In the 
beginning t h i s policy brought dividends to India , l a t e r i t 
k 
s ta r ted earning indifference and h o s t i l i t y of big powers. 
1. Ifehru, op. c i t . , p . 98 . 
2 . The Problem, op. c i t . ^ p . 11 
3 . Devdutta, op. c i t . . pp. 397, 3 8 1 . 
h, Ibid.^ p . 393* Also see , B.N, Chakravarti , op. c i t . p.8 
for the same argument how the non-alignment created 
misunderstanding against India in the U.S.A. 
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Despite remaining non-aligned, India played a commendable role 
in Korean-episode and a lso as the Caiairman for Indo-China. 
Nehru devised i t so as to meet a l l contingencies that may 
confront India• 
While i t i s probably t rue to say that the in ten t ions 
of Ind ia ' s pol icy makers have remained broadly the same since 
19^7, the a c t u a l course of Ind i a ' s n e u t r a l i s t policy has gone 
through three s t a g e s , ' During the years 19^7-50, India was 
preoccupied with immediate tasks flowing from the newly 
achieved independence. Domestic and foreign pol icy tasks were 
closely l inked , India showed strong f a i t h in co rd i a l t i e s with 
Bri ta in and championed Indonesian independence. Indian 
iSeutralism seemed to be pro*-West<arn. 
From 1951 to ^6, India pursued a f a i r l y act ive 
mediatorial role and moved from a western oriented neutralism 
towards a more posi t ive middle-of- the-road-posi t ion. The 
strength and l imi ta t ions of Indian n e u t r a l i s t diplomacy were 
shown by her act ion or inact ion on such issues as Ebrean, 
Indo-Chinese, and Suez wars and Hungarian r e so lu t ion . In 
th i s period, Ind ia ' s r e l a t ions with Russia and China showed 
signs of improvement, with U.S.A. de te r io ra t ion and with Br i ta in 
showed f luc tua t ions , P^ om June. 19^2, there was a new note of 
1. Brecher reports tha t" the term to describe Indian foreign 
pol icy has undergone frequent changes. I t began with 
"neu t r a l i t y" or 'dynamic n e u t r a l i t y ' , l a t e r became 
'neut ra l i sm' and then 'non-al ignment ' . Kehru prefers the 
phrase ' pos i t ive policy for peace ' , he told the author 
in ^ew DeUii on June 13 1956". Michael Brecher, pp , c i t . , 
p . 563• 
2 . For d e t a i l s see , K.P. Karunakaran, India in Uprld.AfTairs^ 
1950-53, Bombay, 1958, and also Brecher, op. c i t .Chapter 
19* 
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cr i t ic i sm in the Indian Government's reac t ion to Vfestern 
a l l i a n c e s . India cons is ten t ly expressed her disapproval of 
almost a l l the western a l l i ances and of western colonial empires, 
Indian diplomacy had two working assumptions that f i r s t l y , 
the Asian a f f a i r s should be decided by Asians and secondly, 
a l l the remaining vest iges of colonialism must be crushed. 
The pol icy pursued during t h i s period favoured and 
improved r e l a t ions with Communist CShina. India at t h i s period 
was developing a world role as was evident from advising s e t t l e -
ments for the Asian and Algerian quest ions , her i n i t i a t i v e s in 
proposing Ifor. a world disarmament agreement beginning with a 
nuclear t e s t ban, her acceptance of the chairmanship of the 
committee appointed to supervise the implementation of the "195^ 
Geneva agreements on Laos, and her ac t ive role in the meetings 
of the Colombo- Powers and at Bandung in Apr i l 1955> l"h«jsthere 
was meeting with Tito and Nasser at Broni in Yugoslovia. In the 
U.N, th i s bloc became more unweildy and Ind ia ' s undisputed 
leadership began to diminish. Later , the l imi ta t ions of Ind ia ' s 
mediatory role were soon to became c lear as^v/ith the eruption 
of the Suez and Hungarian c r i ses in 1956, Ind i a ' s n e u t r a l i s t 
po l ic ies were l e s s effect ive than during the Korean and Indo-
Ghina wars* 
Another factor which was influencing the course of 
1» I b i d . . p . 81+ 
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Indian pol icy was the development of Soviet aid programmes to 
India from 1 9 ^ onwards J Thus hy the end of 1956, India 
had evolved a neu t r a l i s t foreign policy,recognised by both the 
cold war camps as independent, and i f only by contrast with 
the year 19U-7-5lj i t Sfeemed to be s l i g h t l y incl ined towards 
the Soviet bloc*^ From 1957, India tended to content v;ith a 
ra ther quie ter role i n t e rna t i ona l l y , in con t r a s t , with Egypt 
and Yugoslavia to be more moderate, l e s s s t r i d e n t l y r a d i c a l 
and r e v i s i o n i s t , even on an t i«colonia l i ssues* These cont ras ts 
were more evident during 1960-62.-^ Since October 19^2, the 
dispute with China had made a l l other i ssues subordinate, 
/ 
After one and a ha l f decadef of hard won freedom,the 
f i r s t t e s t of non-alignment occurred when; the Chinese invasion-^ 
took p lace . In the context of t h i s loca l i sed Sino-Indian Vfeir, 
non-alignment played the role of keeping out of cold-war from 
South-jlsian region, where India and China, the biggest and the 
largest countr ies were at dagger 's drawn. In the same vein , tl 
e d i t o r i a l of the Indian Express of November 29, 1962 declared 
!• I b i d . , p . bh 
2, See Brecher, op. c i t . , pp. 582-8 
3# Peter Lyon, OP. c i t . ^ p . S5 
'+. I b i d , . p . 86 
5, Satyanand Sinha, China S t r i k e s . London, Blandford Press , 
196M-, p , 77 _» » 
6. The Times of India,(New Delhi) , 2 7 . 8 . 1963 
2h 
that the Chinese aggression on Ind ia ' s borders has swept away 
an'4ccuinulated cobwebs and d i s i l l u s i o n s . A few people held that 
in the new si tuations,non-alignment has become a l l the more 
relevant and a few held to the contrary . The U.S.A. has been 
highly c r i t i c a l of non-alignment^^ which India followed as a 
diplomatic necess i ty and moral imperat ive. Despite the 
re luctance, U.S.A. came for th with massive aid to Ind ia . 
A question hast often been raised that a f t e r the Chinese 
a t tack India should have abandaned non-alignment. Almost from 
a l l quarters of public opinion, p r e s s , journals and the Parl iament, 
a hue and cry was raised that India should get aligned with the 
west, as USSR remained aloof and cold^whereas the US responded 
to the Indian cry with warmth and favour.^ The United ICingdom 
and USA deserve great <gredit for not asking the Indian Republic 
to abandon non-alignment. But the prospects of Ind ia ' s alignment 
with the Vest became bleak when "the most Soc i a l i s t of a l l 
Socialists*^ the Chinese fos ter bro ther , USSR emerged as favouring 
1. The Indian Exiaress^ (New Delhj^, 29 .11 . 1962 
2 . yerner Levi, "Sbreign Pol icy: The S h a s t r i Era" Eastern life r i d . 
London, Sept . Oct. 1966, p . IV. He held the viev/ that Indian 
non-alignment i s in d i re necess i ty of revis ion in a mult ipolar 
world of today as compared to bipolar during post war e r a . 
3 . B. N. Chakravarti , op. c i t . . p.22 
^' I b i d . , p . 2 3 . An American study published in August 1962, 
showed c l ea r ly that India had received more foreign a i d , 
in sheer money terms from both the Soviet Union and United 
States than any other s t a t e . A volume of testimony about 
foreign aid given before the House of Representative 
appropriat ion Sub-Committee ea r ly in I962 was published in 
August 1962. The Times (London) 3 0 . 8 . I962, Hote K.P.Misra-
The Table, p . 87T 
5. Ib id . , p . 23 
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India in the Sino-Indian ( i l l u s i o n . Hence the question of 
abandoning non-alignment became less per t inent in the l i g h t of 
the dividends i t received in get t ing aid from both the cold war 
contending p a r t i e s . 
The pol icy of peaceful coexistence i s c losely linked 
with non-alignment* I t i s a lso a na tu ra l outcome of Ind ia ' s 
re l ig ious and soc ia l background. 
Since the signing of the nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, 
thaw in cold-war i s obvious, a question i s askod about the 
v a l i d i t y and f u t i l i t y of non-^alignment, The blocs have come 
closer in the f i r s t half of the l a s t decade. A few hold that 
when reapproachment i s a t t a i n e d , non-alignment and peaceful 
coexistence would become the order of the day. Xet i t i s 
imperative that non-alignment be adjusted to changed conditions 
of modern in t e rna t iona l world* 
After the death of Nehru, Shas t r i rea f f i rmedyhis support 
to Nehru's po l icy . He followed Nehru's foot-s teps in a l l r e spec t s . 
Though th i s r e spons ib i l i t y was too great to be borne by Shas t r i . ^ 
1» Ibid«t p . 25. India received promises of mi l i t a ry hardware 
from the Soviet Union, cf. about the v a l i d i t y of non-alignment 
G.R.K,, op. ci t«^ p.9« 
2 . I b i d . , p . 36 . 
3 . I b i d . , p . 37 
h, K.P. Misra, op. c i t . . p . 102. 
5, Lok Sabha Debates. Sept . l^ f, 196^, Third Se r i e s , Vol.XXXIII 
No.6, IX Session, Column lU-59. Also see,ijehru, op. c i t « . p ,80 , 
where Nehru emphatically predic ted , ". . . . 1 am quite convinced 
that whoever might have been in-charge of the foreign a f fa i r s 
of India and whatever par ty might have been in power in India , 
they could not have deviated very much from th i s pol icy" . 
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This new Prime Minis ter , was not ready to deviate from 
what Nehru s a i d , Shas t r i reaffirmed tha t non-alignment would 
continue to be the fundamental basis of I n d i a ' s approach to world 
problems and our r e la t ions with other coun t r i e s , HJi^_JIukerJ5e__ 
i s ci ted to have s ta ted in the debate in Lok Sabha that Shas t r i 
has to bear the mantle of r e spons ib i l i t y which has fa l l en on him 
due to passing away of the overpowering pe rsona l i ty of Nehru. 
Moreover, i t must be borne in mind that whatever the terra denoted, 
the government of India ' s pol icy towards the cold war has 
3 
throughout remained unchanged in substance, Shas t r i himself 
declared that there would be no deviat ion from the l i n e s of the 
If policy l a i d down by Kehru, 
To some ex ten t , continued adherence to the so-ca l led 
policy of non-alignment in both eras obscured a l t e r a t i o n s in the 
substance of I nd i a ' s foreign po l i cy . But the c r i t i c i sm in 
o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s , questions and doubts have \>reakened the usefulness 
of non-alignment as a dogma. Myron Weiner i s quoted to have said 
that today to be aligned with every body seems to be aligned with 
nobody. Towards the end of Hehru era and throughout the Shas t r i • 
1. Lok Sabha Debates. September 15, 196^, Third S e r i e s , Vol. 
XXXIII, Ko.6, IX Session, Column lbOl+, Statement by K.CPant 
that he was a "good man". 
2 . Michael Edwards, " I l lus ion and Rea l i ty in Ind ia ' s Jbreign 
Pol icy", in K.P. Misra (ed . ) op. c i t . . p . 215» 
3 . Devdutta, OP . c i t . . p.p 297-38O, 
h. Informal Le t te r , Talks of Shas t r i with Br i t i sh Prime Minister 
Churchi l l , London, Deci., I96I+. 
5. I b i d . , p . 185 
6. I b i d . , p . 186 
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e r a , non-alignment was s t r ipped of i t s missionary connotat ions. 
During th i s period non-alignment was^t-ended to turn into 
2 non-involvement . 
The most sol id r e a l i t y of post-Nehru- era was the 
l ingering of non-alignment*^ I t was, however, noticed that 
Shast r i searched for a new pol icy while in the meantime he d i n g e d 
k 
to the remaants of the o ld . Now the foreign policy tended to 
turn from appeals to the world to the implementation of concrete 
i n t e r e s t s such as production of weapons, the purchase of war 
I , 
mater ia l and the building of s t r a t e g i c roads . The foreign pol icy 
shif ted to realism from romantic idealism* 
• The reasons about t h i s mild change were obvious. The 
foremost among them was the gradual and inevi table awakening of 
India to , the r e a l i t i e s of in t e rna t iona l p o l i t i c s . The concept of 
Asian So l ida r i ty vanished in the r e a l i s a t i o n of inevi table h o s t i l i -
t i e s among them. In the changed circumstances, Nehru's idea of an 
area of peace for the South and the SoutfrSast-Asia turned out to be 
a 'dhimera ' . There were born conf l ic ts of nat ional i n t e r e s t . The 
developments in the course of i n t e rna t iona l p o l i t i c s detained India 
!• I b i d . , p . 186. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 187. 
3 . I b i d . , p . 223 
h-. Ib id . 
5. Werner Levi, op« c i t . , p . 187, 
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to perform the leadership function e i t h e r in her region or in 
the world which she assigned to hersel f during the f i r s t decade 
of her freedom. The second reason for change appeared to be the 
gradual disappeai^T^^ce of the p re requ i s i t e s for successful non-
alignment. This reduced the pol icy to more modest proportions 
during the Shas t r i era* 
imiA AKD THE MITKD NATIONS ORGANISATION. 
Nehru has been most emphatic and equivocal in 
1 
according his staunch support to the United Nations Organisat ions . 
As ea r ly as in 19^6, Nehru declared, "towards the United Nations, 
Ind ia ' s a t t i t u d e i s that of whole-hearted cooperation and unre-
served adherence in both s p i r i t and l e t t e r to the char ter governing 
i t . To that end, India w i l l pa r t i c ipa te fu l ly in i t s various 
a c t i v i t i e s and endeavour to play that role in i t s councils to 
which her geographical pos i t i on , population and contr ibut ion 
2 
towards peaceful progress e n t i t l e s her" . For t h i s s o l i t a r y 
symbol of Hope j-^ the main purpose i s the maintenance of i n t e r -
nat ional peace and s e c u r i t y . For the uncommitted nations l ike India 
1. Nehru, op. c i t . p.166. Nehru sa id , " that we adhere 
completely and absolu te ly to the p r inc ip les and purposes 
of the United Nations Charter and tha t we s h a l l t r y , to the 
best of our a b i l i t y to work for the r e a l i s a t i o n of those 
p r inc ip les and purposes." (From Speech in the United Nations 
General Assembly, P a r i s , Nov. 3 , 19^8). 
2 . Ja fa r Raza Bilgrami, "India and the United Nations", The 
Indian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science. Vol. XXVI, No. 2 , 
ApriF-June 1965, p . 52. 
3 . Nehru, op. c i t . . p . l67.(From Message broadcast by the U.N. 
Hadio network from Lake Success, New York, May 5, 195(31 
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i t i s a greater source of i n s p i r a t i o n . 
India i s in favour of U*ll,*s mediatory r o l e , as the 
U,N, succeeded in i t s e f for t s to ease tension in Congo, Korea and 
Cuba,^ moreover the task of disarmament also receives a t t e n t i o n 
in the U.N.^. India feels that i t i s not only a debating body 
hut also an i n s t i t u t i o n which has undertaken a very heavy task 
If 
and solved some of the r e a l l y d i f f i c u l t problems. Likewise 
Nehru fe l t tha t in Tibetan episode in 1950, the U.N. should 
intervene because of the v i o l a t i o n of human r igh t s and aggression 
-the re 4-^  —- - ~~ 
Nehru in very c lear te rms,es tabl i shed his close 
cooperation and sense of attachment "to the UJJD, He looked at 
the United Nations as an e s s e n t i a l Vtorld Organisation to maintain 
peace. The pr inc ip les of the UNO,when they aspire to do away 
7 
with problems l ike colonial ism, r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n / and 
es tab l i sh in th i s world, se l f -determinat ion and achieve economic 
development-attract India more than the i ssues l ike Capitalism 
versus Communism, German-Unification and the l ibe ra t ion of 
o 
satellites• 
1. Bilgrami, op . c i t . ^ p . 52* 
2. Nehru, O P . cit.,^ p . 222.(From Speech in the U.N. General 
Assembly, New York, October 3 , 196(^1 
3 . I b i d . , p . 220. 
^ . I b i d . , p . l80.(From Speech in the lok Sabha, Nov, 22, I960). 
5 . I b i d . , p . 3lf6.CFrom Statement in the Lok Sabha in rep ly to 
a non-off ic ia l resolut ion that India should take the Tibetan 
issue to the United Nations, September ^ , 1959>« 
6. Nehru, OP. cit>. p. 63. 
7. Nehru, The Indian Annual Uegister, op. cit., pp. 252-2B« 
8. Jafar Raza Bilgrami, op. cit., p. 52 
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Lai Bahadur S h a s t r i , who seldom deviated from the 
path set by Nehru, c l a r i f i ed the same a t t i t u d e in an interview 
where, i t i s maintained that the United Nations had won the 
support of en t i r e non-aligned group and i t s paramount importance 
had been recognised. The United Nations i s mentioned in every 
chapter of the Cairo-Declaration* It i s , the re fore , through 
the United Nations with which the non-aligned group has iden t i f i ed 
i t s common cause, the proposals of the Cairo-Conference would be 
carried forward. This Cairo-Conference has provided for consul-
t a t i on among the non-aligned countries a t each session of the 
UiilLeQ Nalluiis in Lhe furlherance uf-the role of the United Nations 
to preserve in te rna t iona l cooperation among the na t ions . 
"For India the United Nations with Whose creat ion t h i s 
country was closely associated and to whose char ter India fu l ly 
subscr ibes , i s l e s s a Court of appeal or a forum tha t can mete 
out ready-made j u s t i c e than the symbol of a universa l assembly 
of Nations l iv ing and working in cooperation with one a n o t h e r . . . . " 
India missed no opportunity in impressing upon the 
world organisation:. , the imperative necess i ty of tackl ing the 
problems of emerging nationhood and economic development with 
greater emphasis. India urged and influenced the hal f of Afro-
Asian members to see the organisat ion as a means of pursuing not 
1. "Great Importance of the United Nations" An Interview of 
Lai Bahadur Shas t r i , Review of In t e rna t iona l Affairs , 
Vol. X7I, January 20, 196^, No. 355, Belgrade, p . ^ . 
2 . "India and the U.K.", Link, Oct. 25, 1970. p . 16 . 
2 
31 
only for the problem of general i n t e r e s t as avoidance of war 
but a lso for the pa r t i cu l a r and pecul ia r i n t e r e s t in bringing 
to an end the vast ves t iges of foreign colonialism* In the 
p o l i t i c a l f i e l d , where peace-keeping operations were involved, 
Ind ia ' s role has been more obvious. When in 1950-51 apprehension 
of a major world conflagration over Korea was the re , India 
endeavoured to loca l i se the confl ic t and upheld the 'cause of the 
2 
Korean people to decide t h e i r fate« 
India had been against the "compulsive" character of 
the U«N, She favoured mediatory r o l e . She believed that the 
compulsive character would not help creat ing an atmosphere of 
peace. India M'.I§. a passionate supporter of the p r inc ip le of 
r a c i a l equa l i t y , fundamental human r i g h t s , equal i ty OT r igh t s 
and s ta tus for a l l and th i s passion found j u s t i f i c a t i o n in the 
Charter in provision against the r a c i a l discr iminat ion and '^  
apar the id , 
India bas ica l ly believed in the el iminat ion of want, 
disease and i l l i t e r a c y which affects badly the greater population 
of the world, India had extended i t s f u l l cooperation in the 
work of i t s special ised agencies and f i e l d s , through b i l a t e r a l 
1, Bilgrami, op. citoT P» 52 
2• Link«, op« c i t . , p• 16 
3* India and the United Nations ., New York; Manhattan 
Publishing Company', 1957» p« 1^ +^-. 
V. The United Nations Conference on In te rna t iona l Organisation, 
1, Apr i l 29, 19^5, p . 2^5« 
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arrangements and i t s approach to economic and technical 
ass i s tance . Since India i s adverse to colonial iniperialism, 
Mrs. Laxmi N. Menon, Ind ia ' s Minister of Sta te for External 
Affairs said t h a t she f e l t within herse l f the dreams, the 
throbbing hopes and the asp i ra t ions of mi l l ions of other people , 
2 
who were no b e t t e r than what India was a decade ago. For the 
achievement of the foreign pol icy ob jec t ives , India invokes the 
Ifiiited Nations as a 'Vehicle of Communication*.^ 
From the dedication to the r e a l i s a t i o n of the declared 
objefitives of Ind i a ' s foreign po l i cy , there emerged a subsidiary 
dedication to and dependence on an effect ive IBiited Nations, as 
the e s sen t i a l instriiment for t h e i r iarplementation. The U.N. stands 
for the following three main ob jec t ives : 
1, Vigilance against strong Qsceat Power po la r i sa t ion 
2. Maximisation of Moral and P o l i t i c a l aspect 
3# Maximisation of Legal aspect of the U.N. 
India emphasises the second aspect most, so she c l ings 
more to the I I , I I I , IV paragraphs of Ar t i c l e I of" the U.N. 
Charter, which are categorised under the heading of in t e rna t iona l 
cooperation.'^ 
1. Bilgrami, op. c i t . . p . $k 
2. The Statesmany Independence Supplement (New Delhi) , 
15.b . 1957. 
3 . Bilgrami, on. c i t> . p.56 
If. Boss N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi; The Diplomacy of India, 
Stanford, Oxford TJhiversity Press , 1958, p . 12. 
5. Bilgrami, OP. c i t> , p . ^^, 
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What is more re la ted to foreign pol icy is the a t t i t u d e 
of India towards the revis ion of the Cha r t e r . India considers 
an agreement between the Great Powers on matters of importance 
as indispensable . This i s a lso in consonance with the avowed 
purpose of maintenance of peace and peaceful atmosphere. India 
at taches more importance to the p r a c t i c a l organisat ion than 
to i t s s t ruc tu re and t h e o r e t i c a l p r inc ip les and the question 
of reifision of Charter, i s invar iably r e l a t ed with t h e o r e t i c a l 
aspec t . So, what i s imperative i s the smooth operation of the 
machinery of the United Nations as i t stands today. I t should 
be accorded greater importance. 
Mien the Charter \^s signed,India was one of the 28 
countries which voted for the revision of the Charter v/ithin 
10 years . Ind ia ' s delegate mostly emphasised the fact of the 
revision of the voting procedure in the secur i ty Council a f te r • 
ten yea r s . A few issues have invoked grea ter support from 
India as was the case with the representa t ion of the People 's 
Republic of China. Mr. Menon declared in the General Assembly 
that t h i s s tep would be most "subs tant ia l contr ibut ion" tov/ards 
es tab l i sh ing s t a b i l i t y in South-East-Asia and toivards providing 
for non-interference in the a f fa i r s of other s t a t e s and for 
arrangements on non-aggression, ^ and that U.W. should be open 
1. U.N. Conference on In te rna t iona l Organisation, 
Documents. YII p . 2^2, and XI, p . J+89, 
2» I b i d . , p . 172. (:From Speech at the inauguration of the 
Ninth General flonference of UNESCO, New Delhi, Nov. 5, 1956) 
3 . U.N. General Assembly, 9th Session Off ic ia l Records, lf92, ^ 
Plenary Meeting, Oct. 6, 195lf, paragraph- 10. 
3^ 
1 
to a3.1 peace loving countr ies of the world. 
On December 10, 1962, Prime Minister IJehru, in a 
l e t t e r to the U.N. Secretary-General , U. Thant, haS once again 
pledged Ind i a ' s support to the Secretary-'3eneral in a l l h is 
2 
tasks and to the pr inc ip les and purposes of the U.N. Charter . 
India accorded i t s Unflinching support to the decisions and 
aspi ra t ions of the U.N., , She gave even armed troops when India 
was asked for in case of Congo. 
India deems that the United nations should develop more 
constructive role as the "symbol of the a sp i r a t i on of the people 
t e l l i n g us to stand together and understand each o ther" , itcan not 
assure i t s task of e s tab l i sh ing an ef fec t ive instrument of 
in te rna t iona l s ecu r i ty , i f the Great Power harmony lacks otherwise. 
1. Message broadcast by the Unitgd Nations Eadio Network 
from Lafee Success,CNew York, May 5j 1950)• Also see for 
the U.N. represents "the timeless urge of humanity for 
peace", Nehru, op . c i t . ^ p . 168, (From Speech in Lok Sabha 
Jtebruary l 8 , 1953) • 
2 . News Item, The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 2 1 . 1 . 63 . I t 
a lso includes the reply of U, Thant where he confessed that 
" India has demonstrated i t s devotion of the cause of 
in t e rna t iona l peace and cooperation and i t s dedicat ion to 
the high purpose of c h a r t e r . . . . " 
3 . News Item.The Hindu (Madras), 7 ,11 .62 . I t i s reported 
that India sent about 6,000 Indian tropps to the U.N. 
India also sent troops to Ghaza s t r i p . 
M-. News Item, The Times of India ( New Delh i ) , 29 .9 , 5I+. 
Statement by S. Radhkrishnan, 
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the U.H.O. i s i l l u so ry and s e l f - d e f e a t i n g J Today, i t i s 
encouraging that despite the unrelieved f rus t r a t ion and . 
draw-backs, the U.N. remained mankind's only hope against 
war and sett lement of in te rna t iona l disputes vathout recource, 
2 
to mi l i t a ry c o n f l i c t . 
I t i s Said that Ind ia ' s role in the U.N. has been 
less conspicuous in i t s a c t i v i t y a f t e r the CJhinese invasion of 
1962» I t i s t rue to a l a rge r ex ten t , fo r , since then India 
got more obsessed in her own in t e rna l problems of utmost 
importance."^ Since then, two s ign i f ican t changes are noteworthy: 
India abandoned' i t s active sponsorship of China's claims to the 
U.N. and that the x-epresentatives of China in the U.N. should 
require two^third and not simple majori ty . Since 1962, I nd i a ' s 
tendency at the U.N. has been to take a back seat to adopt an 
a t t i t ude of self-effacement* Due to I n d i a ' s preoccupation with 
the unwanted Chinese a t t a c k , her diplomatic i n e r t i a , lack of 
i n i t i a t i v e , had allowed other countries to take her for granted. 
S t i l l the ll*Ii» i s the only ray of hope and s i l v e r l i n ing in the 
ra ther chaotic and troubled dark l^Jbrld of today,v/here shadows 
of war always loom l a r g e . The greatest t e s t of the success of 
1, Berkes, op. cit.. p. 29. 
2, "U.N. Silver Jubilee, " The Link^ 25.10.70 
3, "India and the U.N." The Link, 25.10. 70 
^. Political Commentary by Inder Malhotra, The Statesman 
New Delhi, 11,12. 196^, For the technical aid which India 
received from the U.N. See the Eastern Economist, 
January 15, 1965, XLVI in article under the caption 
"India and the U.N. Technical Assistance". 
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the U»N. in i t s 29th lear is that i t s t i l l e x i s t s . In the 
l a t e s t Arab-Israel "fer of September-October 1973, i t had done 
commendable job , saved the globe from the devastat ion of a 
th i rd World War. 
AMTI COLOl^ IALISM 
India wants freedom for every dependent na t ion . Even 
before India a t ta ined her freedom in 19^ +7» she had become a 
symbol and ca ta lys t of na t iona l self-determinat ion for most 
-I 
na t iona l i s t movements in India and elsewhere. 
Out of two sources of non-alignment there are mater ia l 
and non-material factors which include legacies of h i s t o r y and 
philosophy. The legacy of Indian h i s to ry i s two fold - a n t i -
2 
colonialism and a n t i - r a c i a l i s m . in i n t e rna t iona l conferences 
also India did not f a i l to uphold the cause of ant i -colonia l ism as 
among i s s u e s , agreed upon at Ba>ndung in 1955 there- was 
unanimous condemnation of colonial ism, Goa i s i t s f lagrant 
example• 
Extending his v/hole-hearted support to China in 
Spain in 1939, Nehru wrote that Indian react ion was not only 
on humanitarian grounds, but also to a growing r e a l i s a t i o n of 
the signif icance of the confl ictsr in the world which did not 
j u s t i f y our nat ional i n t e r e s t , Skscisra showed a mirror to 
1. Paul F. Power, "Indian Foreign Pol icy: The Age of Nehru", 
The R-eview of Po l i t i c s Vol, 26, 196lf, p . 25?. 
2 . Jbr d e t a i l s see , Brecher a r t i c l e in K.P, Hisra , op . c i t . , 
p . 52. Also see , Ibid^, p . 101 
3 . Vijai^laxmi, OP. c i t . y p . 37 . 
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imperialism which caused immense suffering to Ind ia . The 
growth of Jkscism meant,the defeat for freedom and democracy 
for which we struggled, we followed, perhaps with greater 
c l a r i t y than elsewhere, the development of Br i t i sh foreign 
policy towards cooperation with the Fascist-Povjers, thus 
our opposition to imperialism and SUscism, 
India has always diampioned the freedom of subject 
peoples and has always ra ised i t s voice against the colonia l 
and r a c i s l po l ic ies of imper ia l i s t powers. Herself being 
subjected to colonial dominations, India sympathises with 
a l l those nations v/hich are s t i l l under colonia l domination. 
The p o l i t i c a l emancipation of subject and colonia l peoples , 
has received India"^s consistent support . India wants to 
el iminate every form of colonialism from Asia. She has 
supported the independence movement in Indonesia, Algeria , 
Morocco, Tunis e t c . This pol icy also stems from Ind ia ' s 
na t ional i n t e r e s t as colonialism i s s t i l l strong and tenacious 
and as yet i t threatens the independence of India and o ther 
Asian and African countries,-^ The end of colonialism v/ould 
f a c i l i t a t e the economic and p o l i t i c a l ^development of a l l Asian 
countries including India he r se l f . This an t i - co lon ia l stance 
1. Friedman, "Indian Nationalism and the Far -i^ast", 
Pac i f ic Affairs , March 19^0, pp. 2^ -5 . 
2 . For d e t a i l s see , Bandyopadhayaya J OQ. c i t , pp. 69-71. 
3 . V. Hi Phharain, " Ind ia ' s Role in torld Affa i rs" , 
In te rna t iona l Affa i rs , Moscow, Ko, 1, January 1958, pp.56-60. 
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has earned much indignation from the U.S.A., as the USA does 
not look with favour at t h i s policy of lashing out against 
-1 
every sor t of colonialism. 
Attached with t h i s pr inciple to which India adheres 
s t r i c t l y ^ i s the abol i t ion of r ac ia l -d i sc r imina t ion . India 
vigorously opposes r a c i a l apartheid in South Africa and the 
U.S.A.,India lef t no stone unturned to do away with i t but 
fai led due to imperial is t designs of B r i t i sh and USA. In the 
Commonwealth also India t r i e d to pr^essurise the Governments of 
South Africa to abolish i t . ^ Nehru deeply appreciated the 
Russian Society for lack of r a c i a l prejudice and colonial ism. 
Nehru as the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of India, 
declared/ that ant i- imperial ism and an t i - r ac ia l i sm were the 
"Kera<^l of our foreign policy",-^ which was evidenced by his 
subsequent e f f o r t s . Speaking at Columbia University in 19^+9, 
Nehru explained the basic object ives of h is overa l l pol icy 
in which he la id main emphasis on ant i -co lonia l i sm. The main 
objectives of that policy were,"the pursui t of peace, not through 
alignment with any major group of powers but through an independent 
approach to each controvers ia l or disputed i s sue ; the l i b e r a t i o n 
1* U*S. News and World Report . January 27, 1965, p . 108. 
2 . Nehru, op. c i t . . p , 213( Krom Speech in Lok Sabha 
December 8 , 1958. Also see pp.502,5^^, 5^ f9 and ^^0, 
3 . See for d e t a i l s , Bandyopadhayaya, OP. c i t . ^ p . 7 1 . 
39 
of subjected peoples; the maintenance of freedom, both na t iona l 
and individual ; the e l iminat ion of r a c i a l d iscr iminat ion; and the 
el imination of want, disease and ignorance, which a f f l i c t the 
greater part of the l«forld's population". 
IMDIA AW im COMH)NWaALTH OF NATIONS 
Since the very beginning of independence, Nehru was 
against any form of mi l i t a ry a l l i ance but th i s basic ant ipathy 
towards secur i ty a l l iance system does not amount to ec l ipse 
p his cordia l a t t i t u d e towards the Commonwealth of Na t ions . ' He 
i5 
Said, that so far as India was concerned, she}prepared to enter 
into a t r e a t y of friendship with any country in the World,-' and 
he regarded Commonwealth t i e s as a t i e of mutual fr iendship and 
cooperation and understanding and not of domination and s lavery . 
Moreover, Ind ia ' s i n t e r n a l problems and ex te rna l po l ic ies are 
k 
not affected by th i s t i e , Gommonv/ealth t i e can also help 
expand area of peace- I nd i a ' s avowed ideal.•^ Kehru once remarked^** 
1. Nehru, o n . c i t . ^ ^19^7-53) 1, & 3 , p . ^ 0 1 . Jbr d e t a i l s of 
an t i - imper i a l i s t policy as the main goal of non-alignment 
see Rehman, op. c i t « . pp. 22-29, 
2 . Nehru, O P . c i t . ^ p . 20. I^^ tom Speech in the Constituent 
Assembly on the motion by the Hon, B.R, Ambedkar that the 
Dre^ft Const i tut ion, framed by Drafting Committee be taken 
in to consideration9 November 8 , 13kQ), 
3« Ib id« , p . 6 l{ From Speech in reply to debate on Foreign 
Affairs in Lok Sabha, June 12, 1952). 
k-. I b i d . , p . 153* Miere Nehru i s against the argument of many 
parliamentarians that the^^Commonwealth t i e has l imi ted in 
the s l i gh t e s t our independents sovereign s ta tus of freedom 
of a c t i o n , i n t e rna l or e x t e r n a l . . . , 'vtom Speech in the Lok 
Sabha on the Citizens B i l l , December 5, 1 9 5 ^ 
5» I b i d . , p . 157 
-^0 
with regard to our intei 'nal and ex terna l po l ic ies India had 
functioned exact ly as t h i s House and the Government wanted t o . 
The Commonwealth re la t ionsh ip did not mar our way in the s l i g h t e s t . 
India differed from the po l i c i e s and pract ice of the other 
Commonwealth count r ies . I t confirmed that our associa t ions in the 
Commonwealth has been of great help to the cause of peace and 
cooperation. I t i s because of th is staunch regard for the 
Commonwealth t i e s that our d ign i ty , freedom of act ion and 
pres t ige had enhanced* 
Nehru said that there v/as no doubt that our Commonwealth 
associa t ion helped us in extending the area of cooperation and 
the cause of peace. India attended almost a l l Commonwealth 
conferences and asserted her f a i th in pr inc ip les of f r iendship , 
cooperation and understanding. 
Vflienever there was a question whether India should 
continue in the Commonwealth, Nehru also emphasised the pos i t ive 
side of the question. In his speech in the Lok Sabha on Ju ly 23, 
1957J Nehru sa id , that by being in the Commonvrealth India was 5 
in no sense , subordinate to anybody, or t i ed up to something that 
might come in Ind ia ' s way, then i t would compell them to agree , 
1* I b i d . , p . 153-lf.(From Speech in the Lok Sabha on the Citizen-
ship B i l l , December 5>' 19^% Also see p . 133, where Nehru 
sa id , "Commonwealth is ijot a super -s ta te in any sense of the 
term(_ ^om broadcast from New Delhi , on May 10, 19^9JL 
2 . I b i d . , pp. 157-58. 
hi 
who object to our being in the Cbmmonwealth. Nehru also 
accepted that there was no sentimental ground for being in the 
Commonwealth. He rather posed a question: " . . . . how our being 
in the Commonwealth has in preictice, injured our po l ic ies in 
the advocacy of any cause that we hold dear? I t has helped 
us in influencing o the r s , and has helped us as regard to other 
1 
matters t o o « . . . . 1 am against breaking any kind of a s soc ia t ion" . 
2 
Certain pragmatic changes of h i s t o r i c s ignif icance 
have occurred in the Commonwealth, such as the enlargement of 
i t s raerabership by entry of Ghana and Nigeria e t c . Our membership 
i s most opportune and f r u i t f u l . 
Speaking at the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Conference, on December 2 , 1957> New Delhi , Nehru said that 
a l l the nations share something and that something i s a t i e , 
a commonwealth t i e . This t i e has got content and some useful 
purpose* It makes us th ink on some common l i n e s , but apart 
from th i s commonsense we maintain our independent way of 
th inking, in approaching the domestic as well as the i n t e r -
na t iona l problems. The Commonwealth countries shared among 
them parliamentary system and democratic approach. The Common-
wealth represents these democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s and the content 
of democracy that democracy means peaceful coexistence.-^ 
1. I b i d i , p . 158. 
2 . I b i d . . p . 159, 
3 . I b i d . , pp 159-60 
h2 
Ind ia ' s support to the Commonwealth in no way means that 
India i s in favour of colonial ism. Vte l e f t no stone unturned to 
do away with the malignant roots of colonial ism. In a speech in 
the General Assembly at Par is dated November 3 , 1 9 ^ ) Nehru s a i d , 
"iisia had suffered a l l e y i l s of colonialism and imperial domination 
and pledges to commit he r se l f to save the freedom of every other 
colonial country. The countr ies l ike India having suffered 
colonia l yoke do not apprehend i t feas ible that other countries 
should remain under i t s e v i l spe l lT Krishna Menon, along with 
p 
Nehru,always favoured the Commonwealth t i e s . " Although Shas t r i 
lacked a l l that Nehru possessed-charisma, he r i t age , experience, 
t ravel-weal th and a r i s t o c r a t i c arrogance. -; he alv/ays t r i e d to 
p rac t ice what Nehru propagated. 
Shas t r i had l i t t l e experience in internatioijial f i e l d . He 
allowed to cut down India* s image according to her s ize and 
admitted that Ind ia ' s role in the past^as an in te rna t iona l peace-
maker was r a the r odd and unproport ionate . He repeatedly assured 
the Lok Sabha that he X'/ould s t r i c t l y follow the Nehru l i ne in 
foreign po l i cy . He never feared to adjust Nehru's pol icy to the 
changing world. This i s w.hat he boldly s ta ted in the f i r s t news 
conference on June 2, 196U-, t h a t , * ' . . . . he would pursue a pol icy 
of f r iendl iness towards a l l without ge t t ing involved in mi l i t a ry 
b locs" . India has grea t ly contributed to the evolution of the 
1» Ibid •, p . 16^ 
2 . Michael Brecher, op. c i t . « p» 312. 
3 . S. Vimnand Bhart i , Can Indica Accept This Ghallenge. 
Bombay, I966, p . 8 I . 
h. Ibid.« p . 8 1 . 
3^ 
Commonwealth of Nations, He believed i t to be an assoc ia t ion 
of great value as i t provides a base for bui lding on the 
common c u l t u r a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l l i nks , e s t ab l i shed 
•1 
when i t s members were Br i t i sh co lonies . 
The successor of Shas t r i , Mrs, Indira Gandhi has also 
t r i ed to follow the a r c h i t e c t . Inspi te of minor changes the 
foreign pol icy of India i s sb i l l the same as i t was during Nehru 
regime. 
1, Edi tora l ly* "Whose Commonwealth", The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) , 27.10, 1970, 
CHAPTER I I 
^QENGIiiiS IN THS K)BEIGIJ POLICY MAKING I N I^IDJA 
ROLS OF THE C^BIHST 
In the whole a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e t - u p involved i n the 
fore ign p o l i c y making, the Cabinet happens to be the most important 
and i n t r i c a t e agency. I t i s the ch ie f working o r g a n i s a t i o n and 
the mouthpiece through which the country speaks to ano the r c o u n t r y . 
The Indian C o n s t i t u t i o n p laces the formal execu t ive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
with the P r e s i d e n t but l i k e the B r i t i s h King or Queen, the P re s iden t 
1 
a c t s on the advice of the Cabinet and the Council of K i n i s t e r s , 
The Cabinet i s composed of the s en io r members from the Council of 
Min i s t e r s appo in ted by the P re s iden t and nominated by the Prime 
Min is te r* This min ia tu re of the Par l iament i s c o l l e c t i v e l y r e s -
pons ib le to i t for a l l i t s f u n c t i o n s . 
I t has a l r e a d y been s t a t e d t h a t when Rehru x-zas at t h e 
helm of a f f a i r s , the fo re ign p o l i c y was h i s monopoly both i n the 
Cabinet and the Congress p a r t y . Between 19^+7-50, xfehru \ ^ s the 
2 '—" " 
duumvirj3,t^,—- as P a t e l concerned himsel f more with the domestic 
a f f a i r s and the fore ign p o l i c y was l e f t e x c l u s i v e l y to Nehru, 
1 , The Ind i an C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1956, p . 2 9 . A r t i c l e 53 (1 ) : The 
execu t ive power of the Union s h a l l be ve s t ed in the P r e s i d e n t 
and s h a l l be exe rc i s ed by him e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r through 
o f f i c e r s subord ina te to him in accordance with t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n " , 
Also s e e , p , 39 , A r t i c l e 7^Cl ) : "There s h a l l be a Council of 
M i n i s t e r s wi th the Prime Min i s te r a t the head to a id and advise 
the P r e s i d e n t in the e x e r c i s e of h i s f u n c t i o n s " , 
2 . Michael Brecher , Nehru, A P o l i t i c a l Biography. Abridged e d , , 
London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Pressj^ 1961 , p . 1 5 1 . 
^5 
After P a t e l ' s death, Nehru became the undisputed leader of the 
Congress Par ty and unr ival led head of the Cabinet. 
The Minister of Bbreign Affairs before taking any decision 
generally takes counsel of h is Cabinet colleagues but so far as 
the Indian Cabinet and the External Affairs Minis ter , Nehru, were 
concerned, h is r e spons ib i l i t y by v i r tue of his being the Prime 
Minister was so large that in th i s regard his normal representat ions 
to the Cabinet were explanations ra the r than c l a r i f i c a t i o n s given 
to the Cabinet members. Krishna Menon was remarkably i n f l u e n t i a l 
and was the p r inc ipa l adviser to Nehru on foreign policy i s s u e s , 
while other senior members l ike G,B. Pant , Morarji Desai and Maulana 
Azad had t h e i r influence confined to domestic a f f a i r s on ly . 
Moreover, the making of foreign pol icy by the Cabinet in 
India has been merely an aspect of general functioning of the Cabinet. 
In the Cabinet, decision-making was s ingu la r ly dominated by Nehru's 
charismatic pe r sona l i ty . Ambedkar and C D . Deshmukh chief ly 
complained of Nehru's prac t ice of taking decisions without consul-
t ing the Cabinet. There are instances when decisions with regard 
to Kashmir were taken by Nehru without e i t h e r consulting the 
Deputy Prime Minister or the Cabinet. I*iile describing the 
Indian Cabinet at work, Krishna Menon nar ra tes his persohal 
1. Richard L. Park, Macridis, op. c i t . . p . 299. "A good deal of 
consul tat ion takes place outside the Cabinet". Also see 
Brecher, on. c i t . ^ p.239, that on foreign policy questions 
the manner of Nehru was,"informing ra ther than debat ing" . 
2 . I b i d . , p . 1^-0. 
he 
experiences in the Cabinet meetings tha t Nehru, "was not the 
person who sought consul ta t ion" , and before r ea l l y discussing 
out the matter he would say, sometimes, 'here i t i s , le t us 
agree on t h i s * . The members of the Cabinet took ample i n t e r e s t 
in discussing foreign pol icy questions and on majority of 
questions, the Cabinet colleagues agreed with Kehru, who mostly 
2 
informed them than debated the mat te r s . 
Though t i l l 1950, Nehru's pos i t ion in the Cabinet was 
pee r l e s s , the foreign pol icy making within the Cabinet did not 
have an a l toge ther smooth s a i l i n g . There was no challenge to 
Wehru'^ s pos i t ion as the chief a rch i t ec t of Ind i a ' s foreign po l icy , 
he ^ however, took l i t t l e or no notice of the Cabinet members, t h e i r 
agreement, disagreement or f r u s t r a t i o n . Consequently in 1950» 
Shyama Prasad Mukerjee and K.G, Neogi resigned from the Cabinet 
in protest against the Nehru*-Liaquat Pact between India and 
Pakistan and Nehru took no notice of the event . Later , in 1957, 
B.R. Ambedkar also resigned whose major c r i t i c i sms were against 
Nehru's pol icy of friendship with China, 
In the Indian Cabinet there has been a Foreign Affairs 
Committee. So far as Menon knew, i t was an Indian invention and 
the f i r s t of i t s kind which consisted of the members nominated 
by the Prime Minis ter , Nehru used to be the chairman of near ly 
a l l committees in the ea r ly days. Menon, Nehru and two or three 
1. Brecher, op. c i t . ^ p . 2h^ 
2 . Ibid.y pp. 237, 2^3 . 
^7 
others were in i t . Later on both i t s scope and membership 
were enlarged owing to the feeling that foreign af fa i r s had 
been t rea ted as the pr iva te preserve of Nehru. I t did not 
meet very o f t en . I t met, for esiample, to f ina l i se the 
delegation to the UN, the decision was a l ready taken and 
members were informed of i t o There were other sub-committees 
and ad-^hoc committees of inquiry t oo . 
To improvise the effect iveness of the Cabinet in 
foreign pol icy mat ters , a standing Committee on Defence was 
formed, but the committee remained ineffect ive in "influencing 
the formation of foreign po l icy" . Nehru was i t s di ief member 
who dominated others l ike the Defence, Home and Finance Min is te r s , 
Pa te l was also i t s member but he took negl igible i n t e r e s t in 
foreign a f f a i r s . Azad was in i t as the Education Minister and 
Menon as the Minister without po r t fo l i o . In i t s essent ia l" na ture , 
th i s Committee was not very much di f ferent from the Cabinet, 
s t i l l , "the policy questions were not usual ly brought before 
i t by the Prime Minis ter" . Menon fur ther explained,"how 
much should be said and what should be discussed", v/as a 
matter for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minis te r , tha t 
i s Nehrup 
The posi t ion of these Committees in influencing foreign 
policy decisions appears ambiguous. The following dialogue 
1. J . Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of Ind ia ' s jforeign Policy^ 
New Delhi , Allied Publ ishers , 1970, pp. m-O-l'+l, 
kS 
between Brecher and Menon i s an evidence to i t : 
Brecher: "Menon, as you look back on the working of 
the Cfeibinet and these Committees, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the realm 
of foreign a f f a i r s , would you regard them as being in any sense 
par t ic ipants in decision'^making or in shaping pol icy , or were 
they not r e a l l y c ruc ia l to the decision-making process , but 
more organs of consul ta t ion in the very broad sense? 
Menon; By and large they did not shape pol icy although 
they did at t imes" . Menon further s ta ted there was no example 
when the proposals of the above mentioned Defence Committee, 
"had to be postponed sinec die"« Some Committees took years 
to decide a thing* 
The Standing Committee on Defence was the Cabinet i t s e l f . 
The decisions taken by i t were tantamount to decisions taken by 
the Cabinet unless the Prime Minister wished othervjise. Certain 
questions were taken by t h i s Committee a lone . The Committee met 
p 
more than any other Committees of the Cabinet. But, on the whole 
i t s de l ibe ra t ions , expected to influence the pol icy, fa i led in 
t he i r endeavour due to Nehru*s pe rsona l i ty , h is mode of thinking 
and deciding t h i n g s . I t s i n a b i l i t y to influence foreign policy 
1. Brecher, op. c i t . ^ pp. 280, 251* 
2 . Ib id , p . 2lf6 
^9 
was pa r t l y the resul t of Nehru's unchallenged leadership and 
the way in which he generally t rea ted the Cabinet, and p a r t l y 
due to the fact that during that c r i t i c a l period, the Defence 
Minis ter , iCrishna Menon, held i d e n t i c a l views with the Prime 
Minister on Defence and foreign p o l i c i e s . 
Very often Mehru fai led to consult his Cabinet colleagues 
and acted e i t h e r on his own d isc re t ion or on the advice of Krishna 
Menon, M.C. Chagla s ta ted that Menon was responsible for the 
policy decisions with regard to Hungary in 1956 and the Goa action 
in 1961, and a l l that Nehru subsequently did v/as to defend 
Menon,'' hence Menon's role in Hungary and Goa, in decision 
making w^s much more important than that of e i t he r the Cabinet 
or Nehru himself^ 
During the l a s t phase of his l i f e , Ifehru often fa i led to 
consult the Cabinet on important policy mat te r s , e i t h e r because 
he was los ing his grip over things in general , or because perhaps 
he was too fatigued to pay serious a t t e n t i o n to important mat te r s , 
•A glaring example was his statement on October 13 > 19^2, before 
the Chinese a t t a ck , through which he ordered the Indian army to 
drive the Chinese out of NSFA a rea . There i s evidence to confirm 
t h a t - i n the Cabinet meeting, i t was decided that the Indian troops 
should observe the s ta tus quo and should not take any i n i t i a t i v e 
to oust the Chinese t roops . Viewed in the l igh t of the Cabinet 
1, Bandyopadhyaya, OP. c i t . , p . lU-l, For de t a i l s see pp. l^l-U^S, 
2 . For d e t a i l s see , B.M. Kaul, The Untold Story, Bombay, 196? 
pp. 385-7. 
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decis ion, the declarat ion looks ra ther odd, but not when i t i s 
examined with reference to Nehru's character and s t a t u s . I t 
has been suggested that Nehru acted l ike t h i s because " (a) 
he wanted to put on a bold face and thus assuage the r e sen t fu l 
public opinion on his China pol icy , without ac tua l ly intending 
to provoke a conf l ic t ; or (b) he hoped to scare away the Chinese, 
who were obviously preparing for an armed a t t a c k , by such bold 
statements; or (c) he was wrongly advised by some close 
a s soc ia t e s" . 
During the recent 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of f r iendship , 
the members of Opposition t a c i t l y admitted that th i s t r e a t y was 
not referred to the Cfeibinet. The angry Union Health Minis ter , 
Dma Shanker Dix i t , while replying to newsmen at Bhubaneshwar 
drew his a t t en t ion to the recent observation of the former 
Deputy Prime Minister , Morarji Desai, that the Prime Minis te r , 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi had bypassed the Cabinet before i t was signed 
and was presented to the Cabinet only for formal approval as a 
fa i t accompli. However, ge t t ing more mild, Dixit t r i ed to save 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi. He sa id that the t r e a t y was, "a d e l i c a t e 
diplomatic move", which warranted informal consul ta t ion at the 
ou t se t . "This was her great contr ibut ion to Indian democracy 
because she even consults opposit ion leaders before taking the 
1, Bandyopadhyaya, OP. cit«. p. lM+. 
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f ina l decisionT'' Thus, in the presence of a powerful External 
.Affairs Minister and the Prime Minis ter , the role of Cabinet 
gets eclipsed* I t can be even reduced to negligible minimum, 
i f the Prime Minister i s capable enough not to put the things 
for the Cabinet approval. 
Another flagrant example in which the Cabinet was s i d e -
tracked was India ' s abort ive pa r t i c ipa t i on in the Conference of 
Islamic-States held in Rabat, in 1969, leading to the Rabat 
fiasco* Parliament raised a hue and cry to defeat Indira Gandhi-
regime* All uproar was due to the fact that the decision was 
taken without Cabinet consultation* 
On the basis of avai lable information,one can conclude 
that from the time of Ind ia ' s independence up to the present day, 
the Cabinet in India has not functioned as the highest and 
col lec t ive decision-making au thor i ty with regard to foreign policy^ 
There has always been concentration of decision-making au tho r i t y 
in the Prime Minister and to a small extent in the Minis ter for 
External Affairs in the post-Nehru e ra , which is bound to mi l i t a t e 
against r a t i o n a l i t y in the making of foreign pol icy . Moreover, 
most of the de t a i l s about Cabinet process , i t s meetings, agenda 
e tc* , are ambiguous as they are kept conf ident ia l to the core . 
Menon once remarked, "I am not prepared to d isc lose what comes 
2 
on a Cabinet Agenda". 
1» The Hindustan Times (New Delh i ) , 27*8. 1971. 
2 . Michael Brecher, Indiq, in World P o l i t i c s : Menon's View of 
the hbrld* op. c i t * , p . p^^T. 
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ROLE OF THE PRBIE MINISTER AW THE £}CTERNAL AgFAIUS MINISTER, 
NEHRU 
In a Parliamentary system, the Cabinet i s the s t e e r i n g -
wheel of the ship of the s t a t e and the Prime Minister i s the 
steers-man» The Prime Minister plays a decisive role in every 
matter , for he is more than, "the f i r s t among the equals" or 
i n t e r S t e l l a s luna minores ( a moon among the lesser s t a r s ) . 
The office is powerful enough to make him the key-stone of 
the Cabinet a r c h . The ul t imate stamp over the decisions of the 
Cabinet i s that of the Prime Minister since he i s the leader 
of the majority Party and almost a d i r ec t choice of the people 
whereas most of his colleagues owe t h e i r offices and s t a tu s 
to him. Nehru was ce r t a in ly a , "giant among pigmies" r a the r than 
the f i r s t among the e q u a l s , ' The office i t s e l f involves power, 
s ide by side Nehru enjoyed a pos i t ion of eminence because of his 
enigmatic personal i ty and charismatic leadership combining in 
him both the offices of the External A,ffairs and Prime Minis ter . 
Perhaps, in no other democratic s t a t e one man dominated foreign 
policy as Nehru in Ind ia . Indeed, so overwhelming v/as h i s 
influence that India ' s pol icy came to mean in the minds of 
people everywhere, the personal policy of Pandit Ifehru, 
P r a c t i c a l l y speaking,Nehru has been the philosopher, a r c h i t e c t , 
engineer and the voice of his country 's pol icy tovjards the outside 
world. He has impressed his persona l i ty and viev/s with such 
overpowering effect that foreign pol icy may properly be termed 
1. Brecher, Nehru; A P o l i t i c a l Biography, op. c i t . , p . 15 . 
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as his pr ivate monopoly. No one in the Congress or the Government 
and the Opposition ever challenged his control in th i s sphere . 
Out of a l l the factors and determinants which shaped 
foreign po l icy , Nehru's ideology, educational background and 
thinking are paramount. In India , public opinion, p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s , emerging pressure groups, parliament and Cabinet did not 
play t he i r roles e f fec t ive ly as i s expected of them in a democracy. 
I t made Nehru's s ingular pos i t ion as the maker of Ind i a ' s foreign 
policy almost completely undisturbed. With an a r i s t o c r a t i c 
background, testern education, p o l i t i c a l backing of Mot i la l Nehru, 
Gandhi and other Congress l eade r s , Nehru was to play an i n f l u e n t i a l 
role in Indian p o l i t i c s . Since Nehru retujmecl to India for severa l 
times he was elected President of the Congress Party and since the 
Madras Session of the Congress (1927) he had become the recognised 
spokesman of the Congress on foreign a f f a i r s^ because he was more 
in te res ted in foreign a f fa i r s and b e t t e r informed than others« 
Due to his a b i l i t y , insight and in t e r e s t in in t e rna t iona l r e la t ions , 
the l a t e r resolut ions of the Congress were inspi red , drafted and 
pi loted by Nehru« 
In 19^2, Gandhi openly declared Nehru as his successor . 
The "uncrowned King of the Indian Republic",^ Nehru enjoyed 
supremacy in every f i e ld , and v i r t u a l l y exercised unchallenged 
and monopolistic j u r i sd ic t ion over foreign a f f a i r s . 
1• BreCher, op. c i t . , p . 1^. 
5^ 
In bhe Interim Government and l a t e r as well , Nehru was 
incharge of External Affairs of Ind ia . The foreign pol icy 
statements which Nehru made as the Prime Minister of the Interim 
Government espec ia l ly on September 7 , 19^6, l a i d dovm the card ina l 
features of Ind ia ' s foreign po l i cy . 
When in 1951, Pa te l died and Purshottam Das Tondon 
weakened in hea l th , Nehru's s t a t u r e embej^€fed with regard to 
domestic and external affairs."* V i r t ua l l y , Nehru appeared 
to be indispensable for the Congress, the Cabinet, the Parliament 
and the country. T i l l h is death in 196'f, his leadership re ta ined 
a qual i ty of something approximating charisma. He re ta ined t he , 
"sole rep'ository of f i na l dec i s ions , master in his o\-m household", 
2 
and enjoyed, "extraordinary s t a tu s within the Congress". 
Nehru combined in him, "a queer mixture of the East and 
the West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere",-' but le f t 
a " t r a i l of glory and a legend behind him", "l ike some triumphant 
Caesar". Though Nehru had much of his 'Western education, 
never the less , he via.s impressed by the Gandhian doctrine of non-
violence, Ashokan and Buddhist doctrine of peace, Socialism 
1» I b i d . , p . 229. 
2 . Brecher, op. c i t . . pp. ^36, U-35. 
3« John Day, J . Nehru, Towards Freedom; The Autobiography of 
Jawaharlal Nehru, l9'f2, p . 353* 
k» Chanakya, "The Rasht rapa t i " , The Modern Review (Ca lcu t t a ) , 
Vol . , LXII, Nov, 1937, p . 5^6. 
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of the East and was deeply influenced by modern European 
hxananist-philosophy* Thus he often visualised'One World as 
a deeply committed i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t . There were the various 
c ross-currents in h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l make i$). I t i s often 
suggested tha t Nehru sometimes fa i led to synthesise them into 
a coherent i n t e l l e c t u a l p a t t e r n , Nehru used to keep himself 
busy in parliamentary business and processes . In a parl iamentary 
sess ion, during question««hour, Nehru used to stay on u n t i l i t s 
conclusion,^. This showed h i s i n t e r e s t in foreign pol icy mat te rs . 
He spoke for hours and hours together when the' motions regarding 
the in te rna t iona l s i tua t ion and the pol icy of the Government 
of India thereof, were debated* 
The year 1956 marked a "turning po in t " in Nehru*s 
Foreign i l in i s te rsh ip* I t was because of the Hungarian episode 
and ^glo-French« I s r a e l i aggression against Egypt coupled with 
the events of 1959> notably the Tibetan r evo l t , China's border 
incursions and Eisenhower's v i s i t to India. Thus, the c r i s e s 
of I956-.57 produced a round of the edges and i r o n i c a l l y , a 
greater sense of inner calm in the face of external turmoil* 
Af ter ' the year of c r i s i s ' , began the disenchantment of Nehru's 
p o l i t i c a l leadership* His open c r i t i c i sm s ta r ted at boi l ing 
point in and outs ide Parliament* Since then Nehru was deprived 
of universal adulat ion. The i n t e l l i g e n t s i a s t a r t ed l e v e l l i n g 
staunch c r i t i c i sm against h is stand on China. The Members of 
Parliament ra ised an iiproar against Nehru's calculated and 
de l ibe ra te attempt to hide re levant information from Parliament. 
?6 
This c r i t i c i sm gained momentum in the wake of the border 
c r i s i s with China in 1959* 
Nehru was an i d e a l i s t i c - r e a l i s t . At times he soared 
in h is 
higher and higher s i t t i n g / i v o r y tower and at other moment, he 
• 1 
appeared as a down to ear th r e a l i s t . In his attempt to present 
a synthesis of idealism and real ism, Nehru sa id , "we propose to 
look a f t e r Ind ia ' s i n t e r e s t in the context of v;orld cooperation 
and world peace, in so far as the world peace can be preserved".^ 
In his approach to the Kashmir i s s u e , Nehru showed the 
synthesis of two approaches when he s a id , 'Ve hhxe indeed been 
over-scrupulous in th i s mat ter" and that "we went out of our 
way to make a u n i l a t e r a l declara t ion that we would abide by 
the wi l l of the people of Kashmir as declared in a ppbisc i te 
or referendum". The i d e a l i s t i c approach of Nehru is evident 
from the reference of the issue to the UN, in the l i g h t of 
infant UN being made a plaything of the then bipolar world. 
In March 1 9 ^ , Nehru openly confessed in a speech in the 
Constituent Assembly, "our making a reference on th i s i ssue 
to the Securi ty Council of the United Nations was an act of 
f a i th , because we believe in the progressive r ea l i za t ion of 
a world order and a vrorld government". If Kashmir was an 
in tegra l part of India and a domestic i s s u e , i t should not have 
1. For d e t a i l s see , Nehru, Ind ia ' s Foreign Policy. 
9Vf c j t . . , pp. 3^ , 51, 7 3 . 
2. I b i d . , p . 28 
3 . I b i d . , pp. Ifif5, If51. 
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been taken to the UN by India and i f i t was an in t e rna t iona l 
i s sue , Pakis tan ' s subsequent claims to i t would be j u s t i f i e d . 
The Kashmir Question, the bone of contention between India 
and Pakistan, was so le ly deal t . with by Nehru in the i n t e r -
nat ional a rena . His r e a l i s t i c sense made him rea l i se that the 
pledge of p l eb i sc i t e was out of the way and impracticable y e t , 
i t i s bel ieved, he acted as a prudent statesman* 
Nehru was the Congress Pa r ty ' s acknowledged spokesman 
i 
on foreign a f f a i r s . In fact he was, "the soul of the Pa r ty" . 
Nehru's ins is tence on Ind ia ' s membership in the Commonwealth 
as an independent Republic was an i l luminat ing example of h is 
dominant role in the shaping of Ind ia ' s foreign po l i cy . Nehru 
was inevi tably influenced by a host of factors in th i s dec i s ion . 
The most remarkable and s ign i f ican t v/as his r ea l i za t ion that 
India could not remain i so la ted in the world of tension and 
that the Commonwealth^link was the most advantageous of a l l l i n k s . 
Mostly Indian trade was car r ied on with the Commonwealth 
countr ies ; i t s foreign exchange reserves were tied up in the 
Ster l ing-Area, i t s mi l i t a ry power then depended on the weapons 
made in Great B r i t a i n . This has a lso enabled India to a s s i s t 
the Indians s e t t l i n g abroad» 
Nehru enjoyed an indomitable stance within h is 
Cabinet. PVom 19^7 to 1958, the^e had been four Congress 
1. Brecher, op. c l t . , p . 162. "Viewed in the perst)ective of 
the duumvirate, i t was an act of high statesmanship, for 
i t was the f i r s t r ea l s t a b i l i z i n g act in India ' s r e l a t i ons 
with outside world". 
2 . Jbr de t a i l s see Supra on the Hole of Cabinet v/here the role 
of Prime Minister Nehru is a lso discussed at l ength . 
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Cabinets, a l l headed by Nehru. At no time the government faced 
a vote of no-confidence for the Congress had an over-whelming 
majority in the Parliament. The main cause of the s t a b i l i t y 
of Cabinet system in India had been Nehru's pre-eminence. In 
foreign affairs^Nehru re l ied on Menon l a r g e l y . In cabinet 
meetings, i t was sa id , "the Prime Minister haS great s k i l l in 
•J 
winning h is colleagues to his view point by persuasion". 
So far as the Sino-India border dispute is concerned, 
Nehru waiS cen t ra l to a l l i t s dec is ions , discussions and nego t i a t i ons . 
His pol icy towards the people 's Ptepublic of China v^ as somewhat 
steeped in i d e a l i s t i c moorings. He made an idea l assessment of 
the Chinese intent ions and took t h e i r gestures of f r iendl iness 
and cooperation at t he i r face value^of which more l a t e r . 
S imi la r ly , in regard to the Goan question, Nehru was a l l in a l l 
in i t s dec i s ions . In his Goa pol icy (as in his I^shmir pol icy) 
Nehru made a firm commitment to cer ta in high pr inc ip les a t the 
o u t s e t , which was indicat ive of h i s p o l i t i c o l ideal ism, but 
eventually re t rea ted from his posi t ion mainly owing to the 
pe rs i s t en t fa i lu re of the i d e a l i s t approach against the then 
inf lexib le Portuguese Governiyent^ 
Nehru's monopoly in foreign a f fa i r s v/as wi l l ingly 
accepted by his colleagues and even acclaimed by members of 
Parliament. L*M. Singhvi, a member of the lok Sabha, went to the 
extent of saying that i t w^ -S fortunate to have a man of d i s t i n c t i o n 
1. Brecher, OP. c i t . ^ pp. 172-73 and 176. 
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and eminence l ike Itehru to preside over the formulation of our 
foreigt) policy* 
Nehru's greatest contr ibut ion to India and intex^national 
vrarld had been his pe r s i s t en t cry for non-alignment, the 
cardinal feature of Ind ia ' s foreign po l i cy . The other leaders 
of t h i s camp were Tito and Nasser. The pol icy was in favour 
of nat ional i n t e r e s t to Nehru's mind, though a f t e r the Chinese-
aggression and India-Pakistan t u s s l e , demands to quit non-
aligm^ient were r a i sed , but Nehru st icked to i t . Nehru was 
so much convinced of i t s being in the na t iona l in t e res t that he 
sa id , " i t i s completely incorrect to c a l l our pol icy Ifehru po l i cy . 
I t i s incorrect because a l l tha t I have done i s to give voice 
to that po l i cy . I have not or ig inated i t . I t i s a policy 
inherent in the circumstances of India , inherent in the paso 
thinking of India , inherent in the whole mental outlook of Ind ia , 
inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind_ inherent 
in the circumstances of the world t o d a y . . . . . I am quite con-
vinced that whoever might have been incharge of the foreign 
af fa i r s of India and whatever party might have been in power 
in India , they could not have deviated very much from th i s 
pol icy". Even his successors , Shas t r i and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, 
/ 
followed his su i t and expressed the i r des i re to move on the 
pre-determined l i n e . I t i s in th i s context that I nd i a ' s ac t ive 
1. Lok Sabha Deh.nt-.^ .g, Third Se r i e s , No. ^ , Vol, XEII, I963, 
Jtebruary 21 , Fourth Session, c o l s . 605-6, 
2 . Nehru, op . c i t . , p , 80 , 
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pa r t i c ipa t ion in the non-aligned Summit Conference (Sept . 1973) 
at Algiers i s to be seen. And today, the main tenets of the 
policy as engineered by Nehru a re the same. 
The Prime Minister himself was the External Affairs 
Minister , he devoted considerable time to supervise and control 
the foreign p o l i c y . l e t , vast nothing-ness exis ted bet \^en 
Nehru and the bureaucracy. The bulk of Civ i l Servants, p r ince ly 
members and the upper echelons of the army personnel were in 
favour of a pro-lfl.festern po l i cy . I t was Nehru, his personal 
experience, s o c i a l i s t i c outlook and belonging to a poor nation 
l ike India , which saved the Western-orientation of our foreign 
po l i cy . I t goes to the c redi t of Nehru and h is towering leadership 
that he waa able to keep the bureaucracy almost completely out 
of basic pol icy dec is ions , and compelled • . i t to submit i t s e l f 
to the p o l i t i c a l guidelines l a i d down by him with regard to 
foreign, defence, domestic and economic po l i cy . 
In the post-Nehru era^the role of the Jixternal Affairs 
Minister has de te r io ra t ed , because a f te r Nehru, the External 
Affairs Minister has not been the Prime Min i s t e r . F i r s t l y , the 
cal ibre of the succeeding leaders and members was dec is ive ly 
lower and secondly, they were l ess popular and have to act under 
the control or the shadow of the Prime Minis te r . In the highly 
f luid conditions of modern Ind ia , i t is d i f f i c u l t to a sce r t a in 
the extent to which Foreign Ministers have been able to exercise 
t h e i r own judgment in decision-making. Now, there have been as 
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many as five Foreign Ministers from 196^-70 and within such 
a short per iod, no Pbreign Minister can be expected to exercise 
formidable influence or take firm pol icy dec is ions , 
Nehru, l ike the Cabinet, dominated the proceedings in 
Parliament a l s o . I-Iis pre-eminence can only be compared with that 
of Churchill a t Westminster during the Second lib r id i/ar. I t i s 
suggested tha t sometimes, while in Parl iament, ilehru sat h e n c ^ ^ " ^ 
over with a pensive expression on his face . At other times he 
would crease his brows as he l i s tened to a sharp a t tack from 
the Opposition, Frequently he would rpdgc one of h is colleagues 
into si lence or leap up to rescue a Minister v/ho feebly answered 
the quest ions . Often he rose in ajnger when he fe l t that an insu l t 
has been hurled at the Government, S t i l l at other times he would 
make moving and solemn speeches. On the v/hole, Nehru v^ as ex t r a -
ord inar i ly ac t ive during debates . He used to make himself present 
in a l l s e s s ions , lie was to lerant to the Opposition. Due to his 
learning and i n t e r e s t , he was consulted by the Minister for 
Parliamentary Affairs before the business of the day was decided, ' 
To conclude, the most a r t i c u l a t e expression of Indian 
foreign pol icy i s to be found in the speeches of Kehru, In 
Parliament and par ty caucus, within India and abroad, he hammered 
on these themes with remarkable consistency. The emphasis may 
1. Brecher, op. c i t . « p . I78 . 
62 
have s h i f t e d but never the main p r i n c i p l e s of the p o l i c y . The 
ro le t ha t JBbreign Affa i r s M i n i s t e r p lays v a r i e s from coun t ry 
to coun t ry , but nowhere one man dominated fo re ign p o l i c y as Nehru 
did in I n d i a , Irfdeed, Nehru was the p h i l o s o p h e r , a r c h i t e c t , 
engineer and the ch ie f spokesman of I n d i a ' s p o l i c y towards the 
ou ts ide wor ld , 
ROLE OF IHS MINISTRY OF EXTERML AFFAIRS; ORGANISATION AIMD 
gONGTIONS 
INTRODUCTION; In a p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy, domestic and 
foreign p o l i c y i s the p r e r o g a t i v e of the E x e c u t i v e . The Foreign 
Office c a r r i e s on the d i r e c t i v e s of the E x e c u t i v e , On account 
of the f a i ^ lung and h i g h l y complex n a t u r e of the fore ign p o l i c y , 
the Foreign Office performs the s i g n i f i c a n t funct ion of feeding 
i t with •• Information^ and 'Advice ' . The e l i t e a t the apex of 
decis ion-making c o n s i s t s of t h e Foreign M i n i s t e r , Prime M i n i s t e r 
and the Cabine t , the Foreign Office i s sur -charged v/ith the work 
of ana ly s ing and e v a l u a t i n g the a v a i l a b l e da ta and recommending 
concre te measures . I t s r o l e i s v i t a l and d e t a i l e d i n fore ign 
pol icy making p/ i thout ,however, bea r ing the odium of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
The Min i s t ry i s s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b l e for the conduct of I n d i a ' s 
r e l a t i o n s with the o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . . I t a l s o dea l s v/ith 
coun t ry ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t the UN and adv i se s the M i n i s t r i e s , 
as far as t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with fore ign Governments and i n s t i t u t i o n s 
a r e concerned. 
The M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Af fa i r s bea r s the r e a l brunt of 
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fore ign p o l i c y p lann ing , l\hen Nehru was a t the helm of A f f a i r s , 
the M i n i s t r y as an agency was l e s s a s s e r t i v e and subsei-vient 
to a s i n g l e man. After h i s d e a t h , i t s p o s i t i o n subsequen t ly 
improved. 
HISTORICAL RETROSPECT;' 
The h i s t o r y of the M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Af fa i r s goes 
back to lyB'+j when for the f i r s t t ime a Department to d e a l wi th 
fore ign a f f a i r s was c r e a t e d in the Government of I n d i a , by t h e 
then Governor General , Ssferren tfeistings. This Department was 
known as t h e Secre t and p o l i t i c a l Department with t h r e e b r a n c h e s -
S e c r e t , P o l i t i c a l and Fore ign . The Sec re t branch d e a l t wi th a l l 
Government t r a n s a c t i o n s concerned with wars , n e g o t i a t i o n s and 
d ip lomat ic missions abroad . The P o l i t i c a l branch d e a l t wi th the 
correspondence with the Res iden t s and Agents i n the Ind ian S t a t e s , 
A l l mat te r s r e l a t i n g to t r a n s a c t i o n s between the Government o f 
India and the Foreign European Powers were looked a f t e r by the 
Foreign Branch. 
In 18^2, the nomenclature of the Department changed to 
Foreign Department and was organ ised i n t h r e e b ranches , Fore ign , 
P o l i t i c a l and Domestic, under the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the Governor 
g e n e r a l . Owing to the i nc r ea sed work of the Department, a second 
post of S e c r e t a r y was c r e a t e d i n 191J+, This change in the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n of the Department and the a d d i t i o n of one more 
Sec re ta ry a l s o c a r r i e d with i t the change of t h e name of the 
Department. The two S e c r e t a r i e s were d e s i g n a t e d as the< Fore ign ' 
and t P o l i t i i g a l ' S e c r e t a r i e s . The ' F o r e i g n ' wing d e a l t with a l l 
6^ 
the matters per ta ining to the f ront ie rs of India and the 
• P o l i t i c a l ' wing dealt with a l l o ther matters emanating from 
the Indian Sta tes and areas administered by t h i s Dcpartraentl 
In view of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes, brought about 
by the Government of India Act 193?i a vast increase in the 
volume of work in the two Departments occurred and the Department 
was bifurcated into External M f a i r s Department and the 
P o l i t i c a l Department. 
The work connected with the Indians Overseas jaas 
o r ig ina l ly dea l t with in a sect ion of the Department of Education, 
Health and Lands. Since 19^-1, that sec t ion was made a sepa*"atfc 
Department, In 3.9^5» the Indian overseas Department was 
entrusted with the work connected with Burma and the Gommonv/ealth 
countr ies , including the work r e l a t i ng to the r ights of Indians 
in the coun t r i e s , 
Jawaharlal Nehru took charge of the Department of 
External Affairs and Commonwealth Eelat ions in 19^6, when 
the Interim National Government was formed. In 19*+7> the 
Department of Commonwealth Relations was amalgamated with the 
External Affairs Department leading to the cons t i tu t ion of the 
'Commonwealth Relations Wing' of the Department, which was 
renamed f i r s t l y 
i t se l f /as the Department of External Affairs and Commonwealth 
Relations and l a t e r as the Ministry of External Affairs and 
Commonwealth de l a t i ons . In March 19^9, the amalgamation of both 
1* The Indian i n s t i t u t e of Public Administrat ion, The 
Organisation of the Government of India.. Asia Publis ing 
House, Bombay, 1958, p . 37 , 
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the wings of the ministry w^s completed and i t was f ina l ly 
\ \ redesignated as the Ministry of External Affa i rs . The Deputy 
A Minister deals with a l l the other Divisions except China, 
^ PaMstan, the United Na t ions and Conference Divisions,which 
are deal t with d i r ec t l y by the Minister of External A f f a i r s . 
The Secretary General i s the adminis t ra t ive head of the 
Ministry and o f f i c i a l adviser to the Minister on matters 
r e la t ing to foreign pol icy and i s responsible for the supervision 
and coordination of the work of the Minis t ry . The Pbreign 
Secretary i s incharge of the Eas tern , the Western, the China, 
the United Nations and Conference Div i s ions . Important 
administrat ive matters are deal t with by the Special Secretary 
in col laborat ion with the Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth 
Secretary^ The Ministry maintains i t s own S e c r e t a r i a t , 
For administrat ive convenience, the Ministry i s divided 
into s ixteen Divis ions , Each one of them deals with a number of 
countries, grouped on geographical or t e r r i t o r i a l b a s i s . The 
Economic and coordination Division i s responsible for coordination 
of p o l i t i c a l and economic pol ic ies a f fec t ing Indians i n t e rna t i ona l 
r e l a t i o n s . 
In the Secre tar ia t there i s a v a r i e t y of Secre tar ies 
ranging from Secretary General to Foreign Secre ta ry , 
Secre ta r ies External Affairs and a number of Addit ional 
S e c r e t a r i e s . Jbr d e t a i l s s ee - Organisat ional se t -up 
and Function of the Ministries/Departments of the Govt. 
of Ind ia . Secre tar ia t Training School (Ministry of Home 
Affairs) Government of India , IV ed,,New Delhi , 1969, pp. 
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During 1963-6 '^+, due to increase in the work r e l a t i n g 
to China, the China Sub-Division in the Eastern-Division was 
const i tuted separa te ly . Besides, the present External 
Publ ic i ty Division and Economic and Coordination Division have 
been recons t i tu ted into two new Divisions namely^the Economic 
Affairs and the Information and Coordination Division, The 
Ministry has got i t s own Foreign Services , the appointments 
to which are made on the basis of competit ion. 
In accordance with the recommendations of the Estimates 
Committee of Parliament, i t has been decided to revive the 
Foreign Service Inspec tora te . Necessary prel iminar ies 
connected with i t s formation have been completed. When the 
Sino-ilnaiau border dispute erupted into a full-fledged war in 
1962, the North East Front ier Agency of the Ministry s t a r t e d 
and speeded both the r e h a b i l i t a t i n g programme and planned 
development. This Agency received a number of v i s i t o r s from 
amongst the members of Parl iament, p o l i t i c a l delegates and 
soc ia l workers, 
FUNCTIONS AND ORGANISATION: The Ministry i s responsible for 
the work connected with foreign a f f a i r s , consular represen-
t a t i o n s , Indian Foreign Service, t r e a t i e s , emigration, passports 
and Visas, NEFA, NAGA Hil ls e t c . I t a lso administers such laws 
as Indian Emigration Act, 1972, the Reciprocity Act 19^3, the 
Post-Haj Committee Act 1932 etc,"* The Ministry of External 
1, The Indian I n s t i t u t e of Public Administration, 
op, c i t , « pp. 38-39. 
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Affairs has got i t s own Secre ta r i a t and a number of subordinate 
o f f i c e s . There i s no attached office functioning under t h i s 
Minis t ry . There are a number of Diplomatic and Consular 
Offices s i tua ted p rac t i ca l l y a l l over the world. By v i r tue 
of t h e i r pecul iar and unique pos i t ion they are not considered 
as subordinate o f f i c e s . The Foreign Minister i s the p o l i t i c a l 
head of the Ministry who i s a s s i s t ed by the Deputy and State 
Ministers and two parliamentary S e c r e t a r i e s . The Secretary 
GenerajUyis the administrat ive head of the Ministry ass i s ted 
by a number of subordinate s t a f f . 
At the moment, the Ministry has 85 Sections of \^rhich 
38 are Administrative and k-7 are T e r r i t o r i a l and Technical 
-J 
Divis ions . These sections are grouped into eleven Div is ions . 
1. Ibid.^ p . k-Of These Divisions include; 
1. American Divis ion:- South and North America 
2 . Western Division: UNO, UK and Europe 
3 . Eastern Division: China, Japan, Korea, Nepal, 
Mongolia, Sikkim, Bhutan and MEEA 
'f. Southern Division: West Asia, South-Sast Asia, North 
Africa, Sudan, Ceylon, I ran , Burma, 
Afghanistan and Colombo Pov;ers 
5» African Division: Afr ica , and other colonies 
6. Pakistan Division: 
7 . Protocol Division: Emigration, Protocol e t c . 
8 . Administrative Division: Accounts and Budgets, General 
Administration, iilstablishment work. 
9. External Publicity Division: 
10. Foreign Service Inspectorate. 
11. Historical Division. 
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The enormous net-work of adminis t rat ion i s carr ied on success-
ful ly through them. Six Divisions are created so as to cover 
re la t ions with nearly a l l nations ranging from America to 
Pakistan and China e t c . The Protocol-Division i s responsible 
for a l l ceremonial matters such as recept ions , preparat ion of 
credent ia ls and formal arrangements with regard to t r e a t i e s and 
other agreements. The Sxternal-Publ ic i ty-Divis ion i s s ign i f icant 
in the sense that i t carr ies on propaganda of policy and r e l a t ions 
abroad. In the columns of the Parliamentary Debates, i t i s the 
most c r i t i c i s e d and applauded Divis ion. I t a lso renders 
valuable ass is tance in organising the exchange of good-will 
missions and c u l t u r a l de lega t ions . The Foreign-Service-Inspec-
tora te makes inves t igat ions in respect of allowances and general 
administrat ive matters and recommends measures to the Government 
of India so as to achieve greater eff iciency and economy in the 
operation of missions abroad. The His tor ical -Divis ion i s respon~ 
s ib le for the preparat ion and maintenance of research papers 
and records for consultat ion by the Minis t ry . 
The vast network of the missions and posts maintained 
abroad by the Ministry, i s the main source of infonnation to i t . 
They prepare the code and d i rec tory of vrorld events and develop-
ments. These missions are u l t imate ly responsible for the 
effect ive implementation of foreign pol icy. 
1. At present (1970) there are 168 Missions and Posts 
abroad. For more de ta i l s sea , Report 1969-70, Govt, of 
India, Ministry of External Affa i rs , New Delhi , 1970, 
Appendix V I I I , 
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There are different modes through vjhich the Minis try 
plays i t s r o l e - . p o l i t i c a l , economic, mi l i t a ry and c u l t u r a l 
diplomacy, propaganda and external -publ ic i ty .machinery . 
Intel l igence and pol icy-planning, personnel-planning and 
coordination, 
POIiXTIGAL DIPLQMAGI; A r a t i o n a l foreign pol icy i s based on 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of de ta i led and accurate information regarding 
general in te rna t iona l s i t u a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l developments. An 
effective evaluation of information cons t i tu tes the basic task 
of the Minis t ry , The f i r s t ingredient in pol icy formation i s , 
the processing of the avai lable information pleading to an 
analysis of proposed a l t e rna t i ve s in consonance with the 
circumstances. Commenting on th i s 'Report ing ' the P i l l a i 
Committee on the Foreign Services,has observed that only on 
the basis of accurate information, a pol icy ca,n be formulated 
and i t i s the primary duty of the Foreign-Service to maintain 
a continuous supply of information to the Ministry of External 
Affairs,by means of accurate and perceptive reports on current 
events . Information i s not suf f ic ien t by i t s e l f , and needs 
to be supplemented by i n t e rp re t a t i ve analysis and by advice as 
to change or modification of po l icy . 
The J^issions are the ears and eyes of the Government 
and the subsequent policy i s followed by t h e i r r epor t ing , sent 
1. J . Bandyopadhyaya, The making of Ind i a ' s Foreign Pol icy , 
Bombay, Allied Publ i shers , I97O, p . 15^+. 
2 . P i l l a i Committee RemrtT I960, p . lU-. 
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to India in the form of monthly r e p o r t s , prepared by the 
S e c r e t a r i e s . An equally potent source i s the spec ia l repor ts 
sent by the heads of the Missions to Foreign-Office, During 
emergencies^,wireless communications ar© frequently resor ted t o . 
Our U.N. representat ives also send regular reports on the 
in t e rna t iona l s i t u a t i o n . I t f a c i l i t a t e s the reassessment of the 
mater ia l obtained from a country» 
A great deal of diplomatic a c t i v i t y takes place through 
the foreign Missions located in New Delhi through the Foreign 
Minister and his counterparts which include personal d i scuss ions , 
exchange of views, de l ivery of important l e t t e r s , submitting notes 
of p r o t e s t , Notes Verbal and Aides memoires l ike the White Papers . 
Another s igni f icant source of information is the news flashed 
by the in t e rna t iona l p r e s s , radio and t e l e v i s i o n . A lot of 
information in India i s procured by the covert network of i n t e l l i -
gence system^which provides the Government an ins ight in to p o l i -
t i c a l c r i ses in a foreign s t a t e and a lso secret knowledge of the 
re la t ions of the s t a t e with the other s t a t e s . 
The Ministry analyses a l l the empirical data and assessment 
received from the various sources . I t processes i t in to concise 
documents on each in t e rna t iona l problem in r e l a t ion to I nd i a ' s 
foreign pol icy . To quote the P i l l a i Committee Report, " . . . . the 
strands of foreign pol icy are manifold and are factioned by many 
^nd3,t)ut i t i s for the Foreign Office to weave them in to a 
coherent whole". Measures are taken to improve the eff ic iency 
^' I b i d . , p . 20 . 
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of the Foreign-Service to meet the present and future needs 
of foreign-policy, planning. 
The advise and suggestions of the heads of Foreign-
Office a lso a s s i s t the Foreign Minister in a r r iv ing at r a t i o n a l 
decisions* However^  the advisory role of the Ministry was 
overshadowed by ce r t a in f ac to r s . F i r s t l y , the matchless s ta tus 
of Nehru, h is persona3.ity and accepted au thor i ty on h i s t o r y and 
in t e rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s . The bureaucracy remained subdued due to 
his towering l eadersh ip . Secondly, the senior pos i t ions in 
fbreign-Office were manned by people of Nehru's influence, who 
lacked the nerve to object Nehru on foreign policy problems. 
Thirdly, the foreign policy during t h i s period was more concerned 
v/ith g e n e r a l i t i e s . However, Nehru consulted some of his close 
associa tes l i k e , N.R. P i l l a i and G>.«^Baopayee. He paid consi-
derable a t t en t ion to the reports of K.M, Parj»*Kar from China 
and Krishna Menon from London and the U.N.O.,which in f ac t , 
only but t ressed Nehru's preconceived notions on foreign a f f a i r s . 
Unlike Nehru, M.C, Ghagla re l ied l a rge ly on the advice of his 
S e c r e t a r i e s , During the gap of one and half yea r s , between 
Ghagla's res ignat ion and the appointment of Dinesh Singh as the 
Minister of Ebcternal Af fa i r s , when Mrs, Indira Gandhi v/as both 
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minis te r , the influence of 
the Foreign-Office as well as the Foreign Secretary in the making 
of foreign policy, considerably increased, 
1, I b i d , , p , V, 
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ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY; 
I t i s equally p o t e n t i a l an element in contemporary _ 
in te rna t iona l re la t ions* Like Br i t a in , there has been a l o t 
of pondering over economic diplomacy in India too , hence a 
powerful organisat ion of the Ministry to deal with t h i s v i t a l 
aspect of foreign policy* Diplomacy and nat ional i n t e r e s t 
are c losely l inked with economic development. The Pi l la i i 
1 
Committee Report sheds ample l i g h t on i t s working, poreien 
and defence po l i c i e s are also interwoven as diplomacy has 
mi l i t a ry connotations* With the resial t , foreign po l icy 
becomes an amalgam of economic and mi l i t a ry p o l i c i e s . With 
regard to economic diplomacy, the Ministry performs s t r a t e g i c , 
operat ional and observat ional functions* 
CDLTURAL DIPLOMACY; 
Our cu l tu ra l t r a d i t i o n , economic ijnderdevelopment 
and mi l i t a ry backwardness make, c u l t u r a l diplomacy one of the 
most important elements of Ind ia ' s foreign po l i cy . Cultural 
diplomacy involves the pro jec t ion of I n d i a ' s c u l t u r a l image 
abroad through i t s represen ta t ives and exchange of cu l tu ra l 
de legat ions . Diplomacy in modern world i s car r ied through 
propaganda and external publ ic i ty* Nations invest enormous 
funds on propaganda measures. Effective propaganda warrants 
tha t global and regional i n t e r e s t s should be c o l l a t e r a l with 
general foreign pol icy goals* For ef fec t ive propaganda, 
t a r g e t s should be careful ly evolved and devised in the l i g h t of 
!• I b i d . , pp, 170-71 
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nat ional i n t e r e s t . There should be frequent evaluation 
of the overa l l contr ibution of propaganda machinery, which 
requires^pioper coordination and planning. The P i l l a i Committee 
provides inniimerable suggestions to improvise the working 
of the External-Publ ici ty-Divis ion, 
The information gathered through overt or covert 
sources, r e l a t i n g to p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , economic and socia l 
developments in various s t a t e s and in t e rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s , 
cons t i tu t e another function of the Ministry, This information 
i s processed and evaluated from a vantage point of na t iona l 
i n t e r e s t . This business, which i s held conf iden t ia l ly , i s 
known as in t e l l i gence . In I967, a separate uni t ca l led the 
External in te l l igence Organisation was formed ^lander the 
Cabinet. The mess of r e p o r t s - p o l i t i c a l and otherwise, 
prepared by the Missionb', s ta t ioned abroad,cons t i tu te raw-
mater ia l for the i n t e l l i gence . However, in Ijndia, the working 
of in t e l l i gence organisa t ions i s marked by inef f ic iency, 
ineffect iveness and de lays . 
The a c t i v i t i e s of the Ministry of Bxtiemal- Affairs 
should be coordinated in order t o f a c i l i t a t e foreign po l i cy -
planning, which i s the backbone of diplomacy. The chief t a sk 
1, "Intel l igence i s both a science and an a r t , - a science 
because inves t iga t ion and analysis i s as pa ins taking 
as research in chemistry or physics ; an a r t because 
in t e l l igence ana lys t s and es t imators need i n t u i t i o n and 
v is ion to i n t e rp re t and forecast events" . Kurt, The 
Making of Foreign Pol icy- East and Westt philadelT^hi^ 
196^. , p . 117. 
7h 
of the external pub l i c i t y i s to secure coordination* The 
work of extern<al p u b l i c i t y which was o r i g i n a l l y managed 
through the Ministry of Jhformation and Broadcasting ^has 
fal len iipon the Ministry of External-Affairs . Now the 
Division i s ac t ive ly engaged in co l l ec t i ng , br ie f ing and 
dissemination of pub l i c i t y mate r ia l . 
Foreign policy-planning and implementation l a r g e l y 
depends on the Ministry, which t r e a t s of the crux of current 
problems and pol icy research. The Policy-Planning and Review-
Division i s control led by the Joint Secretary who provides the 
r a t i ona l e of improvement and t rends in in t e rna t iona l p o l i t i c s . 
The Indian Foreign Services are organised as specia l i sed 
services for the whole range of Ind i a ' s foreign r e l a t i o n s -
p o l i t i c a l , consular, diplomatic and m i l i t a r y . The Foreign 
Office renders s igni f icant services in the conduct of external 
r e l a t i o n s . If i t i s organised in a b e t t e r manner, i t s 
specia l ised expert ise and effect iveness can f a c i l i t a t e the 
negot ia t ions amidst designates who set up the guidel ines of 
r e l a t i o n s . The determination of in te rna t iona l l i n k s , i s the 
chief concern of the Foreign Off ice,which works iinder the 
umbrella of the Ministry of External Affairs .^ 
The role of the Ministry assumes great dimensions in 
the sense tha t continued guidance from the Ministry i s not 
1. For d e t a i l s see, Report of the Committee on the Indian 
Foreign Service. Ministry of External Affa i rs , I965 . 
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merely ornamental. A foreign po l icy , however, well-defined, 
demands for i t s implementation, exper t i se and experience. The 
ro le of Ministry i s of c o n s t r u c t i v ^ ^ o r t and cannot be 
labe l led superogatory. Expediency demands tha t the Foreign-
Office must develop suff ic ient competence to deal successfully 
with the basic needs of foreign po l i cy , i n t h i s changed pa t t e rn 
of in t e rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s . The Ministry should set up a well-
kni t organisat ion and mechanism for adequate consul tat ion and 
coordination with such Minis t r ies as Defence, Information and 
Broadcasting and Civil-Aviation, In order to compartmentalise 
foreign r e l a t i ons and po l icy , an integrated system should 
develop so as to help the Executive in planning and linplemen-
t i n g i t« Foreign Policy-planning ,as a systematised exercise 
of fore thought , i s an expedient innovation over the pas t system^ 
with the r e su l t the Foreign.Office should employ b e t t e r 
techniques in t h i s regard. Piirposive planning based on fu l l 
understanding of current events and future trends,designed 
to secure the na t ional i n t e r e s t ^ i s an indispensable fac tor in 
the conduct of foreign pol icy today» 
Foreign policy-planning i s r e la ted to the framework 
of basic policy, establ ished by the highest cons t i tu t iona l 
au thor i ty . In India i t means, the Gbvernment of t he day and 
Parliament through which the government der ives i t s power. 
Planning i s concerned with pol icy problems, present or 
an t ic ipa ted tha t a r i se in the course of handling foreign r e l a t ions , 
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The d i rec t ion and planning i s obl iga tory on the Secretary-
General* The recent ly cons t i tu ted Foreign pol icy and 
Review-Committee should be accorded permanent footing unddr 
the chairmanship of Sefiretary-C-eneral* The Committee examines 
the problems of long-term planning to achieve foreign pol icy 
ob jec t ives . I t also analyses the important as^jects of foreign 
po l i cy , i n the l i g h t of fas t changing in te rna t iona l s i t u a t i o n s . 
The work r e l a t i n g to Parliament at o f f i c i a l l eve l a lso needs 
ef fec t ive coordinat ion, in order to acce le ra te the pace of 
pol icy-planning programme. The Ministry ought to stgjply to 
the government the necessary g\iidelines and s i tua t ion reports^ 
which can be of immense help to the latter* The Legal and 
Treat ies Division of the Ministry tenders j u r i d i c o - p o l i t i c a l 
advice to the Ministry which helps d ra f t ing of t r e a t i e s and 
nego t ia t ions , 
PABLIAMMT AND ITS COMMITTEES; 
The role of the Legis la ture depends l a rge ly on the 
form of government a s t a t e has got. In a P res iden t i a l system 
i f the p r i nc ip l e of separation of powers i s in opera t ion , a 
c lear l i ne ,w i th regard to administrat ion and making of foreign 
pol icy, i s drawn. In a Parliamentary system where the u l t imate 
r e spons ib i l i t y i s vested in a Parliament, i t gets ample 
opportunity to s c r u t i n i s e , discuss and approve the po l i cy , 
1» Ib id , , p , 3 1 , 
11\ 
The pos i t ion of Parliament, branded as the • ta lk ing shop ' , 
in influencing foreign pol icy va r i es from country to country. 
I t s r o l e , " is determined by an in te rp lay of f a i r l y s tab le 
cons t i tu t iona l elements and of more ephemeral elements, such 
as the p o l i t i c a l cl imate, the s t rength of the p a r t i e s , and 
the character of the leading p e r s o n a l i t i e s involved". All 
the systems f a l l , "within a spectrum the one end of which 
l i e s in the Soviet Union", where the Supreme Soviet, t h e i r 
Parliament, i s denied ef fec t ive power, and on the other hand 
i s the Ifeiited S ta tes , "where the p r i nc ip l e of checks and 
balances assures the l e g i s l a t u r e a coordinate ro le with the 
•J 
executive"• India occupies an intermediate pos i t ion where 
the Parliament and i t s control i s made effect ive by the 
adoption of Westminster model. 
The policy-making- belongs to the Executive branch 
of government. The Parliament confirms r a the r than i n i t i a t e s 
po l i cy . Theoret ical ly , Parliament i s esspected to influence 
1, Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, 
London, Oxford ISiiversity Press , 1963, p» 23* 
Also see, K«C« Mheare, Leg is la tu res , conipares the 
Br i t i sh and the Jimerican systems at l a r g e . In the 
UK"... the whole process of negot ia t ion , s ignature and 
r a t i f i c a t i o n l i e s within the l e g a l powers of the 
Executives p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the l e g i s l a t u r e i s not 
required". Indian pos i t ion i s more or l e s s s imi lar 
to the Br i t i sh p o s i t i o n . 
Y\^\& 
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and control foreign pol icy in a va r i e ty of ways. Par l iament ' s 
r e so lu t ions , which support or oppose the pol icy suggested by 
the government, forcing the government to adopt new p o l i c i e s 
or r eo r i en t a t e the old o n e s , v i t a l l y affect the broad network 
of the po l i cy . The const i tuents of parl iamentary influence 
include, control oter the purse , power,^, to sanction appro-
p r i a t i o n s , reducing or increasing the budget and the demands 
for grants and author i ty to set up ad hoc or expert Committees, 
to affect the formulation and implementation of foreign po l icy . 
The Members of Parliament ,who are experts in foreign a f f a i r s , 
Can also exert t h e i r influence in t h i s regard by l e v e l l i n g 
Valid c r i t i c i sm and suggesting remedies. The role of Parliament 
i s not fixed as the p o l e s t a r . ¥ i t h a strong Opposition within 
the Parliament, i t s ro le can be enhanced. The ro le of 
Parliament in foreign pol icy i s t h a t of scrut iny. I t can 
conduct enquir ies i f i t i s not furnished with relevant infor»« 
o 
matiori. The duty of the Esecutive i s , t o develop means to keep 
the Parliament well*-informed. The t imely information fed to 
Parliament, woiild enable i t to influence the decisions and to 
1. J,C# Kunzru, "Formulation of i id ian Foreign Pol icy", 
parliamentary Studies^ Vol, I I , No, ^ September 1958, 
p . 22. 
2, Paul Martin, "The Role of the Canadian Parliament in the 
Formulation of Foreign Pol icy" , Par i lament arian (London), 
Vol, I , October I969, p . 26if, Also see p . 255 where the 
l i n e s occur, " • . . , Parlieiment i s concerned with the 
r e a l i t i e s of the day and i t s Members therefore need 
specia l opportuni t ies and f a c i l i t i e s " . 
79 
f u l f i l i t s function of keeping people in touch with the 
publ ic a f f a i r s , iinother factor which determines the influence 
of Parliament i s the nature of the pa r ty system. In a s ing le -
par ty system, fundamental difference i s not v i s i b l e between 
the Government and the Legis la ture and the Government dominates. 
In the American two-party system "fluid major i t ies give the i 
l e g i s l a t u r e ^great iniportance*•« In the Br i t i sh two-party system 
where the pa r ty d i sc ip l ine i s r i g i d , a qjajority Government, 
commanding a reasonable majority in the House of Commons i s 
f a i r l y secure from in te r fe rence . A s tab le mul t i -par ty system 
can para lyse the Government as for example, in the Fourth 
Republic and to some extent in the German cons t i tu t ion . The 
Indian pos i t ion i s unique and appreciably d i f fe ren t , despi te 
the mul t i -par ty system, the Congress has been in power a t 
the centre with overwhelming majority* During the f i r s t and 
the second Parliaments, the re was s t ream-rol l ing majority 
of the Congress Party. Consequently, parl iamentary approval 
of the pol icy was a formality* 
The Rules of Procedure in the Indian Parliament, 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y provide provis ions for a well-planned control 
over po l i cy discussions* The Parliament can withhold assent 
1. Frankel, OP. c i t * . p .25 
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on any pol icy motion and reso lu t ion . Whether the po l icy 
i s approved or not , de ta i led discussion and debate occurs 
on i t . The Members also put for th many pieces of advice, 
which may affect the future course of po l icy dec is ions . The 
other instruments of parliamentary con t ro l , discussed l a t e r 
a t l a r g e , are the Adjournment Motions, No-Confidence Motions, 
Short-Notice Questions, Half-an-hour discussions and Question-
Hour.^ These modes of accountabi l i ty , in a parl iamentary system 
enable the Parliament to throw a p i e r c ing search- l ight in 
every nook and comer of pol icy decis ions and ac t ions . Nothing 
f a l l s short of the perview of Parliamentary scrut iny . The 
opinion of the members of Parliament, as expressed during 
debates, help to ident i fy the cont rovers ia l i ssues with 
the public-opinion, which acts as a r e s t r a i n on the pa r ty -
decision^ making in the House# 
The Parliament can also influence the formulation of 
the foreign pol icy through i t s Consultative r o l e . The p r a c t i c e , 
however, va r ies from s t a t e to s t a t e . In the TJhited S ta tes of 
America,the convention of consult ing the Secre tar ies of S t a t e , 
President and individual Congressmen has grown. The House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign 
1. Richard L. Park, "Indians Foreign Policy^' in Roy C. 
Macridis, Foreign Policy in iferld P o l i t i c s , (ed,) I I ed. 
Eaglewood d i f f s , Prent ice Hall , 1962, p . 3 0 1 . 
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Relations perform not only an important consul ta t ive function 
but also keep a' constant check on foreign pol icy , through t h e i r 
i nqu i r i e s , hearings and cross-examinations of members of the 
Executive, in the United Kingdom^such a formal committee of 
Parliament i s lacking, though there i s the convention of consul-
t a t ion between the Members of government and important Members 
of Parliajnent, However, in India such a Consultative Ctommittee 
of ParliaJtnent i s in existence* The d e t a i l s with regard to the 
working and functioning of t h i s Committee have been given in 
the Chapter on the Bole of Parliament, 
PARLIAMMTAHY COMMITTEES; 
The Committees of the Parliament are one of the 
effect ive ways of legislati:^^' control over the foreign po l i cy . 
Their nature and size var ies ftom s t a t e to s t a t e . They are 
found in the l e g i s l a t u r e s of the European countr ies and the 
United Sta tes of ^ e r i c a , but in most of the Commonwealth -
Parl iaments, such Committees are missing. In ,Creat Br i t a in , 
the se t t ing up of such Committees has been advocated but the 
Opposition p a r t i e s are re luc tan t to join a committee^which 
would remain committed to the po l icy , advocated and pursued 
by the government, Miere there i s a good deal of agreement 
between the government and the Opposition about foreign po l icy 
in the Commonwealth count r ies , the Opposition p a r t i e s p re fe r 
to avoid cooperation through the Parliamentary-Committees, 
1. Wheare, on. c i t . , pp, 185'*89 
82 
Foreign Affairs Committees of the Parliament are not 
l e g i s l a t u r e s themselves. The Minister of Foreign Affairs 
would frankly e g r e s s h is ideas in the Committee^if he i s 
assured that what he says ,wi l l not he divulged to the 
l e g i s l a t u r e as a whole. Membersof t h i s Committee are bound 
to maintain secrecy. I t i s pointed out ,wi th regard to the 
working of the Foreign Affairs Committee t ha t i t keeps the 
Legislature in the dark about the discussion tha t occurs'on 
i t s forum. The democraiic control of foreign po l icy i s not 
achieved through such Committees, Their u t i l i t y i s mitigated^ 
though t h e i r work i s highly evaluated. 
The extent to which the Parliaments and the Foreign 
Affairs Committees can be kept informed, depends on the 
nature of tha t countrys ' foreign po l icy , lihere the country 
pursues a po l icy of neutralism or non-alignment, the Parliament 
and i t s Committees woiild remain qui te informed, ^Whatever be 
the extent of information to the Parliament and i t s Committees^ 
the importance of i t s impact remains i n t a c t . In foreign 
pol icy matters the Committees and the Parliament play a 
second f iddle to the Executive branch of the government. 
In a parliamentary system, l i k e ours , the Parliament seldom 
provides p r i o r consul ta t ions , Hhat i t a v a i l s , i s the opportunity 
to approve f a i t accomplish The Parliament exists .,to approve 
of the broad ou t l ines of the foreign policy^ which provides 
confidence to the Executive , that i t enjoys parl iamentary 
approval. The need i s to improvise and galvanize the working 
of i t s Committees and increase parl iamentary accountabi l i ty . 
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CHAPTSa I I I 
INSTRUMEOTS OF PARLIAMSICTARY GONTBQL OF K)R£IGH POLICY 
QUESTION-HOUR 
Question-hour i s the f i r s t hour of every s i t t i n g i n 
the P a r l i a m e n t . I t i s one of the most widespread procedur2s 
2 
•1 
in parliamentary prac t ice and the most i n t e r e s t i n g par t of 
parliamentary proceedings. 
The procedure of asking questions i s Br i t i sh in or ig in 
and charac te r . I t a t t r a c t s the g a l l e r i e s and gives to the 
Parliament the great significance , i t possesses . The r a t i o of 
questions on a pa r t i cu la r f i e ld shows the i n t e r e s t of members. 
in the administrat ion of foreign pol icy problems. Raising 
questions i s a modern method for supervising the general policy 
pursued by the Government.-^ 
Asking questions is on& of the "surest ways of bringing 
k 
administrat ion to book.". I t i s a regular feature of the 
Parliamentary l i f e in India which f a c i l i t a t e s to put the 
Government on parliamentary t r i a l . 
^* Parl iaments, Inter-Parl iamentary Union, Capetown, 
Gassoll , Unwin Brothers , 1962, p .271 . Also s ee , Ibid . , 
p . 267. 
2 . S.L. Sankdher, "Administrative Accountabi l i ty to 
Parliament", Indian Journal of Public Administration 
Vol. XII, No. 3 , July-September, 1966, p , 360, 
3« B.B, Tiwari , "Parliamentary Questions", Journal of 
Const i tu t ional and Parliamentary Studies^ Vol. I , No. 3 
July-September 1967, p.37« Also see Macridis, OP . c i t . , p.38 
k-, Sankjdiier, QPI. c i t . . p . 367 
Qh 
ORIGIN OF PARLIftMSiNTARY QUESTIONS; 
The Br i t i sh Parliament's procedural committee 
described question-hour a s , the readies t and the most effect ive 
method of parliamentary control over the act ions of the Executive, 
In Great Br i t a in , the f i r s t question in Parliament was asked 
in connection v/ith foreign a f f a i r s . However, in India, i t was 
not so . In the f i r s t session of Parliament on 28th January 
1950, no question was ra ised and the f i r s t par t of the Procee-
2 dings v/ith regard to questions waS never published. 
This mode of d i rec t "catechis ing" is not foliov?ed 
in a l l the coun t r i e s . In India the present procedure of 
questioning was adopted as a resul t of severa l modif icat ions . 
The present Eules of Procedure in Lok Sabha contain the raison 
d'i^tre of the experience gained over the yea r s . Under the Indian 
Ctouncil' ' Acts of I86 I , the function of the Legis la t ive 
Council was l imited to l e g i s l a t i o n . The members could not 
enter in to grievances, c a l l for information or examine the 
conduct of the Executive through ques t ions . There v/as no such 
questioning procedure• After l88^ when the A.I.C.G, came into 
ex is tence , i t i n s i s t ed on responsible government. Lord Dufferin, 
the then Viceroy, in his I888 Despatch recommended i n t e r a l i a , 
1. Tiwari , oo. c i t . . p , 38 
2 . Parliamentg-ry Deb9.tesy Part I I , Proceedings other than 
Questions and Answers, Off ic ia l Report, Vol, I , 
1950, 28th January 195O to 23rd Pfebruary 19^0, 
I Session, CJolumn I , 
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the r ight of asking questions by members of the Legis la t ive 
Council. The next stafee came during the Minto-Morley Reforms 
by the Indian Council' • Act of 1909* Under the Moi^t^gu/ 
Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, the Legis la ture bedame bicameral and 
i t s powers increased. Under these Rules , not more than five 
quest ions, asked by the same member could be cal led for ansv/ers. 
The landmark in th i s regard vas reached in 19^7-50» the most 
s igni f icant of a l l changes, occurred when the Rules with regard 
to questions on foreign a f fa i r s were abrogated yet the number of 
questions kept on inc reas ing . 
After 1950, severa l a l t e r a t i o n s are made such as with 
regard to l imi ta t ions of number of questions for o r a l answers 
and half-an-hour discussion e t c . 
PROCEDURAL GHANGfiS DURING THE THIRD LOK SABHA; 
During the Chinese-aggression, when the country was 
facing grave emergency, the Third Lok Sabha came into ex i s t ence , 
•1 
The President proclaimed i t on 26th October 1962* The Speaker , 
in a meeting on November 7, 1962, with the l eaders , represen-
ta t ives of a l l Opposition groups in the House and the Minister 
of Parliamentary Affairs^decided upon the three procedural 
changes which are spec ia l ly about the three ty^QS of Questions 
which are as follows: 
1 • Starred 
2 . Unstarred 
3 • Short Notice C^uestions 
The l a t t e r being the questions which r e l a t e to a 
matter of urgent public importance and can be asked with 
1. I b i d . , pp. 38-ifO, 
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s h o r t e r n o t i c e than the pe r iod of not i c e _, pre s c r i b e d for an 
o r d i n a r y q u e s t i o n . 
RULES RELATING TO QUESTIONS; 
A minimum of t e n c l e a r days no t i ce i s n e c e s s a r y 
for a ques t ion to be answered. The M i n i s t e r s a r e however, 
e n t i t l e d on ly to f ive d a y s , no t i ce before ques t ion i s put on 
the Order Pape r . 
ALLOTMENT OF DAIS K)R QUESTIONS: 
After the f i x a t i o n of the da t e s of s i t t i n g of a 
s e s s ion of Lok Sabha, a l lo tment of the time a v a i l a b l e for 
answering of ques t ions with regard to va r ious m i n i s t r i e s on 
d i f f e r e n t days i n r o t a t i o n i s made. I f on the a l l o t t e d day, 
ho l iday f a l l s , the ques t ion w i l l not be asked dur ing the v/hcle 
week,'' And the M i n i s t e r to whom the ques t i on i s a d d r e s s e d , 
s h a l l f o r t h with_,lay on the Table^a w r i t t e n r e p l y to the ques t ion 
and no o r a l r e p l y w i l l be r equ i r ed for such a q u e s t i o n and 
2 
consequen t ly , no supplementary ques t ions s h a l l be r a i s e d t h e r e o f . 
After the da te i s announced for the s e s s i o n , l i s t 
of ques t ions c a l l e d "Subject L i s t " i s given to the M i n i s t e r s 
concerned, .Questions are an in format ive device hence t h e i r 
scope i s reasonq.bly l i m i t e d . On the l i s t of ques t ions not more 
than t h i r t y ques t ions can be l a i d for Ora l answers i n one day . 
2 . I b i d . , p . ^7« 
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The M i n i s t e r s are supp l i ed with ques t ions a t l e a s t f ive . 
days before the date i s f ixed for a sk ing ques t ions» Af te r 
the ques t ion i s r a i s e d by a M i n i s t e r , i t i s open to any 
member of the House t o ask supplementary q u e s t i o n s ; and i n 
Ind ia they a re alarffl;kngly r a i s e d , A Member can withdravj a 
ques t ion by Notice before the s i t t i n g for which h i s ques t ion 
has been placed on the l i s t . Answers t o ques t ions proposed 
to be given i n the House by the M i n i s t e r s a re not open for 
p u b l i c a t i o n , u n t i l they have been a c t u a l l y given on the f l oo r 
of the House or l a i d on the t a b l e * They are pu rpose fu l l y 
not open for pub l i c p e r u s a l . 
SHORT NOTICE QlISSTIOKS: 
In a day not more than two such ques t ions a re put 
u p . The average number of shor t n o t i c e Questions in the 
s e s s i o n of s i x weeks d u r a t i o n i s about 1 2 . Even t h i s q u e s t i o n 
2 
can be followed by s u b s i d i a r y s h o r t - n o t i c e Ques t ions . 
HALF AN HOUR DISCUSSION; 
As a mat te r of s u f f i c i e n t p u b l i c importance t h i s 
d i s c u s s i o n i s provided as an of fshot of the Ques t ion Hour.-^ 
1» I b i d . , pp . ^ 3 , ^ 5 , ^ 7 , and M-9 
2 . I b i d . , p . 50 . 
3 . T i w a r i , O P . c i t . ^ p . ^0 
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Thus the question-hour pinpoints the adminis trat ive 
1 
errors and p u t s / ' a search l ight on i t s f a i l u r e s " . ' 
QUEST ION-HOUR IN PRAGTIGS; 
The Questions can be raised indiv idual ly as well as 
in co l labora t ion . For example, the Oral question No.H-0, v/ith 
regard to the Colombo Powers' fresh move to s e t t l e Sino-
Indian border Dispute was raised by 7 members in co l l a -
y 
boration namely, P.K. KumacSn, R.K. Bhuwalka, S.C.Deb, 
Krishna Ghundra, M.P. Bhagawa'-,' A. Subba Rao, and A.M. Tariq.'^' 
In the f i r s t Session of the I I Lok Sabha, the number 
of quest ions, Oral and wri t ten was as follows: 
(1) Oral answers to Questions- '^h'}) 
(2) Written answers to Questions - 559 
Only H- questions were about the Sino-India border 
t i lspute, in which none was of any ser ious na tu re . 
And in the I I Session of the Parliament,qnly one 
qusstion was ra ised with regard t© Indo-Pakistan Ganal Viator 
Dispute CQ. WO. 8 1 ) 19 Members ra ised i t , ^ and every Minis ter , 
1. Ibid. 
2. Parliamentary Debates ^  Rajya Sabha, Official Report 
Vol. XLV, Ko.2, 19*11.1963, Col. 238. 
3. Lok Sabha Debates ^  II Series, No. 17, Vol. II, 315-57, 
Gol, 3133. 
^» Ibid.^ Gol. 3202. 
5. Lok Sabha Debates. I I Se r i e s , Vol. I l l , No.2, 16.7.57 
Cols. 3633-3'+. 
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may 
v;hose concern i t /have been, v/as there to bear his respon-
s i b i l i t y for his ac ts of omission and corcraission. I t i s 
during the Question-Hour tha t , " the Government i s able to 
quickly fee l the pulse of the nation and adopt i t s po l i c i e s 
and act ions accordingly". 
Questions ra ised by Members help to efface 
misconceptions from the minds of the members of Parliament» 
They are meant to gather information on a cer ta in spec i f ic 
i s sue , for instance Bans i l a l enquired from the Prime Minister 
whether the Chinese mi l i t a ry contingent has tirithdrawn from 
the demil i tar ised zone in Ladakh and v/hat steps the Goveiemnen.t 
took to meet the s i t u a t i o n , Dinesh Singh informed the House 
that a Protest Wote^against i t s establishment had been 
lodged with the Chinese Government. 
Through Questions in Parl iament, the Members get 
an opportunity to maintain t h e i r day to day contact with 
toheir const i tuencies and the public in general , whose 
grievances of executive or administrat ive character are 
brought to the notice of the Government. Questions a lso 
enable the ministers to gauge the popular react ion to t h e i r 
policy and* adminis t ra t ion . This a lso keeps the c i v i l servant 
on his t o e s . I t also compels the Ministers to be a l e r t , 
thus preventing those pe t ty in jus t i ces which are commonly 
1* Tewari, OP. c i t . ^ p . 37 
2 . Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Off ic ia l Reports , 
Vol. XLIV, K0.3, 16th August, I963 . Written question 
No. 80 Col. 372. 
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1 
associated with bureaucracy and parliamentary democracy. 
Similar ly in 1959 > when Jaswant Singh saw a report 
about the Chinese crossing the Indian border at Barahoti , he 
enquired of Madam Laxmi Menon i f the report was correct and the 
l a t t e r repl ied in the negative sa t i s fy ing the p a r t i c u l a r Weraber 
as well as the House .'^ Questioning i s a device to keep the 
House informed of the l a t e s t developments in any f i e l d . Question-
hour i s the l i v e l i e s t time in Parl iament . I t appears to be an 
engrossing period for the Cabinet and the Members of Parl iament. 
If i t i s des i rab le , the question can lead to fur ther quest ions . 
The purpose of supplementary questions i s to ex t rac t information 
not to enter in to an argument with the Minister concernea,-' 
1. Tiwari , Op. c i t . ^ p.52 
2» Parliamentary Debates^ Rajya Sabha, Off ic ia l Heport, 
Vol, XX7I, Wo,3, 19.3". 1959? wri t ten question No.27'+ 
c o l . 1101, 
3 , See, Parliamentary Debates, Raoya Sabha, Off ic ia l Report 
Vol. LIX. 1^0.2, 8,9.6M-. Oral answer to Question No.Bo, 
Cols, 228-229- raised in col laborat ion by Eaini Reddy, 
S. Rama, Mahabir Dass to furnish information about the 
fact of Chinese i n f i l t r a t i o n in to North East of Bhutan, 
t he i r claim l ine in Tashi Yatse e t c . , the construct ion 
of the Chinese a i r f i e l d s , Mrs, Laxmi Menon repl ied 
that about the former, there i s no information, the middle 
one, in the negative and confirmed the l a s t one about the 
newly constructed net work of roads and publ icat ion of 
wrong maps. Also see the wr i t ten answer to question 
No.¥f, c o l . 238. 
Also s ee . Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, 
Off ic ia l Report, Vol, XLIV, No. 3 , 16*8.63, o r a l answer 
to question No,75, c o l s . 353 -^ . When the Deputy Minister 
Shri D.R, Chavan gave a pos i t ive information to the 
question"how many times China has viola ted the 
Indian a i r space sincefsJie declared u n i l a t e r a l cease - f i r e?" 
Contd 
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Miile answers may be long or short according to the 
mood of the Minis ter , questions should be short and to the 
point* The Members of the Eaaya Sabha are more prone to 
argumentation; as compared to Members of the Lok Sabha. 
(Continued from the previous page) 
raised b j R.S» Khander, Shri Ram Sahay, Chavan sa id , "T;i?elve 
times since 21st November 1962 on the basis of information 
avai lable to date to Government", 
Also s e e , for information Q, 1966* "Chinese in t rus ion 
into Indian t e r r i t o r y " . 
Question No, 9 raised by Shri Raffi Singh and K.C.Baghel 
asked the Minister of Defence to S t a t e : 
(a) the d e t a i l s of intrusions of the Chinese troops in to 
Indian t e r r i t o r y during the l a s t three months; 
(b) vvhat i s the number of c a s u a l i t i e s suffered by both 
sides in clashes that the intrusions due to the Indian 
Defence forces^ 
Minister of Defence, Y.B. Chavan: 
(a) "During the period from November 1965 to Jan,1966, 
the Chinese committed -^0 in t rus ions into Indian 
t e r r i t o r y and Sikkim, sec tor wise d e t a i l s i s given 
below. 
NEFA . . . . 11 
Sikkim . . . . 8 
Ladakh . . . . 20 
U.P 1 
Total ho 
1, Editoria^lly,"Questionable", Indian Express. (Now Delhi), 
16.5«68, The Rajya Sabha member is compared to Oliver 
Gold Smith's, village school master, who,though vanquished, 
keeps on arguing. 
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Question-Hour brings to l igh t the pr inc ip le of 
min i s te r i a l r e spons ib i l i t y and the re fo re , the Question-Hour 
and the i n t e r - p e l l a t i o n does not happen to be a mere device 
for obtaining information, but a very d i rec t form of cont ro l , 
which i s l inked up with the h i s to ry of the parliamentary system 
i t s e l f J 
Undoubtedly, r a i s ing question i s a valuable r ight of a 
.Member of Parliament.^ Like the 19th century Great Br i t a in , the 
questions are raised and answered in India with appal l ing 
frankness.^ The Supplementary Questions put the Ministers to 
acid tes t s« It may often expose the fa i lures of the policy 
dec i s ions . The answers by the Ministers should convince the 
Parliament of the Min i s te r ' s answers of t h e i r departmental 
a c t i v i t i e s . It subsequently builds the image of success on the 
general publ ic , 
Question-Hour i s not only a device to e l i c i t facts but 
also to provide an opportunity for the display of parliamentary 
r eac t i ons . A supplementary question involves subt le care ^as i t 
can not only s ide t rack Oppositional comments but a lso confuse 
1. Parl iaments, o p . c i t . . p .265. Also s e e , Tiwari , 
OP, c i t , . p . 52, "'liie Question Hour i s the very l i f e of 
parliamentary democracy. I t gives tone and v i t a l i t y 
to the i n s t i t u t i o n and on the maioneijtLn which the ;;uestion 
Hour i s u t i l i z e d depends the degree of success which 
democracy can achieve. And in India t h i s i s democratically 
u t i l i z e d " , 
2 . Shankdher, O P , c i t , ^ p . 361, 
3 . Peter G, Richards^ Parliament and gjreign Affairs« London, 
George Allen and Unwin,.1967, p . 8 3 , 
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the whole mat ter . I t can be a su i t ab le device to fur ther 
elucidate any issue i f per t inent question and pinpointed ans\'rer 
i s given. 
Sometimes very relevant and pert inent questions are 
raised and answered on the floor of the fbuse, Regarding 
the Sino-India border d ispute , Ram Subhag-Singh asked the length 
and breadth of the road constructed by the Chinese Government 
in the Indian t e r r i t o r y in Ladakh, In 195'^ -> the Government got 
the information for the f i r s t time that th i s road is being 
constructed. The Government was doing i t s best to stop th i s 
construct ion. Nehru furnished t h i s information in d e t a i l s , tha t 
the Sinkiang Gartok High-way ran approximately 100 miles 
through the Indian t e r r i t o r y in Eastern e.xtremity of /iksai-Chin 
in Ladakh» The f i r s t doubts arose in 1957 and the follovfing 
summer, the Indian Government decided to send two reconnaissance 
p a r t i e s . Having confirmed th i s news, a Protest Note was lodged 
by Delhi on l8.10*1958* Many supplementary questions follov/ed 
th i s information. Thus the Parliament was furnished v/ith 
1. Parliamentary Debates^ Rajya Sabha, Off ic ia l Report, 
Vol. XXVII, No. 1, Oral question No.15, Cols. 22-25. Also 
see Parliamentary Debates, Parliament of Ind ia , Off ic ia l 
Report, Vol, I , No,1, 6,2,52 Part I , c o l s . 1-2, Oral answer 
to question No, 2 , where the question was asked by Shri Raj 
Kanwar about the "U.N, mi l i t a ry observers in I^shmir", 
t he i r s t rength the contingent which met t h e i r expenditure, 
the country of o r ig in and the number of observers . 
9^ 
relevant information by the answers. A question, in fac t , 
i s pr imari ly asked for the purpose of obtaining information 
on a matter of public importance. Questions which contain 
arguments, inferences or defamatory statements or otherwise 
refer to the character or conduct of any person except in 
his o f f i c i a l or public capacity are not admitted by the 
Speaker. Moreover, i f the subject matter of a question is 
sub~,iudice, i t i s not permitted to be r a i sed . The most 
s igni f icant point about a question being that questions 
d i r ec t l y involving policy-matters are not allowed, for i t i s 
not possible to enunciate completely pol ic ies within the 
compass of an answer to a question, Furthermore i t i s not 
desirable to disclose the secret i n t r i c a c i e s involved in a 
policy dec is ion . Sometimes such questions are ra ised V7hich 
act as the gambit for a challenge to government pol icy in the 
2 
form of a br ie f in te r roga t ion through supplementary quest ions . 
The vol ley of questions keeps the Government v ig i l an t 
and a l e r t . Asked by B.D, Khobarsgade, about the publicat ion 
1. Tiwari , op. c i t , , pp. k-3'-¥+. Also see the Annexure 
attached therev/ith between pages 53 and ^5 under the 
capt ion,"condit ion of admiss ib i l i ty of ques t ions . " 
IfJhere such flules occur (XI), " i t sha l l not ra ise questions 
of pol icy too large to be dea l t with within the l imi ts 
of an answer to a quest ion. 
2, Richards, op, c i t « , p . 87. 
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of a wrong map in the Chinese magazine, 'China -Encounter' , 
Mrs. Laxrai Menon repl ied that the Government endeavoured 
to efface the misconception from the minds of o ther s t a t e s 
through i t s information services to correct the erroneous 
impression createci by the Chinese false p u b l i c i t y . 
Often, very s i l l y questionaare r a i s ed . As, in the 
wake of Chinese threat on NEFA, Earn Subhag Singh, in co l l a -
boration with Shr i Badha Raman, Smt. Mafida Ahmad and 
Bhagwati, asked Nehru, i f the press report about the v i l l age 
Aka being washed away was correct as mentioned in the 
Statesman (New Delh i ) , October 26, 1957* Nehru confirmed that 
2 
the report vjas " f i c t i t i o u s " and b a s i c a l l y without "foundation" 
Both the members of the Party in power and Opposition 
u t i l i s e t h e i r r ight in th i s r e spec t . Sometimes the questions 
are directed to e i t h e r the Prime Minister or the Foreign 
Minis ter , or the Deputy Minister or the Minister of S t a t e , 
Often, d i f f i cu l t and embarrassing questions are r a i sed , anyw-ay 
the Minister of iiixternal Affairs cannot dodge the barrage of 
questions encountering him. Like debates , the Question-Hour 
1. Parliamentary Debates, Bajya Sabha, Off ic ia l Report, 
Vol, XXVIII, No. 3 , 10.2.60, Written question No,60,Gol.2»+2, 
2 , Lok Sabtia Debates, I I Se r i e s , No.23, Vol. X, 10.12,57 
Column, ^'+39. 
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procedure remains under the cont ro l of the Speaker, and i f the 
Speaker ever f a i l s to exert his proper con t ro l , the Question-
Hour and the supplementaries may degenerate into a frivolous 
debate, ' ' 
Sometimes the question are not ansi-jcred on the ground 
of public i n t e r e s t . I t s notable example was the refusa l by 
Y.B* Ghavan on the ground that i t was not in the public i n t e r e s t 
when P.L* Kureel asked him to d isc lose the Governments ascer ta in-
ment v;ith regaiCd to the new roads and border posts constructed by 
the Chinese government to increase road building in EEFA.2 
However, due to the fear of quest ions , the Government keeps i t s 
accounts in an apple pie order . 
The Ministry of External Affairs i s often questioned 
about i t s pub l i c i ty function. On the floor of the House, 
r a i s ing the bogey of questions i s not monopolised by a pa r t i cu l a r 
1. Tiwari, op . c i t . . p . ^ . Also s ee , Ramesh Narayan Mathur, 
"Parliamentary Procedure in India" , Parliamentary Studios, 
Vol. 2 , No. 3, October, 1958, p . 29. Where he wr i tes , 
"The Speaker as the guardian of the r igh t s and pr iv i leges 
of the House i s bound to admit question V7hich bring to l igh t 
abuses and in jus t ices of the admin i s t r a t ion , " 
2 . P,arliamentary Debates^ Rajya Sabha, Off ic ia l Report TSol.XLIX, 
No. 7, 15th September 1964-, wr i t t en answer to question No.200 
c o l s . 1332-3• Also see , co l . 13^2, in the same debate wri t ten 
answer to question No.37, ra i sed by Ram Sahay in connection 
with aerodromes bu i l t by China near the Indian border, l^bstly 
a f t e r 1957 the questions on foreign a f fa i r s were asked on 
China hence the freauent reference to these quest ions . 
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Ministry or Minis ter . With regard to the Ministry of 
Sxternal Affairs various members were obliged to answer 
on the floor extending the area of information of the Msrabers 
of Parliament. 
An unguarded and spontaneous reply on a matter of 
foreign policy can produce an awkward s i t u a t i o n for the 
Government. The Minister has to be careful and cautious in 
his answers, and, moreover, has to keep^himself well av/are 
of facts and developments so as to avoid any embarrassment. 
There has been a steep r i s e in the number of 
questions raised against the Minis t ry of Sxternal Affa i r s . 
The following Table shows the r i s e in quest ions , 
ra ised against the Ministry of External Affairs between 
1957 and 19 61.'' 
rears Total -Questions Questions under EA Percentage 
1957 
19 ?8 
1959 
I960 
1961 
1. Second Lok 
8,310 
13,806 
13,992 
12,212 
m,^o 
Sabha, Act iv i t i e s 
327 
"^15 
626 
588 
717 
and Achievements, 
3.91.^ 
4-.l6;^ 
^.W 
^.79.^ 
^+.95/^  
19^7-62, 
Lok Sabha S e c r e t a r i a t , New Delhi , 1962, Statement 
No. XIII , p . 25 
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The number of Starred Questions answered during the 
Question-Hour has been on the decrease from Lok Sabha to Lok 
Sabha. In the F i r s t Lok Sabha/52*-57| the average number of 
que St ions ora3.1y ansv/ered l^ a^s 15 to 20 but in the Third Lok 
Sabha of 1962-6?, the number of questions o r a l l y ansv/ered came 
down to 5 and 10» The average of o r a l l y questions in the House 
of Commons i s 22 to 25• 
In fac t , a question acts as a ca ta lys t which forces 
Government to frame policy a f te r prolonged period of hes i t a t ion 
2 
and doubt• Sometimes questions may lead to the appointment of 
a commission, a court of enquiry or even l e g i s l a t i o n when matters 
raised have been grave enough to a g i t a t e the public raind,-^ 
STATBMH^ M! SHOV>iII^ G THE NUMBER OF QUOSSTIOKS UMDER 
V J ^ I O U S M I M I S T . ' : R I B S AHSWBRSD I N THS SECOm LOK SA3PIA 
CI3PT0 THE EHD OF 15TH SESSION)TT 
Name o f M i n i s t r y Number o f 
questions 
Defence 2,33^+ 
Atomic Energy/ (Dept. of) 265 
External Affairs and P.M. S e c t t . 2,829 
Home Affairs 5j^92 
Total Cof questions in 
a l l Min is t r r i es ) 62,800 
1. Tiwari, op. c i t » , p» ^ . 
2 . Richards, op. c i t . , p . 88, 
3 . Tiwari , O P . c i t . . p .37 . 
^» Second Lok Sabhat a c t i v i t i e s and Achievements, 1957-62, 
Lok Sabha S e c r e t a r i a t , New Delhi (62), Table No.Jp;i. 
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The method of questions and parliamentary in te r roga t ion 
i s important in a var ie ty of ways. I t enables to obtain the 
Governments' views on a changing s i t u a t i o n or a new problem. 
I t keeps the Minister in touch with public opinion and provides 
an opportunity for c r i t i c s to challenge any aspect of foreign 
pol icy . I t i s a "safety valve and swift method of ca l l ing 
2 
a t t en t ion to wrongs otherwise overlooked". 
1 . Also see , Kenneth Young, "Public Opinion and 
Foreign Pol icy" , The Br i t i sh Journal of 
Socioloavf 1955, Vol. VI, pp. 172-73, in v/hich 
the values of question time i s s t r e s sed , 
2 . Tiwari, op. c i t . , Tiv.'ari c i t e s Alfred C.Bossom 
to have explained i t as a vehicle for both Governments 
and members to d i spe l l i l l u s i o n s , explain uncer-
t a i n t i e s , remedy in jus t i ces and reassure the pub l i c . " 
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The fol lowing t a b l e r e v e a l s the t r end of the number 
of ques t ions asked under var ious M i n i s t ' r i e s , The Minis t - r ies 
which have been the sub jec t of major a t t e n t i o n a r e Pbod, 
A g r i c u l t u r e , Commerce, Development and Coopera t ion , Home 
A f f a i r s , Educat ion and Railways and each r eco rd ing more than 
7f» of t h e t o t a l followed by Minis t rjies, of Commerce, Defence, 
E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , F inance , Hea l t h , Skmily P l a n n i n g , I r r i g a t i o n , 
Food e t c . , r ecord ing more than y/o o f the t o t a l . The r e s t in 
gene ra l have recorded l e s s than Z% of the t o t a l number of q u e s t i o n s . 
STATEMENT SHOWING TliE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS 
ASKED BY MEMBERS IN THE THIRD LOK SABHA 
DURING THE YEARS 1962-66 UNDER VARIOUS MINIS'JIIEIS ., 
Name of 
M i n i s t g r i e s 
Defence i nc lud ing 
e r s t w h i l e Depar t -
ment of Defence 
Coordinat ion f+th 
& 5th s e s s i o n 
Department of 
Atomic Energy 
Ex te rna l Af fa i r s 
Home Affa i r s 
7 5 3 V- 1 jj 1962 01963 I1196M- 0 1965 5 1966 
ft Total 5 Total fi Total O^o. Total 5 No. P.Total 
I 0 ^ 5 J 
h6h if39 690 7.52 566 5,70 791 6.71 
56 0.50 35 0.38 39 0,39 63 0.53 
565 5*^5 ^01 hM> W?5 ^.78 759 6.Mf 
8J+6 8,01 672 7.32 7^ +9 7.5^ 120J+D.21 
6 ^ 3.82 
107 
823 
161+1+ 
0.63 
if .85 
9.69 
Total 
Act iv i t ies of Third Lok Sabha 1962-67 ( S t a t i s t i c s & Charts) , 
Lok Sabha S e c r e t a r i a t , New Delhi, October I967. 
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A total of 1,62,33V notices of questions were received 
from Members during the sixteen sessions of the Third Lok 
Sabha from 1962-1966, Out of this 58,^*0 questions representing 
about 35^ of the total receipts were admitted. 
Starred questions are those for which oral answers are 
required. Oistarred questions are those for which only 
written answers are to be furnished and short Notice Questions 
require oral answers within short notice. The table below 
shows the proportions of the Notices received and "admitted". 
STATEMENT SHOMING THE DISPOSAL OF qUEgTIONS RECEIVED 
FROM MEMBERS DURING THE SESSIONS OF THE THIRD LOK SABHA. 
Questions No. Percentage ^ e s t l o n s 
to t o t a l 
No. Perce-
tage to 
t o t a l 
Starred 1,^5,580 89*68 
Uhstarred 12,021 7 . ^ 
Short Notice ^,733 2.92 
Starred 
IBi s ta r red 
Short Notice 
Starred qs, 
admitted as 
ISi s ta r red 
1^312 
6,133 
288 
Short 
Not ice 
Questions 
admitted 
as Starred 
and Uhstarred 
1 0 . ^ 
O.I49 
26,916 63.17 
791 1.36 
Total l>62,33if 100.00 58, MK) 100.00 
Ac t iv i t i e s of Third Lok Sabha. I962-67 ( S t a t i s t i c & Charts) , 
Lok Sabha Sec re t a r i a t , New Delhi, October I967. 
102 
MOTIONS AND RESOLUTIONSr 
Motions regarding Ind ia ' s foreign pol icy and Resolutions 
regarding s igni f icant s i tua t ions provide another opportunity to 
the Parliament to control foreign po l i cy . These motions lead to 
lengthy discussions on the f loor of the House r e su l t i ng in the 
pol icy s h i f t s . Mhen the Parliament i s in session, these ^fotions 
and Resolutions enable i t to be kept informed of the l a t e s t 
in te rna t iona l developments. They provide p u b l i c i t y for explanations 
of min i s t e r i a l pol icy and enable the Cabinet to discern t rends 
of the opinion of the Opposition. They create a focus of scru t iny 
for min i s t e r i a l actions and enable the Ministers to present 
t h e i r c l a r i f i c a t i o n s to some of the confusions a r i s i n g in the 
minds of the Members of Parliament which may amount to parliamen-
tsLTy si:pport for the p o l i c i e s of the Government. The Motions 
regarding In terna t ional s i t ua t ions provide ample opportunity for 
an elongated debate on the main t e n e t s and specif ic t rends in 
foreign po l i cy . In India such Motions and Resolutions are moved 
by the Minister of Bjctemal Affairs at a given t ime. The focal 
point of c r i t i c i sm during such discussions i s the fa i lu re of the 
Government of India^ e i the r in the pol icy i t s e l f or in i t s 
implementation in a given s i t i i a t ion . 
Almost during every session Nehru used to move t h i s 
motion, followed by h is broad in t e rp re t a t ion of the in t e rna t iona l 
happenings visi.a'-vis the pol icy followed by the Government of India. 
The motion proceeds by speeches of eminent parliamentariajns. The 
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Opposition members who weigh the pol icy of the Government, with 
e^plaud or jaundiced eye, l eve l c r i t i c i sm against i t or p ra i se i t . 
They freely move amendments and t r y to add things to the o r ig ina l 
motion by a subs t i tu te motion* A f t e r / o n e or two days or even a 
week long debate, the motions are e i t h e r entered and stand 
passed or are rejected* On no occasion during the Nehru regime, 
an important motion was re jec ted . Despite c r i t i c i sms by the 
Opposition p a r t i e s , they ful ly endorsed the pol icy of the Government 
from time to t ime. The longest debates were held on the Sino-
India Border Dispute during 1957> when for the f i r s t t ime, the 
fact of Chinese road building was disclosed to Parliament, most 
of the time was devoted to the discussion of Sino-Indian Border 
Dispute and the pol icy followed by the Government of India* 
Between May 10, 1957 and May 311 1957, during the 1st 
Session of the I I Lok Sabha, 106*36 hours in s i t t i n g s were given, 
no discussion was held under the Ministry of External Affa i rs , 
no s igni f icant foreign pol icy issue was raised* In the 
P res iden t ' s address which spe l l s out the broad pol icy l i n e s of 
h is Government, no reference was made to foreign policy* What 
gained primary was railway budget and general d iscuss ions . This 
r e f l e c t s the non-seriousness of the Members in foreign a f f a i r s 
vla^fiv-g-ifi the economic issues of the nat ion . Even a cursory 
glance at the motions reveals tha t the Members were preocci:tpied 
with the domestic i s sues , hence the absence of any foreign 
i 
policy issue as -^  matter of urgent public importance. 
1. Lok Sabha Debates II Series, Vol. II, No. 17, 31*5.57 
(Resume) col* 3363* 
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Since 19^7 onwards^ China became the p ivot of debates , 
Nehru r ea l i s ed tha t China was something more than a mere 
neighbour and the question of Sino-India border needed 
a t ten t ion ,^ Miile moving the motion regarding in te rna t iona l 
s i tua t ion Nehru appaulded the increasing amount of i n t e r e s t 
that the House s ta r ted taking in in t e rna t iona l a f f a i r s . He 
f e l t t ha t i t was important t h a t not only the -parliament but 
also the whole country should increase t h e i r i n t e r e s t in 
in te rna t iona l a f f a i r s , without, however a t the expense of 
the domestic problems, which always ca l l for primary consi-
dera t ion . The domestic problems are affected so much by 
in te rna t iona l events tha t i t helps to have t h i s l a rge r 
perspec t ive , ULtimately Nehru l e f t t h i s discussion» to the 
House to have as much time as poss ib le to express t h e i r own 
opinions and tender suggestions to the Government for fur ther 
ac t ion . The debate was concluded in ascer ta in ing the approval 
of the po l icy of the Goverment,-^ As compared to Lok Sabha 
debates, the Rajya Sabha debates are l e a s heated, l e s s 
passionate and l e s s sent imental . Since the I4)per House 
consis ts of more sophisfloated personnel , the debates are 
more calculated and co&l. 
1. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report, 
Vol. XVI, No. 8 , iiy.3»i?y. Col. 725. 
2. Ib id , , co l . 1^ 
3. Ib id . , co l . 865. 
105 
In the l a s t session of 1957 Parliament, the Lok Sabha 
discussed the motion on in t e rna t iona l s i tua t ion taking about 
8 hours time,which centered around the looming problems in Ooa, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Ceylon, After a long piay-way with i t 
in which members of Parliament spoke, i t again ended with the 
adoption of the motion approving the Government's po l i cy . All 
the other iijnendment Motions were withdrawn* 
In every session such motions are moved, and i f the 
s i tua t ion i s taxing and demanding, more ^amendment Motions are 
moved and debated. Sometimes the House p r a i s e s the manner in 
which the Government ca r r i e s on i t s business with the wisdom 
and advice of the Parliament in the handling of foreign af fa i rs^ 
Nihar Ranjan Hay, while emphatically supporting the po l i cy of 
the Government, expressed h i s appreciat ion for the way the 
Government had been thoroughly performing i t s duty in terms of 
the pol icy tha t the people of t h i s country have l a i d down through 
t h e i r two Houses of Parliament.-^ 
In 1956,the highest recorded number of s i t t i n g s of the 
Lok Sabha took p lace . I t was 151 t imes, consuming 1026 hours 
in one and a half decade from 1950~66. The next grade was in 1951, 
1. Lok Sabha Debate I I Ser ies , Vol. X, No. 28, 17th 
December 1957| col . 6018 
2. Parliamentary Debates. Rajya Sabha, Off ic ia l Report 
Vol. XXX. No. 8, 18.8.60 co l . I238 statement by Sudhir Gosh. 
3 . Ibid.^ Cols. 171-72 
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• 1 
when in 150 s i t t i n g s 987 hours were enrployed. 
STATEMENT SHOWING THE NUMBER OF DURATION 
OF ANNUAL SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE (UPTO THIRD 
LOK SABHA). 
H ii 
Year I No.of s i t t i n g s ii Duration of s i t t i n g s in Hours 
I \ 
1026 
668 
781 
792 
798 
668 
730 
787 
7?3 
730 
810 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
i960 
19 61 
1962 
1963 
-196if 
1965 
1966 
151 
106 
125 
123 
121 
102 
116 
122 
122 
113 
119 
NO-CONFIDENCE MOTIONS 
b^-Confidence in tl Sometimes Motions of Ncm-Confide  i  the Cfouncil of 
Ministers are adopted. The maximiun were adopted during 1962-»67. 
102-13 hours were consumed in such discussions^which threw 
1. Ac t iv i t i e s of Third Lok Sabha. ( S t a t i s t i c s & Charts) 
October I967, Lok Sabha S e c r e t a r i a t , New Delhi, p , 8 
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ample l i g h t on t h e fo re ign p o l i c y of t h e n a t i o n , consuming 
2#8^ of t h e t o t a l 37^2#U0 hou r s . ^ 
TABLE NO. XXI 
RESOLUTIONS DISCUSSED IN THE THIHD LOK SABHA 
1 
Date/Day on which i Subject 
the Resolution x matter 
was discussed < 
_ 
? Name of the 
j member in-
} charge 
T 
I 
JL 
Time ?Action 
5taken by 
j t h e House 
(A) Government Resolu t ion 
Third Sess ion 
8 a i . 6 2 ) 
9 .11 .62 ] 
10.11 .62 ) 
12 11 62 ^ Chinese Aggression 
13 .11 .62 ) 
l i f .11 .62 ] 
S h r i J .L.Nehru 3 7 A 7 Adopted 
Third Session 
8 .11.62 
9 .11 .62 
10 .11 .62 
12 .11 .62 
13 .11 .62 
l l f .11 .62 
S h r i J .L.Nehru 3 7 A 7 Adopted 
ifipproval of Proclamat ion 
of Bnergency under 
A r t i c l e 352 of t h e 
Government, 
Fourth Sess ion 
19 .3 .63 Admin i s t r a t ive p o l i c y S h r i Hem Barua 1.15 Withdrawn 
by l e a v e of 
t h e House 
Third Lok Sabha. I962-65 a SOUVENIR, P a r t I I : S t a t i s t i c a l 
Sta tements , Lok Sabha S e c r e t a r i a t , New De lh i , March I 9 6 7 , pp 66-67 . 
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T 5 Date/Day on which ? Subject i Name of the 
the Resolution was ? matter % member in-
I 5 charge discussed 
i 
Time Action 
5 taken by 
jl the House 
i 
NEFA 
21,2»6M- Proclamation of 
Bnergency 
Shri Tridib 2,32 negative 
Chaudhuri 
Twelfth Session 
^•3*6^ I Quitt ing of 
2^.9 65 ) Commonwealth 
12.11,65 ) 
26.11.55 ) " 
30.11.65 ) 
Shri Bhagwat 
Jha Azad 
ti 
5.16 
0.25 
0.15 
Not conclu-
ded 
A s u b s t i -
t u t e 
motion by 
Shri S.N. 
Das 
regarding the adjournment 
of the Debate on this was 
adopted by the House on 
12.11. 1965. 
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STATEMMT SHOWING THE TIME TAKEN BY THIRD LOK SABHA ON 
VARIOUS KINDS OF BUSINESS DURING FIRST TO SIXTEENTH SESSION 
T T Type of Business jl Time taken ^Percentage 
5 on each item 5to t o t a l 
^ Hime. i i 
Adjournment motions 
B i l l s -
(a) Govt, B i l l s 
(b) Pr ivate Members Bi l l 
Calling Attention Notices (Rule 197) 
Discussions 
(a) Half-an-hour Discussion (Rule $5) 
(b) Short Duration Discussion 
(Rule 193) 
Motions 
(a) Motions (Rules I9 I & 3^2) 
^(b) Motions of No-Confidence in 
the Council of Minis ters , 
(c) Motions for modification of 
s t a tu to ry Rules, Rule(235)» 
Pres iden ts ' Address 
Questions 
Statement by Ministers (Rules 372) 
Miscellaneous 
Hours Minutes 
* ^1.25 
9^,2^ 
119.3^ 
111.00 
7 
^9/13 
378/^3 
102.13 
6.28 
105*01 
561+.U-1 
68-lfO 
222.27 
1.1 
19.8 
3.2 
3.0 
l.h-
1,6 
10.2 
2.8 
0.2 
2.9 
15.1 
1.8 
6.0 
Total 3732.J<0 100.00 
Ac t iv i t i e s of Third Lok Sabha 1962-^67 ( S t a t i s t i c s & Charts) 
Lok Sabha Secre ta r ia t - New Delhi, October I967. 
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^QTION FOR ADJOURNMENT; 
The Indian Parliament often u t i l i z e s these motions 
to cairry another debate to which i t can lead . I t happens to 
be highly conveBlent for i t allows speeches to range widely 
unres t r ic ted by the terms of a reasoned motion for debate. The 
Adjournment motion can also be used to permit debates i n i t i a t e d 
by the back-benchers. I t also includes hal f -an-hour-discuss ions , 
in the Third Lok Sabha, ^1.25 hours were taken by 
various adjournment motions, which comes to !•!% of the t o t a l 
time consumed by other kinds of business . During the I I I 
Session of the I I Lok Sabha from 11.9.57-21.12.57, 23 such 
motions were received, none was admitted and a l l the motions 
2 
were withheld by the consent of the speaker. 
MINISTERIAL STATMMTS; 
Statements of min i s t e r i a l po l icy are often made to 
the Parliament a f te r the quest ion-Hour. This device of p a r l i a -
mentary process i s useful , for i t enables the Government to give 
the House i t s views of the l a t e s t developipe n t s and many i n t e r -
nat ional i ssues affect ing Ind ia ' s na t iona l i n t e r e s t abroad.^ 
U ActiTri-ties of Third Lok Sabha 1962-67. ( S t a t i s t i c s and Charts) 
Lok Sabha Sec re t a r i a t , New Delhi, October 1957> p . l 8 . 
2. Lok Sabha Debates. I I Ser ies , Vol. X, No.32, 21.12«57,Co.7202. 
3 . See, A.M. Thomas, the Minister of Defence Production, the 
statement r e l a t i ng to s i tua t ion on the India-China Border, 
Parliaiaentary Debates. Rajya Sabha, Off ic ia l Report, Vol. ICX, 
No.3, 16,2.66 co ls . 312-317. He s ta ted "since a 
\ Contd . . . , 
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These statements can be made in reply to private notice 
questions that are pre-arranged with the Ministers, The 
Ministerial pronouncement is generally followed by questions and 
if the matter is of great importance, the leaders of the 
Opposition j^arties can make statements and it can assume the 
status of miniature debate* It is probable that this statement 
may be made and debated on the motion ofor adjournment. 
Some procedural modifications are necessary if the 
Parliament wants to remain fully informed in moments of grave 
crisis and tension. During the III Session of the Lok Sabha 
between 11,9,57 and 21,12,5>7, 59 notices on matters of urgent 
public importance were received and 10 statements were made, 
(Continued from the previous page) 
large number of questions have been asked by members of 
Parliament about the happenings since then, I am making this 
statement to indicate the up to date position". After 
Noveipber 30, 1965, it is the first statement to be made. He 
adds that during the months of December 1965 to January I966, 
the Chinese committed 27 violations I9 of them were in Ladakh, 
h in NEFA, 3 in Sikkim and one in U.P, The Chinese have 
increased their military potential and since then, there has 
been no change of policy of the Government of India, 
1, Lok Sabha Debates. II Series, No. 32, Vol, X, 
21,12^577 Col. 7202. 
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Very often the Ministers make personal statements to the 
Parliament when some misreporting takes place* A minis ter who 
resigns due to pol icy misiinderstanding may also make c l a r i f i -
cat ion-s ta tements . Although such occasions are uncommon, they 
can be debated and commented vipon in l a t e r debates . Most important 
statements made by Nehru are as follows: 
1. Indo-Mest Pakistan Border Conference on 9«2. 62 and 
2. on 23<»3»59 and 8,5»58 on the s i tua t ion in Tibet and . 
3 . on 2^<.3«6l on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference. 
OTHER OPPORTUNITIES; 
The other miscellaneous items in the time t ab l e of the 
Parliament, specia l ly the Lok Sabha? give enhanced f l e x i b i l i t y 
to i t s proceedings providing addi t ional opportuni t ies of discussing 
the foreign a f f a i r s . For ins tance, on the publ icat ion of an 
important repor t , the Government obl iges the House to discuss 
i t s conclusions. Often such a discussion i s disallowed owing 
to the time factor as well as to avoid de ta i led commitments in 
r e l a t ion to the conclusions. In the same way, the p r iva t e 
members' time hardly make any major contr ibut ion to parliamentary 
discussion of foreign pol icy but, however, i t can be of value 
i f used to examine a special ized or secondary topic tha t i s 
2 generally overlooked. Although discussions may also r e s t a t while 
1. Lok Sabha; Ac t iv i t i e s and Achievements,. 1957«62 
Lok Sabha Sec re t a r i a t , I962, New Delhi, pp. I08 , I09 and 
110 Table No. XXXVI, 
2« Richards, OP. c i t . . p . 95 
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considering the repor ts of f inancia l committees, Public 
Accoimts Committee or any other Committee but these Committees 
are not the proper forum for broad discussion on in t e rna t iona l 
problems. The f inancia l committees do not challenge Government 
po l icy , on the contrary they ensure l e g a l i t y and economy in 
the use of public fundsJ 
PABLIMMTARY DEBATES; 
2 
The Parliament, "the forum of debate" i s not allowed 
to t i e i t s hand in negot ia t ions and the course of discussion 
with foreign powers i s not revealed to i t before-hand, i t i s 
p r iv i leged to hold frequent debates to have a know-how of 
i n t e rna t iona l problems and p a r t i c i p a t i o n in those d iscuss ions . 
Hence in both the Houses, a wide-range of topics pe r t a in ing to 
foreign a f fa i r s and pol icy are debated ajid discussed at l a rge 
ranging from the main p r i n c i p l e s , t h e i r relevance to present 
day in t e rna t iona l s i t ua t i on , disarmament, commonwealth t i e s 
to foreign aid and i t s a d v i s i b i l i t y . 
Most of the time in Parliament i s spent on general 
debates , questions and min i s t e r i a l s tatements . The question 
period and the general debates , exemplify the usefulness of 
Par l iament ' s ro le with respect to policy-making.^ Since 
1« Ibid*, pp. 95-6. The statement i s o r i g ina l l y a t t r i bu t ed 
to the Bri t i sh Committees. 
2. K.C. Kheare, o p . c i t . , p . 185 
3 . Leon D, O s t e i n , "Bri t ish Foreign Pol icy" , Boy C.Macridis 
( 6 d . ) , OP. c i t . , p . 38. The statement, though with regard 
to Br i t i sh system i s equally appl icable to Indian Parliament. 
l l i f 
Parliament i s understood to be a 'platform on which views 
sire to be expressed and exchanged" f reely , "a wide range of 
1 
views finds expression in the Parliament". 
Parliament debates foreign pol icy i ssues vigorously 
and .• : s i gn i f i can t ly . I t i s free from independent decis ion-
making. The popular ly elected Lok Sabha i s the main forum but 
occasionally i t i s also discussed in the Rajya Sabha* Debate 
i s an important instrument of influence and controls Though 
both the Houses debate in t e rna t iona l s i t u a t i o n , the Gbvemment 
p r inc ipa l ly defends i t s pol icy in the Lok Sabha# In each 
parliamentary debate, a wide spectrum of views finds a force-
ful expression by members of Parliament, the main centre of 
a t ten t ion i s on the give and take between the pa r ty leaders 
i . e . the Prime Minister and expectant leader of the shadow 
Cabinet. The debate takes p lace between those who are 
l i t e r a l l y responsible for po l icy and those who would l i k e to 
become responsible . In fact i t i s "a discussion between a 
2 
government and i t s a l t e r n a t i v e " . 
In a debate for Motion regarding in t e rna t iona l 
s i tua t ion in the Lok Sabha, the language of which i s always 
the same i s read out by the External Affairs Minis ter , as 
1. ¥.H* Morris Jones, Parliament in India. London, 
Longmans, Green c&Co., 1957, p» 327. 
2. Leon D, Epstein, OP. c i t . . p»37 
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follows; "That the present in te rna t iona l s i tua t ion and the 
pol icy of the CSovemment of India in r e l a t i o n there to be taken 
in to consideration"* Then the in te res ted members p a r t i c i p a t e 
and beg to move a couple of Subst i tute Motions but generally 
a f te r a long discussion the debate ends by a solemn proclamation 
of approval by the Speaker 
"This House having considered the present in te rna t iona l 
policy of -the 
s i tua t ion and the/government of India in r e l a t ion there to 
approves the said po l i cy" . On a p a r t i c u l a r day, i /e . - December 
1957, 6 hours were taken by the above mentioned debate and 
•1 
l a t e r on the motion was adopted. 
In India, the session of Parliament s t a r t s with a 
formal speech by the Pres ident ,del ivered by him in a jo in t 
session* In t h i s speech, the pol icy of the Government or Cabinet 
i s stated* This Address i s followed by a Motion of thanks, 
allowing a wide-ranging examination of government pol icy that 
l a s t s usual ly 5 days* Subsequently the debate on in te rna t iona l 
s i tua t ion takes place* Very often^in a debate on P re s iden t ' s 
address, foreign pol icy becomes the major point of a t t ack . 
Sufih as in the f i r s t session in i960, foreign pol icy was the 
major point of controversy during the debate on P res iden t ' s 
Address, in which a "bit of acrimonious exchange took p lace" . 
1. Lok Sabha Debates. Second Ser ies , No. 28, Vol. X, 
17th December 1967, col . 5879 for the motion moved and 
col . 6018 for motion adopted* 
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To some Members of Opposition, the Note to Cfeiau-ai-lai by 
Nehru seemed,a fundamental reversa l of po l icy as s ta ted 
in the P re s iden t ' s address* Some fttembers cal led i t a betrayel 
of " fa i th" . Never before Nehru has to save h is stand more and 
1 
jus t i fy his po l icy . 
Frei|uency of major foreign po l icy debate var ies very 
considerably. If the in te rna t iona l scene i s tense and causes 
a deep divis ion of opinion between the p a r t i e s , arguments 
thereon shal l be more animated and heated, " i f the 
in te rna t iona l scene i s r e l a t i v e l y peaceful and the p a r t i e s are 
in general agreement in t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards foreign po l icy , 
debates are infrequent and when they do take place are normally 
2 
calm". When in I963, the world was having a peaceful 
atmosphere showing prospects of thaw in the cold«war, the 
nature of debate was quifet. The debate in the ear ly 63, 
affirmed i t s "fresh" f a i t h in non«alignment as a f ru i t fu l po l i cy . 
Even in the serious conf l ic t with China and in the hour of 
danger to Ind ia ' s secur i ty , i t proved to be aji i n t e l l i g e n t and 
sound po l i cy . This was the feel ing among the metabers, only 
the Swatantra Party wanted alignment with the ¥est.-^ 
1» "The Debate on Address", Notes and Comments 
Parliamentary studies^ Vol. IV, No. 3» March i960, p.6« 
2. Paul Martin, "The Bole of Canadian Parliament in the 
Formulation of Foreign Policy", Parl iamentar ian. London, 
Vol. L, October,,1969, p . 262» 
3# BditArial ly, "The Making of Foreign Pol icy", National 
Herald. (Lucknow)y 2 n 3 . I963. 
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The tone of debate i s grea t ly affected by whether i t i s 
expected to end with a challenge to the Government in the 
divis ion lobbies . Waen the speech i s by the Prime Minister^ 
the Chamber remains crammed tip. Since the major p a r t i e s in 
India generally agreed on basic p r i n c i p l e s of foreign po l icy , 
these debates generally ended without a vote being challenged. 
of 
Cri t ics/Parl iament often comment unfavourably about the sca rc i ty 
of a t ten t ion the Members pay in the chamber. One of the r ea l l y 
hot debates in Indian Parliament on a foreign pol icy i ssue was, 
on the a t t i t u d e adopted by the Government of India on Russian 
intervent ion in Hungary. 
There i s a democratic element in debating and holding 
publ ic discussions on v i t a l problems. The iinplication i s tha t 5 i t 
i s a matter for the exper ts , yet i t i s l e s s majest ic to suggest, 
however hes i t an t ly , tha t some aspects of defence are l eg i t ima te ly 
the concern of the e n t i r e cotmtry and therefore should be ful ly 
2 debated, but there i s a tendency in the Government to take 
resor t to the contention tha t ce r ta in matters cannot be discussed 
for secur i ty reasons. Efforts in Parliament and elsewhere to 
obtain mater ial da ta on defence matters generally flounder against 
1. J»C, Kunzru, "Formation of Indian Foreign Pol icy", 
Parliamentary Studies . Vol, I I , No.^, September 1958, 
pp, 21-22. 
2, "Swings of the Pendulum", a r t i c l e by Surveyor, Times of India (New Delhi), 1 1 , if, I960* 
118 
the dea^d wall of secur i ty requirements. Except for a few 
notable contr ibut ion in debate by persons who take an i n t e l l i g e n t 
and keen i n t e r e s t in defence matters and apparently hare t h e i r 
own sources of information, the debates in Parliament reveal 
the handicaps caused by lack of adequate information. 
In Bri ta in and other commonwealth count r ies , the re are 
frequent debates in the l e g i s l a t u r e ? , some d i r e c t l y iipon questions 
2 
of po l i cy , o thers a r i s ing out of debates themselves. Very 
often the nature of debate r e f l e c t s the amount of i n t e r e s t the 
country shows in foreign a f f a i r s . For the Lok Sabha session in-ifte 
mid-December 1962^it i s said, "the temper in the Lok Sabha Debate 
. . . . re f lec ted the new mood of the country. The present c r i s i s 
has spot - l ighted the fact tha t the nation stands so l id ly 
behind Mr* Nehru in Emergency".^ 
Thus,the best opportunity avai lable to the indiv idual 
Members of Parliament to p a r t i c i p a t e in foreign pol icy matter® 
i s the debate which i s held a t i n t e r v a l s in the whole House. 
They support' the pol icy , i f they are s a t i s f i ed and c r i t i c i s e 
i t vehemently, i f they are d i s s a t i s f i e d . The foreign po l i cy 
debate in the Lok Sabha on September 29, 196V,viis "a s p i r i t e d 
1. P. ?.R# Rao, Defence without Drifts Bombay, Popular 
Prakashan, 1970, p . v i , 
2» Wheare, OP* c i t . . p . 19^-. 
3 . The Indian Express. (New Delhi ) , 12.12. I962. 
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debate throughout", when L.M# Singhvi did not give h i s 
support to the non-alignment po l i cy . He f e l t t h a t , "there 
was no need to ex to l " the non-alignment po l icy , "and adopted 
i t for ever" as i t may, "sap the v i t a l i t y of the country" and 
t h a t , "the time had come when the pol icy of exenrplifying 
non-alignment should be reviewed r e a l i s t i c a l l y with a view 
to giving i t a forward looking content" . On the contrary 
Menon favoured i t whole heartedly* 
Debates in Parliament are a wilful obs t ruc t i on ' t o 
Executive despotism. I t provides an opportunity for i ssues 
to be discussed but i t i s only an expostfacto scru t iny of 
i s sues . I t i s i r on i ca l tha t the debates take place a f t e r 
the issue. . is over. They are mere formalitieis but s t i l l they 
affect the Government decisions as the government i s sensilftve 
to Parliamentary opinion* During debates , Jlembers are to 
express as to what cons t i t u t e good for the coimtry and what 
modification of the ex i s t ing po l i cy i s required. During the 
debates, the ilembers have fu l l l i b e r t y to c r i t i c i s e the 
administrat ion for t h e i r pas t performance and suggest how 
they should behave in future or how a p a r t i c u l a r measure 
should be carr ied out or implemented. Actually, adminis-
t r a t i v e accountabi l i ty a r i s e s out of adminis t ra t ive respon-
s i b i l i t y . The parl iamentary debates serve to remind the 
administration of t h e i r du t ies and ob l iga t ions . They affect 
1. The Times of India . (New Delh i ) , 29.9,196^. 
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the adminis t ra t ive thinking and action in a va r i e ty of ways. 
That subtle inf luence, which cannot be measured in terms of 
v i s i b l e u n i t s , pervades every inf luence, within a l l the ranfts 
• 1 
of adminis t ra t ion. Through parliamentary d iscuss ions , the 
Parliament approves the po l i cy . "Mhile implementing i t , the 
Government i s guided by various view po in t s expressed on the 
floor of the House, Whatever may be the i s sue , the tone of 
the discussions and the motions had always ended in the 
approval of the pol icy of the CJovernment of India t h e r e t o . 
The rank and f i l e in India i s l e s s concerned about 
foreign a f fa i r s and foreign po l i cy dilemmas* The account of 
the proceedings in the Lok Sabha i s coinprehensively followed 
vjp by the leading newspapers, to keep the s izable educated 
minority informed of parl iamentary debates. 
In India , the debates in the Houses present t^jroarious 
scenes. An emphatic example was the l a s t day of the Monsoon 
Session of Lok Sabha in September 1970, when the Speaker, 
Dhillon, commented with resentment tha t i f the Hembers could 
s e t t l e "every issue with the show of f i s t s , the re i s no need 
for Parliament. If you s i t in Parliament you have to argue 
and t o l e r a t e each o ther . If you think t h i s i s a forum jus t 
1, S.L. Shankdher, "Administrative Accoxintability to 
Parliament", Indian Journal of Public Administration, 
Vol. XII, No, 3 , July-September 190b, p . 367. • 
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for shouting and showing fists then it is a "wrong forum". 
On the contrary, on less important issues at times the Debates 
take place in peace and calm, as the Winter Session in 1970) 
started in a subdued note without any angry debates or uproarious 
scenes* 
Since one of the most important functions of the 
Members of Parliament is to criticise the executive, they 
debate great issues of public concern. They constitute 
»a grand inquest of the nation^, and act as what John 
Stuart Mill called "a committee of grievances" and **a congress 
of opinions", but it is also not the function of the Parliament 
to be the sole forum of debate or the sole committee of 
grievances in its country's political system, these fiinctions 
2 
must and should be shared with other bodies. These other 
such forums of discussions include, special sessions of 
Committees, Seminars and Symposiums in ISiiversities and 
commentaries in the Newspapers. 
It is hard to comment about the standard of debates 
in Parliament, Sometimes they are high-flown and detailed 
when the mighty-orators like Kriplani, Menon, Minoo Masani, 
Ashoka Mehta are there and sometimes low,when the lot is less 
eaqperienced and less interested in foreign affairs. A Parlia-
mentary Correspondent writes about the December I967 (Winter 
Session) debate that it was insipid and that the Prime 
1. Tjflieare, O P . c i t . « p . 1 
2 . I b id . f p p . 2 3 3 - 3 ^ 
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Min i s t e r ' s speech/bontained l i t t l e evidence of any fresh 
thinking and further suggested t h a t i t was high time when the 
foreign a f f a i r s need whole time a t t en t ion . Parliamentary 
debates would have been r i che r ^ad r ea l p o l i t i c a l organisat ion 
preceded the speech-making* Often t h e i r performance i s 
extempore and thus there was every l ike l ihood for i t s having 
a low standard. The problem i s how to coneliorate and improvise 
the standard of Parliamentary debates* Out of the vol ley of 
suggestions, the most notable being given by a Parliamentary 
correspondent having l i s t ened to Debates of the second half 
of November in IV Lok Sabha, 1967» He put forth two adminis-
t r a t i v e suggestions tha t iilSe' Government should use the forum 
of Parliament to inform and to explain i t s major p o l i c i e s and 
to seek the advice of the members on them. I t may be argued 
that the l a t t e r aspect i s looked a f t e r in the committees of 
Parliament, but tha t i s not e n t i r e l y the case and secondly 
the Opposition p a r t i e s should expedite the process of po l a r i s a t i on 
among themselves and should not cancel each other as Opposition 
2 gro\:5)s. The eminent parl iamentarian l i k e H.N. Mukerjee 
r e a l i s e s the need to make the parliamentary debates more 
parl iamentary. While speaking in Parliament over the motion 
1. '"Parliament in session'* by Parliajnentary Correspondent, 
Parliamentary Studies . Vol. XII, No. 1, January 1968, p . 12 . 
2. Parliament in Session", A Parliamentary Correspondent, 
Parliamentary Studies^ Vol. XI, No. 12, Dec* 1967, p. l5» 
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regarding International situation and the policy of the 
Government of India in relation thereto ,he said that if the 
members of Parliament wanted to push him out of parliament, 
ways and means are open to them to do something about it. But 
he failed to understand why this kind of deviation into an 
unmannerely exhibition of anti-parliaraentarianism existed in 
the Indian Parliament. 
A question may be rjaised how much a debate really 
matters. Although a bad governmental showing does not modify 
majority approval in the immediate circumstances, it weakens 
the position of the Cabinet leaders within their own party, 
leading to future changes in personnel or policy. It can also 
brighten the election prospects of the Opposition. A minister 
would find it difficult to survive if his own supporters find 
him a poor spokesman for the government and party. A successful 
Minister has to be a fluent debater, 
A. D, Dhar poetically laments for the 1970-Lok Sabha 
Session, "Ah, for the last Lok Sabha.' for those angry inter-
ludes, those heated debates, that '*zero'*hour" which was always 
pregneoit with crisis, for the perpetual possibility of the 
Government losingia a vote, which kept the reporters to 
their seats". However, successful use of the above mentioned 
instruments and organised Opposition would increase executive'' 
servitude and its failure would lead to executive despotism. 
1. Leon D. ^ s t e n , OP. c i t . , , p .37. 
2. The Indian Express/ New Delhi)> 9,U-. 1971, 
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CHAPTER IV 
ROLE OF OPPOSITION PARTIES 
INTRODUCTION 
In a parliamentary democracy like India, the ruling 
Party is entrusted with the task of governing the country. 
It presupposes the existence of one or many parties to act 
as critics and opponents with a possibility of presenting 
the government with alternative policies. Opposition"*" is 
of permanent importance in such governments. It is one of 
the major factors which affect and influence the formulation 
and implementation of foreign policy in a democracy. It is 
inherent in the nature of parliamentary democracy that the 
Government comes to the House periodically for the endorsement 
of certain of its policies. It is for the Opposition to see 
that the policies which the Government is currently following 
come from under the scrutiny of the House* 
1. Opposition is derived from the Latin word 'oppositio' which 
means to oppose. The idea of opposition as an institution 
is British in origin. H.S.Fatyal, Role of the Opposition in 
the Indian Parliament. Allahabad, Chattanya Publishing House, 
1965, p. 1. 
2. D. K. Kunta, 'The Role of Opposition and Working in Parliament', 
Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 26-1-1970. "For democracy 
to be effective, it is necessary that its legislature should 
have not only a party in power but that it must have a very 
powerful opposition". Also see, Lok Sabha Debates. 
17 September 1963, Third Series, Vol. XXI, No. 26, Fifth 
Session, Col, 6566, Smt. Gayatri Devi speaking, "consultation 
with the opposition specially in terms of national crisis 
is quite national. It is also a form of assuring continuity 
in foreign policy in democratic countries". Also see. Ibid., 
March 15, 1965, Series III, Vol. X, No. 11 Cols. 4293-4, 
Sri M. C. Chagla speaking 'Government is responsible to 
Parliament and to the country so is opposition. I do not 
think parliament can function with out a responsible opposition", 
also see Ibid.. 13-2-1964, Third Series, Vol. XXV, No. 4, 
Col. 639, Sri Ranga»s speech and also Shri Mahata speaking, 
Ibid., col. 650. 
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The Opposition exists to filter the policy framed by 
the Government in power. In a democratic system, the foreign 
policy decisions of the Government, like other decisions, 
are tested in the light of public opinion influenced by the 
political parties, press, filtered through the Parliament 
and finally approved by the Cabinet. On the virtiole, the 
ultimate determination of the national interest by the 
Government is based on a broad consensus generated by the 
Opposition. The views of the Opposition as expressed in the 
House,greatly influence the press and the public opinion and 
thereby determine the popular reaction towards the ruling 
party and the Opposition. The existence of parliamentary 
Opposition as distinct from the ruling authority is one of 
the essential conditions for the successful working of the 
parliamentary Government. The foreign policy outlook of the 
Opposition parties inevitably affects such decision-making, 
not only because of the role that the latter usually plays 
in the Parliament but also because of their influence over 
the political system as a whole. Very often, within the 
ruling party or parties, the unanimity of opinion may be 
1. Bandyopadhyaya, Op.cit., p. 5. Also see, W. H. Morris Jones, 
Parliament in India, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1957, 
p. 324 "In the absence of a proper Opposition, with 
adequate strength and enjoying due recognition, there can 
be no healthy parliamentary government, for the government 
will be uncontrolled and unresponsive." Also see the 
statement by the then Education Minister, M.C.Chagla, 
" it was the duty of the opposition to oppose. I 
concede that right to opposition It is the duty of 
opposition to be critical, to be vigilant, to keep the 
Government on its toes, to see that there is proper 
administration of this country but ..... the opposition 
must also have a sense of responsibility," 
L-S.D., 15 March 1965, col. 4293. 
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missing on foreign policy i s s u e s . I t i s the task of 
decision-making which involves a r t i c u l a t e balancing of 
the contrary and contradictory views within the ru l ing 
party itself."^ The role of the Opposition in India during 
the decade 1952-62 was generally conditioned by the 
following factors ; 
1 . The Congress enjoyed an unbroken p o l i t i c a l hegemony 
a t the nat ional leve l as shown by the following t a b l e . The 
Congress had functioned u n t i l l 1947 more as a nat ional 
movement than a p o l i t i c a l party and had now the twin 
advantages of having a galaxy of nat ional leaders a t the 
helm of a f f a i r s and also of being the party which achieved 
na t ional independence. 
2 . Believably, Nehru's towering personali ty a t the 
helm of decision-making was enough to rule out any ser ious 
t h r e a t to the rul ing party by the Opposition. He was an 
indomitable force whose s t a tu re as a leader was unquestioned. 
3 . The Opposition was ins igni f icant as compared to 
the overwhelming strength of the Congress with 354 sea ts 
2 
out of a t o t a l of 486. The Opposition was unaware of i t s 
implied r e spons ib i l i t y . I t was in the stage of infancy 
and lacked any strong basis or popular i ty . 
4 . There were no abnormal challenges to ra ise 
controvers ies against the rul ing par ty . The Congress had 
1 . Bandyopadhyaya. op. c i t . , p . 83. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 84. Also see, Abdul Fazl Usmani, Role of 
Opposition Par t ies in Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) 
1962-67 Unpublished Thesis, 1970), pp. 1 8. i l . 
" I t was a period of p o l i t i c a l calm and cont inui ty 
which helped the germination of parliamentary system. 
I t a lso helped the opposition par t ies to grow and 
learn the a r t and science of t h e i r role»». 
LOK SABHA GENERAL ELECTIONS 
PARTY POSITION 
F i r s t General Second General Third General Four th General F i f t h General 
E l e c t i o n E l e c t i o n E l e c t i o n E l e c t i o n E l e c t i o n 
25 .10 .51 - 10 .5 ,52 24 .2 .57 t o 9 . 6 . 5 7 16 .2 .62 t o 6 . 5 . 6 2 1 5 . 2 . 6 7 t o 2 8 . 2 . 6 7 1 .3 .71 t o 13 .3 
P A R T Y 
Sea t s 
Con-
t e s t e d 
Seats 
won 
Sea t s 
con -
t e s t e d 
Sea t s 
von 
Sea ts 
con -
t e s t e d 
S e a t s 
won 
Sea t s 
con -
t e s t e d 
Seats 
won 
Seats 
con-
tested 
Congress 
P.S.P. 
C.P.I. 
Ja^ n Sangh 
Others (Ind.) 
Swatantra 
Republican 
C.P.I, (M) 
S.S.P. 
Akali Oal 
V.H.P. 
Congress (O) 
Muslim League 
469 
400 
69 
91 
946 
354 
20 
26 
3 
83 
483 
175 
115 
103 
580 
366 
18 
29 
4 
71 
««•« 
» «•«• 
... 485 
168 
137 
196 
716 
173 
68 
358 
12 
29 
14 
44 
18 
3 
- — 
.-« 
452 
110 
101 
235 
670 
177 
66 
57 
119 
280 
13 
23 
36 
44 
42 
1 
19 
23 
410 
60 
71 
162 • 
726 
60 
46 
50 
89 
13 
3 
205 
10 
350 
2 
23 
22 
43 
8 
—m 
25 
3 
1 
16 
3 
*Sham Lai ( E d . ) , A Times Of India D i r ec to ry And Yearbook. 
i n c l u d i n g Who*s ¥ h o . 1971, (Times of India P r e s s , Bombay), p . 837. 
ii^  
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longer and more meaningful experience of 'dabbling* in 
international politics. 
During the period, the Opposition parties, both on 
the left and the right as well as the various Opposition 
groups within the Congress exercised some influence on the 
making of foreign policy. Bninent speakers like Masani 
and Kriplani both applauded and criticised the policy* 
When Nehru was there in the House, the Opposition 
seemed less articulate* After the third General Elections, 
the Opposition however, became more active and articulate. 
Critics of the existence of Opposition feel that it 
vainly indulges in obstruction tactics due to which so 
much time of the House is consumed by the procedural debates 
and privileges motions that it hampers the scheduled 
2 
business of the House. 
Even till 1963, the single, strong and effective 
Opposition could not «nerge in India to take the responsibility 
3 
of the Government on i t s shoulders* Moreover members of 
the Indian Opposition often used derogatory terras such as 
shame• Such remarks, by the order of the Speaker, aire 
4 
expunged from the o f f i c i a l records of parliamentary deba tes . 
1 . The Times of India (New Delh i ) , 21-3-63, "The ease with 
which the Prime Minister dominates the House on the subject 
of foreign a f f a i r s , i s , in pa r t , a t r i b u t e to the Opposit ion's 
quite remarkable bankruptcy of ideas ••• Mr. Nehru therefore 
had an easy time - he usually does - in demolishing the 
feeble manoeuvres". 
2 . Ed i to r i a l l y "On to Parliament", The Hindu (Madras), 
28-10-66, The ed i t o r i a l was in react ion to the debates in 
the House on 28-10-66. 
3 . LSD, 20 August 1963, Third Ser i e s , Vol, XIX, No. 6, Fif th 
Session, c o l . 1655^ statement by Smt. Renuka R&^ 
4* Lok Sabha Debates. 23 January 1963, Third Se r i e s , Vol. XII, 
No. 29 (c) V Ed. c o l s . 5995-5997, Also see ,o ther 
Lok Sabha Debates in t h i s context . 
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The Parliament in India abounded in noisy scenes, 
walk-outs and uproars* 
Once Nehru was clarifying the Indian Government*s 
stand over the Colombo Conference Proposals of 1962. Much 
disturbance was there on the Opposition benches. The 
Speaker had to pacify them by asking them to remain mute 
and speak only when they were asked. Referring to such a 
situation, the Prime Minister Nehru said, "I regret Sir, 
that this matter which we are discussing, which as the 
whole House realises is one of the highest importance and 
not only in the present but for the future also, should be 
reduced occasionally to a very much lower level by these 
interruptions" • 
Though, Nehru influenced the course of foreign policy 
thinking within the party, he could not and did not go very 
much against the broad consensus of opinion within the 
Congress Party. His main contribution was to 'harmonize 
and synthesise the rightist and leftist opinion on foreign 
policy and bringing them to common focus. His own foreign 
policy thinking and decision-making, were probably 
influenced to a considerable extent by the actual and 
potential reaction of the various Opposition parties to 
his moves. 
In the united Kingdom the Opposition is privileged to 
demand discussion oft such policies, but in the Lok Sabha one 
1. Ibid.« col. 5997. In the same debate, when somebody said 
that in the past Nehru was not so severely interrupted as 
in 1963, the PSP member Surendra Nath Divedi said. 
"Interruptions are relevant I do not think that all 
interruptions are a taboo." col. 5998. 
2. Bandyopadhyaya, op. cit*. p. 85. 
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witnesses that such extraordinary discussions rarely occur* 
Moreover, in our form of democracy where the Government is 
amenable to the will of the House, it is the main function 
of the Opposition to see that the Government is allowed to 
act in the three main fields with detailed examination, 
analysis and due consent of the House. 
In India sometimes the working of the Government is 
hampered by strong criticism. Khadilkar, while speaking 
over the Colombo Proposals in the Lok Sabha felt that the 
members of Opposition who participated in the discussion, 
disclosed that the honourable members from the Opposition 
2 
have failed to grasp the significance of this move* 
Frank Anthony felt that the need of the hour was that the 
Opposition must present a united front in the House while 
there was an emergency. This unity must be maximised not 
only in the House but also in the country* Speaking over 
the same motion, R«S. Pande felt that in a democratic set up 
the role of Opposition is an important as that of the ruling 
party, the Opposition should, as it does in Britain, emerge 
and come forth with alternative proposals and guidelines* 
He optimistically expected that a day must dawn when the 
Opposition would realise its responsibility, endeavouring 
to remain aloof from the instinct of provocation, election^ 
votes and sentiments, and playing the role of solid and 
concrete Opposition. For the past, he regretted that the 
1. K. D. Kunta, "The Role of Opposition and Working in 
Parliament", Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 26-1-1970, 
2. Lok Sabha Debates. 23 January 1963, Third Series, 
Vol. XXI, NO. '1^\ (c) V (ed)., col. 6088. 
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history of Opposition is not upto the expectations. It 
opposed for the sake of Opposition. Whatever is done by 
the Prime Minister and decided by the government is criticised 
and debated by the Opposition parties in the Parliament, 
The need is to give to the government full support and 
allegiance in the face of any eventuality. S.M.Banerjl 
felt that the Indian Opposition consisted of reactionary 
forces-
Opposition is the ventilator of grievances. Yashpal 
Singh, in one of his speeches in the House clarified the role 
that the Opposition plays or had played. He thinks that the 
Opposition exists to criticise, not to admire. If the 
government has constructed a 100 miles road, the Opposition 
would not applaud it, if the 10 mile road is damaged or 
left unconstructed the Opposition would highlight the 
drawback* In the same vein, Ravindra Varma said, "It is 
also necessary that the Opposition should not only point 
its finger at the failures of the government, but place 
3 
before the House and the country a practical alternative..." 
The DMK Member^Manoharan expressed the role of the Opposition 
with sympathy rather^when he said that it was the duty of 
the' Opposition to criticise and embarass the Government* 
The duty of the Government is to listen. They should 
1. Ibid., cols. 6070, 6096-7, 6098 and 6131. 
2. Ibid.. 25-3-1963, Third Series, Vol. XIII, No. 6, 
Fourth Session, col. 1112. 
3« Ibid.. 19-8-1963, Third Series, Vol. XIX, No. 5, 
FITth Session, col. 1331x Sri Ravindra Varma speaking 
over the motion regardin*g lack of confidence in the 
Nehru*s Council of Ministers)* 
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understand problems. While the Government speak the 
Opposition should hear, while the Government condemn,the 
Opposition should search its conscience and if needed, 
should reform itself. There is absolutely no point in 
criticising the government for the sake of criticism itself* 
But usually, the criticism of the Opposition has been less 
concrete* 
The Opposition discharges its function of criticising 
and assessing the Government through the media of parliamentary 
processes* The Question-Hour is most important of them. It 
is the most commonly used device of obtaining information 
from the Government on various issues involved in foreign 
affairs and thereby sometimes focus attention on some issue 
or problem* It is a lively and useful weapon in the hands 
2 
of Opposition* The official records of the Parliament are 
Ibid«. 20 August 1963, Third Series, Vol* XIX, No* 6, 
Fifth Session, col. 1637, the same motion. Also see, 
Lok Sabha Debates. 25 February 1963, Third Series, 
Vol. XIII, NO. 6, Fourth Session (c) V Ed., cols. 1009-10. 
(Sarojini Maheshi speaking). 
Speaking about the acceptance of Colombo proposals 
and coincidence of Communist Party's siding with us, 
Sarojini Maheshi said that the friends in Opposition have 
criticised us severely* "*.* Perhaps they think that it 
is the duty of Opposition to oppose every thing said or 
done in the House by the ruling party. I do not know how 
many of them are able to realise their duty. Of course 
it is the duty of opposition to guide the Government 
properly when it does not go on proper lines. But many of 
them see to be under the impression that because they are 
in the opposition •*• It is their duty to oppose everything 
said and done by the ruling party. The behaviour of some 
opposition party members at the time of the Presidential 
Address clearly speaks volumes*** 
"The question-hour enables the individual members to obtain 
information on any particular aspect of working of small 
Government and thereby turning out the defects, if any, focus 
the attention of the House and the Government on the 
deficiencies in any particular area or region or induce 
to take note of the same." K. D. Kunta, OP. cit** Also see, 
supra. III Chapter* 
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r e p l e t e with relevant or i r r e levan t questions raised by the 
Opposition on cruc ia l as well as ins ign i f ican t matters but 
the information, if the Government so d e s i r e s , can be wi th-
held in "public i n t e r e s t " . 
Debates on Demands for Grants or on Motion regarding 
i n t e rna t i ona l s i tua t ion and the policy of the Government of 
India thereof gives another opportunity to the Opposition 
t o inves t iga te and evaluate policy decisions of the Governmento 
Every year the policy i s la id down a t l e a s t twice through 
the Pres iden t ia l Addresses, which i s subsequently debated, 
approved or c r i t i c i s e d by the motion of thanks on the above 
mentioned addresses . The Opposition pa r t i e s voluminously 
expressed t h e i r views whenever such opportuni t ies were made 
ava i lab le to them. Some regre t tha t the Opposition, seems 
to be incapable of any o r ig ina l th ink ing . I t r a ther confines 
i t s a t t en t ion to the usual p la t i tudinous debating against 
non-alignment as the chief p r inc ip le of foreign pol icy . I t 
i s an unprofi table balancing a c t . 
The Vote of Non-confidence along with Adjournment 
Motions i s , "the l a s t arrow in the armoury of the Opposit ion". 
When Nehru was a l ive there was only one such motion as a r e s u l t 
of the alleged fa i lure of New Delhi to reach and assess 
Peking's i n t en t ions . The motion was moved on August 19, 1963, 
1 . N. J . Nanporia, "Renewal of Faith : (Commentary)", 
The Times of India (New Delh i ) , 26-8-1963. 
2 . Lok Sabha Debates. 15 September 1964, Third Ser i e s , 
No. 7, Vol. XXXIII, Ninth Session, c o l . 1807* 
CSmt. Maheshi speaking over the motion of no-confidence). 
2 
n^ 
but i t fa i led miserably. When Shas t r i was t he r e , two 
such motions were moved but they were a lso defeated* 
These motions, however, served to focus public a t t en t ion 
on in te rna t iona l i s sues , though without bringing about 
any s ign i f ican t change in the policy of the Government 
of Ind ia , 
The Opposition pa r t i e s in India have been divided 
among themselves on minor and major i s s u e s . Very often 
the Opposition showed i n t e r e s t in confusing the s t r a i g h t -
forward problems. With regard to the reac t ion of the 
Opposition pa r t i e s on Colombo proposals, A»N»Vidyalankar, 
the Member of Parliament, f e l t , t ha t the Opposition 
p a r t i e s , "have attempted t o s idetrack the i s sue , t o confuse 
t he issue"* A lengthy discussion took place over the 
above mentioned issue but t h e i r speeches gave an impression 
as if the Congress benches were inac t ive or "paralysed"* 
The unanimity of opinion in Opposition pa r t i e s i s lacking 
t h e r e . 
SINO-INDIA BO/RDER DISPUTE AND THE MAJOR OPPOSITION 
PARTIES 
In the f i r s t three Lok Sabhas, the Opposition was 
ne i the r numerically strong nor su f f i c i en t ly vocal and the 
majority party members of the Congress Party in Parliament 
were happy over the opportunity they got t o a i r t h e i r views» 
1 . Lok Sabha Debates. 23-1-1963, Third Se r i e s , 
Vol. XII, NO. 29, (c) V Ed. c o l . 6393. Also see . 
I b i d . , 20 February 1963, Third Se r i e s , Vol. XIII , 
No. 1, Fourth Session, c o l . 994,CVasudevan Nair 
speaking t h a t the in tent ion of the Opposition i s not 
to c r i t i c i s e the government vainly^# 
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the Government to an appreciable extent s tar ted learning 
to behave s t rong ly . The Opposit ion's vigi lance and ro le 
became vociferous a f t e r 1962, when China waged an aggression 
on Indian s o i l s . The general fee l ing when the 1962 a t tack 
took place was, tha t the Opposition par t ies consented to 
every thing tha t was being done by the Government. The 
following c r i t i c a l analysis of the opinions, c r i t i c i sms 
and reac t ions of the major Opposition p a r t i e s , vi2#^ 
Communists, Jan Sangh, PSP and Swatantra show t h e i r 
respect ive ro les in Sino-India border dispute and the policy 
of the ru l ing party* 
The Chinese aggression was a c ruc ia l incident for the 
Communist Party of India , The Communist Party has made up 
i t s mind to give up the policy of lying low,which i t adopted 
as a measure of se l f -pro tec t ion in the face of the upsurge 
of anti-communist feel ing in the wake of the Chinese 
aggression* An overal l ana lys is of the Par ty ' s documents 
make i t obvious tha t i t was d i f f i c u l t t o guage the loyal ty 
of the Communists* They were a t bay to choo£se between 
in t e rna t iona l communism and Indian nat ionalism. The party 
was aware of the Congress Party*s strong measures and wanted 
t o prove i t s e l f a genuine r a t i o n a l i s t i c party by giving 
1 . Morris Jones, op. c i t . t p . 324. 
2 . Lok Sabha Debates. August 1963, Third Ser ies , Vol. IXIX, 
No. 5, Fifth Session, c o l . 1234, statement by J .B.Kriplani 
over the motion of No-confidence in the Nehru Council of 
Min i s t e r s . Compare the whole-hearted support of the 
Opposition Party to Indira Government over the recent 
Bangla Desh i s s u e . 
3 . E d i t o r i a l l y , "Equivocal", The Times of India (New Delhi ) , 
5-7-1973. 
4 . The Indian Communist Party Documents 1930-56 (1957), pp.47-48< 
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strong support to the government. The Party avoided 
statements t h a t may go contrary to the governaent^s avowed 
and declared views. The meetings and discussions of the 
Party reveal the differences of opinion within the party 
over the nature and genesis of border d i spu te . The Party 
was put in an unprecedented s i t u a t i o n . Since the Party 
favoured friendly t i e s with the USSR and china, the Chinese 
aggression brought a schism in the Party. I t was a bol t 
from the blue for the nation and the unity of the Par ty , 
The party equivocally refused to admit t h a t China committed 
an act of aggression in defiance of in te rna t iona l law. 
The divis ion resulted in the CPI following the Moscow-
l i n e and the CPI (M) following the Peking-l ine. The apparently 
widening Sino-Soviet r i f t , the Indian Government's des i r e 
to have Russian support, enabled the Indian Communists to 
support the Indian stand agains t China. Before 1964, when the 
o f f i c i a l Communist s p l i t took place, the CPI const i tu ted 
the l a r g e s t Opposition group to Congress in Parliament but 
when the r i f t took place, i t ceased to be the la rges t 
Opposition group in the Parliament and i t s place was taken 
over by the Swatantra Par ty . 
1 . T. A. Nizami, "The Communist Party and Ind ia ' s Foreign 
Policy. New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1971, 
p . 231. For the Marxist-Leninist basis of the approach 
see p. v i i . Compare, the statement of the National 
Council in i t s eight day session on February 12, 1963, 
" I t i s not possible according t o the pr inciple of 
Marxism-Leninism for a Communist Party, specia l ly a ru l ing 
party l ike tha t of China to ra i se a border d ispute and 
push i t to the point of an armed conf l i c t with a country 
l ike India in non-aligned, peace-loving and democratic." 
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The CPI condemned the chauvinist and expansionist 
tendencies of China for world domination. In a press 
conference in New Delhi, on December 16, 1961, the General 
Secretary of the CPI, Ajoy Ghosh, raised his voice against 
the Chinese a l lega t ion tha t Indian foreign policy was 
influenced by American imperialism. He added tha t the 
CPI did not agree with the Chinese leaders in t h e i r 
assessment of India ' s foreign policy and a lso t h e i r 
2 
a t t i t u d e towards India, 
In the wake of Chinese aggression, the National 
Council of the CPI met from October 31 to November 2, 1962, 
t o discuss the s i t u a t i o n . On November 1, 1962, a resolu t ion 
was adopted by a majority vote which condemned China as an 
aggressor . I t s resolut ion condemned the Chinese aggression 
and supported the Government of Ind ia ' s stand t h a t nego-
t i a t i o n s on the border dispute would take place only on the 
bas is of withdrawl of Chinese forces to the posi t ion they 
held before September 8, 1962. The resolut ion refuted the 
Chinese claim tha t the McMohan Line was i l l e g a l . I t 
appealed to party uni ts to support a l l moves taken by the 
J-* Resolutions of the Central Executive Committee of the 
CPI, Delhi , September 10-15. 1964. p. 12. 
Compare the 1959 view of the Party, when the CPI believed 
t h a t the ' 'Social is t China can never commit aggression 
against India". New Age. 4-10-1959, p. 5 . Also see, 
New Age. 22-11-195^, p. 7, where th is view i s r e i t e r a t ed 
a t the Meerut Session of the National Council, "There i s 
no question of a war between our country and China - A 
S o c i a l i s t China - can never think in terms of war against 
India, j u s t as free India can never think in terais of war 
aga ins t China." Also see New Age, 22-11-1959, p . 7, for 
the CPI a l lega t ion tha t the r e s t of the oppostion p a r t i e s 
along with the Congress are launching a corapaign of hatred 
agains t China, 
2 . Times of India (New Delhi) , 17-12-1961, 
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Government to bring about a peaceful se t t lement . 
Consistent with the d ign i ty of the nation, the Council 
attached significance to Nehru's statement if the t a lk s 
between India and China f a i l , the Government of India 
would be prepared to r e f e r the border dispute to the Hague 
Court . Even in l a t e *61, Ajoy Ghosh declared tha t if the 
Chinese crossed the McMahon Line, the CPI would support the 
2 
Government of India. All the moves of the CPI in 
supporting the Government of India, almost unanimously, 
gave s trength to the Government. 
The CPI welcomed Nehru's l e t t e r to Chou-En-Lai for 
easing tension as a s tep in the d i rec t ion of negot ia t ions 
and peaceful se t t lement . S. A. Dange made c l e a r his pa r t y ' s 
posi t ion in the Lower House declar ing tha t he supported 
the Prime Minis te r ' s l e t t e r because, "he s t i cks to the 
approach of peaceful negot ia t ions which h« has so ably 
expounded today ••• Therefore the posi t ion which he has 
taken is consis tent with the basic approach and po l ic ies in 
the matter of foreign re la t ions as pursued by Prime Minister 
4 Nehru and the Government of India together ." Despite the 
1 . Quoted in Nizarai, op. c i t . . p . 231 
2» The Times of India (New Delhi) , 17-12-61. Also see 
Ajoy Ghosh, "Communist Answer to Pandit Nehru" New Age, 
5-12-64, p . 1, where the party is declared to ha i l the 
Panchsheel Agreement as a "Significant landmark in the 
annals of Asia." 
3 . J . L. Nehru, We accept China's Challenge. Delhi, 1962, 
pp. 18-19, Nehru whole-heartedly welcomed th i s CPI support 
and decided to make most out of i t in gaining unity to 
repel the Chinese agress ion. 
4 . B.T.Ranadive, "India China Relations", New Age. 
December 1959, pp. 56-57. 
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par ty ' s support to the Colombo Proposals for t h e i r 
acceptance by the Government of India in t o t o , i t did not 
believe t h a t i t was necessary tha t China should a lso do the 
same and fur ther asked the Government not to make the 
acceptance of those proposals as the only basis of nego t i a t ions . 
The CPI welcomed the Colombo Proposals and hoped tha t China 
would abide by them "without any rese rva t ion" . I t character ised 
the Communist Party of China as being, "dominated by dogmatist 
2 
thinking '» The Central Executive of the CPI passed a 
reso lu t ion in Calcutta on September 25, 1959, urging friendly 
negot ia t ions for the sett lement of the Sino-India border . 
d i spu t e . I t consumed considerable time of the party to reach 
a t t h i s f ina l decision,** 
In the beginning, the CPI members l ike Dange did not 
expect that there could be any invasion from the Chinese s i d e . 
Later on the wing led by P.C.Joshi and S.A.Dange, supported 
Nehru*s stand t o t a l l y as opposed to the group led by 
B.T. Ranadive supporting China and denouncing India*s stand 
in Tibet . As a r e s u l t of t h i s , the 101 member National Council 
of the CPI met in Meerut on November 10, 1959 supporting the 
1. Lok Sabha Debates. 24 January 1963, Third Ser ies , Vol. XII, 
No. 30, c o l s . 6248-54. Statement by Renu Chakravar t i . 
2 . Statesman (New Delhi) , 13-2-1963. 
3 ' Statesman (New Delhi) , 27-9-1959. 
4 . Lok Sabha Debates, 12 September 1959, Vol. XXXIV, No. 31 , 
VIII Session, c o l s . 8029-36.(S.A. Dange speaking over the 
"White Paper on Indo-Chinese Relations'?. 
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Government of India stand that the traditional border in 
Ladakh should be accepted by China."^ Following the policy 
of peace, the CPI favoured negotiations to settle the border 
dispute after Ladakh incident* 
The Jan Sangh is another party in Parliament which 
gives vent to its reactions quite vehemently. The Sangh 
3 
considered China as one of the two enemies of India, and 
is somewhat critical of the policy the Government of India 
followed in regard to China, But so far as the Colombo 
Proposals were concerned, the Jan Sangh totally supported 
the Parliament's resolution of November 14, 1963. It 
regreted the Government of India to have rejected the 
proposals.'^ Bachhraj Vyas declared that the policy from 
the beginning has been unrealistic and based on appeasement* 
In one of the Resolutions the policy of the Government of 
India has been declared inappropriate. It also criticised 
the policy for keeping the Parliament in dark ; "by 
calculatedly keeping the Parliament and the people entirely 
in the dark in respect of China's misdeeds on the one hand. 
1. News Item, The Statesman. (New Delhi), 15-11-1959. For the 
support the CPI gave to the Government from time to time^ Also 
see, The Statesman (New Delhi), 18-1-1963, News Item, 
Times""or India ^New Delhi), 16-4-1963, accusing China of 
strengthening, "the very forces which do not desire a peaceful 
settlement". Also see, news item, the statesman (New Delhi), 
2-11-1962, which supported Nehru*s stirring appeal for 
national unity in defence of the country". 
2* Lok Sabha Debates. 15 February 1960, Second Series, Vol. 
XXXVIII, No. 6, cols. 1015-6. Also see, Vol. XXXII, No. 27-28, 
December 1959, Cols. 6670-1,(Statement by Hiren Mukerjee> 
3. Principles and Policy of BJS adopted by the Bharatiya 
Pratinidhi Sabha of the Party at Vijayawada, January 25 8. 26, 
1965. 
hraj Vyas, Presidential address, at the Twelfth Plenary 
sion of the BJS, Vijayawada, January 23-24, 1965, p. 18. 
5. Ibid., p. 19. 
4. Bac 
Ses 
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and, on the other , by allowing the people to be lu l led in to 
a fa lse sense of securi ty by chanting Panchsheel mantras, the 
Government has ve r i ly been gui l ty of a lapse, which in any 
other democratic country may have been objected Ind ia ' s 
China policy has been a complete and dismal failure"•"'• 
To Sangh leadership, the idea of taking the border 
question to the Internat ional Court a f t e r India had declared 
China an aggressor, was r id i cu lous . The continuance of 
diplomatic t i e s was a l l the more i r r e l e v a n t . To them the 
a t t i t u d e of the Government of India likewise encouraged the 
enemy, confused the public mind and deprived our po l ic ies of 
c l a r i t y of purpose. To deal with the Chinese aggression^the 
sangh formulated a 6-point programme. The Sangh always 
dis l iked the effor ts the Indian Government made to f a c i l i t a t e 
3 
the admission of China in the UN. . 
The main accusation tha t the Sangh has levelled against 
the Government is that i t has failed to have helped Tibet in 
1950, when the expansionist Peking-administration forcibly 
occupied i t . India should have ra ther endeavoured to save 
Tibet from tha t undesirable and un-welcome *rape ' . The Sangh 
! • Resolutions of the Eight Annual Session of the BJS. Nagpur, 
January 23-25, 1960. 
2 . For d e t a i l s see. Resolutions passed a t the Tenth All-India 
Session of the BJS, Bhopal, December 20-31, 1962. Also see. 
News Item, lJ&&lStatesman (New Delhi ) , 3-7-1967, when the 
Sangh has demanded disrupt ion of diplomatic t i e s with China. 
3 . Ed i t o r i a l l y , Organiser. 19 (8).October 13, 1965, p . 3 . 
4 . Raghuvira, Pres ident ia l Address, a t the Tenth Annual Session 
of the BJS, Bhopal, December, 1962, 
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i s a l s o vehemently c r i t i c a l of the Government of India fo r 
having signed the Panchsheel , which to some was an immortal 
t r e a t y . 
The Sangh is also opposed to the acceptance of the 
Colombo-Proposals. The Working Committee of the Sangh regre t ted 
tha t the Colombo Conference bypassed the issue of aggression 
and t r i ed to es tab l i sh par i ty between the aggressor, China, 
and the aggressed, India , 
The Swatantra Party t h a t gained momentum in 1959, was 
highly c r i t i c a l of the Government's pol icy. I t wanted to 
• rec t i fy the unfortunate impression' created in the world 
t h a t India had a 'b ias in favour of Communist b l o c ' . I t was 
aga ins t the policy of non-allignment and advocated an a l l i ance 
with the West most vigorously since the Sino-India border 
conf l i c t in October-November 1962. AS. N. G. Ranga f e l t 
t ha t non-alignment has vjeakened India and fa i led her to 
obtain foreign aid,"^ 
The Swatantra Party arr ived on p o l i t i c a l scene when the 
period of Sino-India fr iendship was over and r e l a t ions had 
begun to de t e r io r a t e , the f i r s t foreign policy problem to be 
tackled by the party was the border conf l i c t with China. The 
Party f e l t t ha t China is a grea ter menace to India than 
J-* The Statesman (New Delhi) , 1-7-1967,(Statement by S.C.GoyalX 
Also see, e d i t o r i a l l y . Organiser. October 10, 1965. Also see . 
Resolutions of the Eighth Annual Session of the BJS,op. c i t« 
2 . Resolutions of the Emergent Working Committee of the BJS^ 
Bhopai, January 19, & 20, 1963, BJS Central Office, Delhi* 
3» The Statesman (New Delh i ) , 17-12-1964. The Party ins i s ted 
tha t non-alignment i s 'masterly inac t iv i ty ' ' and 'splendid 
i s o l a t i o n ' must be replaced by alignment with the West, 
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Pak i s t an and non-alignment should be given up as a r e a c t i o n 
t o t h e expans ion i s t t r end of Peking p o l i c y . The f i r s t 
Nat iona l Convention of the par ty (March,1960) adopted a 
r e s o l u t i o n on T ibe t , express ing the views of t h e par ty on 
t h e c r u e l f a t e t h a t has b e f a l l e n on a n a t i o n of peace- lov ing 
people a t t h e hands of agg res s ive and i m p e r i a l i s t communism, 
and affirmed t h a t a f irm and v i g i l a n t po l i cy should be 
followed to dea l wi th the Chinese communist a g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t 
2 Ind i a . 
The P a r t y ' s views on Tibet mirrored r e a c t i o n s of the 
Jan Sangh, in l i n e with T i b e t , i t a l s o f e l t t h a t Tibe t should 
not be t r e a t e d as an i n t e r n a l a f f a i r of Ch ina , I t s l e a d e r s 
3 
f e l t t h a t the Tibetan ques t ion should be r a i s e d in the UN. 
The Par ty denounced the t a l k s between the Prime M i n i s t e r 
of India and China, and demanded severance of d ip loma t i c t i e s 
with China and stoppage of sponsor ing China*s admission t o 
t h e UN.'* 
The Government's China pol icy was c h a r a c t e r i s e d as a 
po l i cy of complacency and appeasement. The Par ty wanted t h e 
5 Government t o follow a po l i cy of f i rmness and d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 
1 . Swatantra Pa r ty . F i r s t Nat iona l Convention, Pa tna , 
March, 1960, Bombay, i 960 , p . 8 5 . 
2 . I b i d . , p . 6 2 . 
3 . Lok Sabha Deba tes . Second S e r i e s , Vol . XLVII, No. 3 1 , 
August 3 1 , 1960, c o l s . 5995-6<. Statement by N.G.Ranga, 
"The whole s to ry of r e l a t i o n s between China and Tibe t and 
India proves t h a t i t cannot be t r e a t e d as an i n t e r n a l 
problem of China. We should he lp Tibet to cont inue t o 
remain f r ee . ' 5 -
4 . Lok Sabha Debates , December 7, 1961, Third S e r i e s , V o l . 9 , 
No. 20, c o l . 3879, M. R. Masani, the General Sec re ta ry of 
t h e Pa r ty , s a id " t h e r e can be no n e g o t i a t i o n u n t i l fo re ign 
o u t p o s t s which a re an a c t of a g g r e s s i o n , a r e f i r s t removed." 
5 . Lok Sabha Debates . Third S e r i e s , V o l . VI, No. 20, 
C ONTO. 
After the Chinese invasion, the party got a golden opportunity 
to expose the so-cal led weakness of the Government's pol icy . 
The Parliamentary Board of the Party cal led for the adoption 
of a defence s t ra tegy by which the i n i t i a t i v e might pass t o 
Indian hands. In order to secure ass i s tance from the world 
organisat ion, the Party s tressed the need of taking the Sino-
Indian dispute to the UN, Anyhow, the Board applauded the 
spontaneous, prompt and generous manner, in which the United 
S t a t e s , Br i ta in , Canada and other countries came to Ind ia ' s 
a s s i s t ance . 
The Party unequivocally blamed the Government for i t s 
mi l i t a ry unpreparedness to defend i t s northern f r o n t i e r s . I t 
wanted that the Government should give a pro-Western or ien-
t a t i o n to foreign pol icy. Even since i t s formation, the v 
Swatantra Party advocated a l l i ance with the West. While a l l 
the other par t ies maintained tha t non-alignment be followed 
in the wake of Chinese aggression, the Swatantra alone wanted 
the Government to discard i t . While speaking in the 
Parliament, Ranga expressed his resentment agains t the 
policy of non-alignment which fai led to serve our purpose. 
He sa id , " the sooner we get r id of i t , the be t t e r ; the sooner 
2 
we turn our back to i t , the b e t t e r . " 
When the question of the Chinese cease- f i re was being 
discussed, the Swatantra leaders sponsored a subs t i t u t e motion 
August 13, 1962, c o l s . 1497-1506, (statement by 
Shri P. K. Deo, the leader of the Party in the Lok Sabhsji, 
1 . "Call for change in Foreign Policy", Swarajya. 1711, 
62, p. 10. 
2 . Lok Sabha Debates, Third Ser ies , Vol. IX, No. 2, 
8 November, 1962, c o l . 159. 
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in the Lower House,which favoured the refusal to negotiate 
t i l l the Chinese communists withdrew from the Indian 
t e r r i t o r y and secured massive mi l i t a ry aid from a l l f r iendly 
coun t r i e s . 
The party f e l t t h a t the Colombo-Proposals were the, 
"deceptive mirage to lure the Indian people from t h e i r high 
reso lve , to counter the splendid s o l i d a r i t y and for t i tude 
of t h i s country a^ nd to dampen the spontaneous upsurage tha t 
has been seen in t h i s country." The proposals were viewed &s 
2 
a / ' t reacherous t rap to humiliate u s " . 
Since the Party wanted a complete re jec t ion of the 
Colombo-Proposals, N. G. Ranga sa id , "I do not consider these 
proposals to be honourable or f a i r to us ••• If we were to 
accept these Colombo-Proposals, we would be dishonouring, 
3 d i s f igur ing , d i sc red i t ing our country . . . " On February 10, 
1963, the General Council passed a resolut ion t h a t these 
proposals were "contrary to the nat ional i n t e r e s t and na t ional 
se l f - respec t and inconsis tent with the solemn resolve 
unanimously announced by Parliament on 14th November, 1962". 
On the whole, the pa r ty ' s a t t i t u d e towards China was more 
influenced by , " i t s a t t r a c t i o n towards West than i t s opposition 
4 
to Communism." 
1. Swatantra Party, General Secretary Report. Third National 
Convention, Bangalore, 1964, p. 26. 
2. Lok Sabha Debates. Third Series, Vols. X - XI, No. 25, 
December 10, 196i, cols. 5112-13. Sri P. K. Deo speaking* 
3. Swatantra Newsletter, op. cit., p. 4. 
4. K. Raman Pillai, India Foreign Policy : Basic Issues and 
Political Attitudes. Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969, 
p. 145. 
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ThePSP was b a s i c a l l y sof t on the S o c i a l i s t China. I t 
s t r o v e fo r f r i e n d s h i p between the two c o u n t r i e s of Asia and 
advocated the admission of Communist China t o the UN. However, 
t h e T ibe t en , ep i sode brought a s h i f t in i t s a t t i t u d e . The 
Nat iona l Executive of t h e par ty commented : "an a t tempt t o 
j u s t i f y the invas ion of 8 Lakh s q u i r e mi les of t e r r i t o r y on 
the ba s i s of sovere ign r i g h t s which are as doubt fu l and 
un tenab le as they are i m p e r i a l i s t s i s an i rony of which no 
modern Government should have been thought c a p a b l e . The 
people of T ibe t a lone may dec ide in a f r ee vo te or p l e b i s c i t e 
t h e i r form of government or of a l l i a n c e wi th the o u t s i d e 
wor ld . " 
Acharya K i r p a l a n i , the PSP l e a d e r , s eve re ly a t t acked 
Nehru 's approach t o the Tibetan ques t ion , "The plea i s t h a t 
China had the anc i en t r i g h t of suze ra i r t t y . This r i g h t was 
o u t of d a t e , old and an t iqua t ed I c o n s i d e r t h i s as 
much a c o l o n i a l agg res s ion on the pa r t of China as any 
c o l o n i a l aggress ion indulged in by Western na t i ons . . • . « 
C h i n a ' s occupat ion of Tibe t i s a d e l i b e r a t e a c t of agg res s ion . "^ 
Consequent ly , the PSP considered t h e Panchsheel Agreement as 
3 
a s u r r e n d e r of I n d i a ' s r i g h t s in Tibet* The P a r t y ' s 
1 . S o c i a l i s t Par ty of I n d i a / H i m a l a y a n Pol icy f o r Ind i a , 
Bombay, 1951, p . 20 . The par ty urged the Indian people 
t o a s s i s t the Tibe tan people main ta in ing t h e i r independence 
and evolving a po l i cy of soc ia l i sm* 
2 . Lok Sabha Debates , 21 May 1954, Vol . 5 , pa r t I I , No. 5 , 
c o l . 7548. 
3* I b i d . , 19 August 1958, Vol . XVII, No. 22, c o l . 1676, 
Acharya Kr ip lan i s a i d , "This g r e a t d o c t r i n e (Panchsheel ) 
was born in s i n . . . s i n because i t was enuncia ted to put 
s e a l of our approva l upon the d e s t r u c t i o n of an a n c i e n t 
na t i on which was a s s o c i a t e d with us s p i r i t u a l l y and 
c u l t u r a l l y . " Also s e e , "Red Imperia l ism in T i b e t " , J ana ta 
(New D e l h i ) , 29 March 1959, p . 3 . Statement of N.G.Goray, 
t h e General Sec re ta ry of t h e p a r t y . Also s e e , PSP 
Reso lu t i ons passed a t the meeting of t h e Nat iona l Executive 
CONTD. 
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attitude towards the Tibetan issue was consistent with 
its ideal of 'freedom of nations*. 
About the general policy that the Government of India 
followed with regard to China, the Party blamed it as one 
of 'appeasement' and proposed a 'tougher attitude'. Still 
the PSP extended its full support to the Government to meet 
the unhappy situation created by the Chinese aggression, 
though warning against following a weak-kneed policy. After 
the Chinese invasion, the party adopted a resolution which 
demanded that the Government should insist upon an immediate 
vacation of wrongly held Indian areas. The Party also had 
a strong faith in the validity of the McMahon Line as a 
border line and its acceptance by China as a prerequisite 
for negotiations with China. 
The year 1962 marked^a shift in the rather soft PSP 
attitude towards Communist China. It condemned China as 
guilty of deliberate unprovoked aggression against a loyal 
friend and gave full support to the efforts of the Government. 
Immediately after the massive aggression, the PSP leaders 
met Nehru on October 21, 1962 and discussed the boCrder 
situation with him. They insisted that a special session 
pf the Parliament be summoned. Consequently, the Parliament 
met before it was scheduled to meet. Ashoka Mehta, the 
New Delhi, April 1959, Janata. 26-4-1959, which favour 
the Tibetan people's rights of self-determination. 
1. News Item, Janata (New Delhi), 22 November 1959, 
p. 16. 
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PSP leader suggested to sink the party-wise differences 
and make a common cause with the Government to f ight the 
Chinese menace, H. V. Kamath, Deputy Leader of the Party 
in the Lok Sabha, said^. "We want every inch of our t e r r i t o r y 
he 
should/cleared of the l a s t Chinese so ld ie r . . . The Himalays 
are not today a physical ba r r i e r . . . They are an ideological 
2 f ron t i e r between democracy and communism...." 
The PSP was t o t a l l y against the Chinese Premier, 
Chou-En-Lai's v i s i t to India in April 1960. The Party 
proposed r a l l y s and demonstration in i t s bid^not to welcome 
Chou and demanded the vacation of aggression in Ladakh, 
3 
Longju and recognition of the McMahon Line. 
Except the CPI^all the Opposition par t i es demanded 
firm ac t ion . Almost a l l the par t ies were unanimous tha t the 
vacation of t e r r i t o r y should precede nego t ia t ions . This 
united demand of the Opposition,made i t d i f f i c u l t for the 
Prime:. Minister to negot iate freely with the Chinese 
Premier in i960. 
The PSP whole-heartedly endorsed the Prime Min i s t e r ' s 
resolut ion^regarding the Proclamation of Emergency and aggression 
1. Janata. 28-10-1962, p. 3 
2. Lok Sabha Debates. Third Series, Vol. IX, No. 2, 
November 9, 1962, cols. 390-1. 
3. Janata. 27 March I960, p. 12. Also see, "M.Ps., caution 
on Frontier Discussion", Janata. 10 April 1960, p. 4, for 
the famous PSP demand in coalition with the other 
opposition parties, not to 'surrender' land. Also see, 
Pillai, op. cit., p. 135. in July 1962, the PSP members 
of Parliament m a letter to the Prime Minister Nehru 
requisitioned an emergency session of Parliament to 
discuss the deteriorating situation in Ladakh. 
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by China. The u n i l a t e r a l ceasef i re by China and the 
so-cal led peace proposals, were only part of Chinese 
s t ra tegy to weaken and paralyse India ' s wi l l to r e s i s t 
aggress ion. 
The Party was c lea r about i t s be l ief in non-alignment, 
as the best policy. The aggression did not for a moment 
af fect t h e i r non-alignment pol icy . 
The Party refused t o accept the Colombo-Proposals. 
Speaking in the Lok Sabha, S. N'.' Dwivedi sa id , " I f ee l the 
Colombo-proposals were dangerous in t he i r implications and 
d i sas t rous in t he i r consequeniesfor the country, p o l i t i c a l l y 
and m i l i t a r i l y , they were advantageous and favourable to our 
enemy.' H3 
Consequently, February 10, 1963 was observed as 
'Anti-Compromise Day'. The Resolution adopted by the 
National Executive said that the Colombo-Proposals w«Te,an 
effort in equating the aggressor with the victim of 
aggression whereas the aggressor is allowed to taste the 
4 
fruits of aggression. 
1. Ashoka Mehta, 'Fraudulent Peace', Janata. 2 December 1962, 
p. 30, that "the Chinese proposals are not just tricky 
but fraudulent." 
2. Lok Sabha Debates. Third Series, Vol. X, No. 2, 
December 10, 1962, col. 5134,CS. N. Dwivedi speaking). 
3» Ibid., 23 January 1963, Vol. XII, No. 23, Third Series, 
cols. 6046-50, :-.(S. N. Dv/ivedi speaking). 
4. Resolution adopted by the National Executive, Janata. 
10-2-1963, p. 11. The Resolution passed at the National 
Conference, Bhopal (1963) asked the Government to resign 
for its military unpreparedness. 
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While the Party strongly held the va l i d i t y of non-
alignment with the Power blocks, i t made i t c l ea r in 1962 
tha t the policy was not applicable , in the case of r e l a t i ons 
with China. Non-alignment remained a sacred dogma with the 
PSP l ike the Congress. 
Even the Andhra Pradesh PSP^s Executive which met on 
February 25, 1962, declared tha t the Colombo-Proposals were 
unacceptable and dangerous. I t said, "the Six nations tha t 
met a t Colombo instead of condemning China for i l l e g a l 
occupation of Indian t e r r i t o r y had ind i rec t ly l en t t h e i r 
sea l of approval to the aggression by asking India to allow 
i t to r e ta in large parts of Indian t e r r i t o r y under i t s 
exclusive control and also t o agree to have a j o in t c i v i l 
administrat ion over some of the other i l l e g a l l y occupied 
2 Indian a reas , " In the same vein^Nath Pai asserted in 
Parliament - " i f we are asked to succumb to such proposals 
tha t wi l l mark the d i s in tegra t ion of t h i s country and if 
India d i s in tegra ted , there may not r ea l ly be such a thing in 
3 
Asia. It will only be larger China." 
In India^after 1962, when the Congress started waning 
in influence, Nehru passed away, a few parties emerged with 
more strength and improved status, the role that the Opposition 
played, gained momentum. This period heralded an era of 
1. Pillai, op. cit., p. 137. 
2. Janata, March 10, 1963, p. 8. Also see Ibid., p. 2. 
3. Janata. 31-3-1963, p. 6. Also see Ibid., Sri Hem Barua 
speaking in the Lok Sabha, "By our acceptance of the 
Colombo Proposals we have made a departed cease-fire 
line into a de jure line. This is defacto appeasement." 
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great political significance. It provided the acid test 
for the effectiveness of the ruling party and the effectiveness 
of the Opposition parties playing their role with caution 
and sagacity. During this period few significant political 
changes occurred : 
1. The Opposition became more cautious and vigilant 
in the wake of unabashed Chinese aggression. The Opposition 
parties received it as a bolt from the blue and the ruling 
party lost faith in the unforeseen shallowness of the 
Panchsheel as a doctrine of mutual understanding between 
India and China. 
2. The effect of the role which the Opposition can play 
was marred when the emergency was declared in 1962 and continued 
till 1968. It was accepted by the Opposition parties as a 
despotic measure by which the ruling party misused the 
political power* 
3. The Congress suffered a set-back, when Nehru expired 
in May 1964 as there was no comparable leader to take his 
place. The Opposition had been weak and divided when Nehru 
was there at the helm of affairs. After his death the 
Opposition became more articulate and clamorous* 
4. Anti-Congressism gained momentum in the country 
because of the failure of the Government of India to face 
the Chinese menace effectively. The structure of the political 
parties also changed. The CPI split was an obvious result 
of Chinese aggression. The two socialist parties merged into 
one Samyukta Socialist Party in 1964 only to part company 
in 1965* 
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5. The Swatantra party now emerged as a formidable 
force. In the third General Elections it was next to CPI 
gaining 18 seats as against 29 of the CPI,-^  the most determined 
group in Parliament* 
These factors and forces were, by no means, incon-
sequential and the political edifice of India, so laboriously 
built, was put to severe test. During 1962-67, the Opposition 
assumed a greater significance. Their criticism or 
condemnation of the broad policy orientations of the Government 
and their own ideology and policies were to act as a balancing 
factor to the programmes of the ruling Party. The Opposition 
is required to play its role more effectively during this 
period than ever before. 
On the whole, the vigilance of an Opposition which 
sometimes, may be inconvenient to the Government, is essential 
for the survival of parliamentary life as such. The debate 
that was held during September 1964, is an outstanding 
instance how the Opposition in Parliament contributes to the 
2 
integrity of public life and to the correction of Government. 
The above mentioned motion ended in asserting confidence 
in the Government when 307 Members voted in favour of 
confidence and 50 voted for lack of confidence in Nehru's 
3 
Counci l of M i n i s t e r s . 
1 . Sham L a i , op . c i t . . p . 837. 
2 . Lok Sabha Debates . Third S e r i e s , Vol . XXXIII, No. 9 , 
Ninth s e s s i o n , c o l . 2290, (concluding speech by 
V-K.Krishna Menon on the vote of no-confidence motionX 
3 . I b i d . 
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Hence the emergence of more mature Opposition a f te r 
1962 is a healthy sign for the success of parliamentary 
democracy. The r e spons ib i l i t y of parliamentary process has 
to be shared by a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s . Speedy emergence of a 
mature, full-fledged Opposition in Parliament would indeed 
be an a s se t , not a hardship to the Government, but i t 
•the 
has not reached , i t s peak. Even during/worst c r i s i s in 
Br i t a in , the Opposition has not been as vehemently c r i t i c a l 
of the Government as i t has been in India during Sino-lndian 
border c r i s i s . In India, occasional ly, the c r i t i c i sm has 
2 
been ludicrous . When a vote of no-Confidence was adopted 
aga ins t the Government in 1963,Bhagwat Jha Azad c i ted a 
statement from the Statesman, while speaking in the Lok Sabha, 
"the Opposition par t ies could not se l ec t for t h e i r a t tack 
any single act of the Governnesnt or i t s pol icy, ins tead, 
they presented a blank form of no-confidence, leaving each 
party to f i l l up the blank as i t l iked . That i s how they 
have come to th i s House and to th i s country with a vote of 
3 
no-confidence"• 
To some extent the ro le of Indian Opposition did not 
reach upto the mark. Somehow, i t fa i led to enable the 
Government to see reason where the Government fai led and 
4 
convince' the Government to be on the r ight* If the 
1 . Ed i to r i a l l y , "The Other Half", Tribune (Ambala), 19-5-1970. 
2 ' Lok Sabha Debates, 17-9-1963, Third Ser ies , Vol. XXI. Mo.26, 
Fi f th Session, Col. 6570, (Srimati Gayatri Devi speaking), 
3 , i b i d . , 21 August 1963, Third Ser ies , Vol, XIX, No. 7, 
Fi f th Session, c o l s . 1812-13. 
4 . I b i d . , co l . 1918.(Statement by the Finance Minis ter , 
Morarji Desai,while concluding the debate on the motion 
of no-confidence> 
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Opposition discharges its expected duties,it can embetter 
the functioning of the Government establishing the practice 
of periodical appraisal of government policies under 
different ministries through a debate raised for the same,"^  
The speeches of the Opposition, full of zeal and 
zest ^ helped in raising the morals of the people and the 
2 
army* But very often the Opposition itself has challenged 
3 
its existence. Such stands affirm that the Opposition was 
not united and organised as is a prerequisite for a successful 
parliamentary democracy. 
One cannot agree that the Opposition Parties did not 
play any role in influencing the Government* As expected, 
the party bosses were of^ten found ready with their relevant 
suggestions. It depends', on the flexibility of the Government 
how far it is sensitive to such proposals. Bishan Chandra Seth 
put forth a list of 9 suggestions as a guideline to the 
Ministry of External Affairs.^ It is desirable that the 
Government should remain sensitive to the points and arguments 
5 
raised by Opposition* 
1. K. D. Kunta, op. cit» 
2. Lok Sabha Debates, 24 January 1963, Third Series, Vol. XII, 
No. 30, Third Series,(C) V. (ed), col. 6304,(Speech by 
Tayagi^ , 
3. Ibid., col. 6247. Statement by Smt. Renu Chakravarti. She 
further added, "What is the aim of such parties as the 
Swatantra, Jan Sangh and even the Praja Socialists. They 
try to demoralise India." 
4. Lok Sabha Debates, 11 April 1964, Third Series, (C) V. (ed). 
Vol. XXIX, No. 48, cols. 10581-83. Bishan Chandra Seth 
speaking on the demands for Grants of the Ministry of 
External Affairs. Also see, Lok Sabha Debates^ 16 September, 
1964, Third Series, Vol. XXXIII, No. 8, Ninth Session, 
Cols 2025.(P. G. Menon's statement that the Opposition 
must be ready with alternatives and counter suggestions. 
5. Ibid.. 14 September, 1964, Third Series, Vol. XXXIII, No. 6, 
CONTD. 
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I t is suggested, however, tha t Nehru did not have any 
regular pract ice of consul ta t ions with leaders of the Opposition. 
I t was during the Chinese aggression, however, t ha t t h i s 
pract ice was introduced. He used to c a l l for consul ta t ion 
about eight senior members of Opposition. Inspi te of the 
overwhelming dominance of the Congress Party, often a s ingle 
e f fec t ive speaker made a dent on Government p o l i c i e s . Thus 
during the c r i s i s of Chinese aggression,the powerful 
opposit ion speeches did play a major role in securing 
expulsion of Menon as the Defence Minis ter . When Shas t r i 
became the Prime Minister , the Congress was somewhat in a 
b e t t e r posi t ion in Parliament. Shastr i was most pa r t i cu l a r 
about consult ing the Opposition during the 1965 India-Pakistan 
war, he had a special genius for evolving a consensus even 
from the most desperate of p o l i t i c a l elements, both in Parliament 
and ou t s ide . His was a pragmatic approach, not overburdened 
with cl iques and slogans of idealogue. " His approach was 
d i f f e ren t on account of his r ea l i s a t i on of his weakness as 
a leader to succeed indomiJ|^table Nehru• 
When the period of Congress hegemony was over and 
s p l i t within the Congress took place, there appeared a ' v i s i b l e 
trend towards the growth of a more complex p o l i t i c a l system 
in the country*, the role t h a t the Opposition can play has 
2 become more c r i t i c a l . Consequently, the Congress s p l i t . 
. • Ninth Session, co l . 1535,rHarish Chandra Mathur speaking 
over the motion regarding No-confidence> 
1 . Frank Anthony, "Recent Changes in Our Parliamentary 
Scene", The Times of India (New Delhi) , 26-1-1970. 
2 . Bandyopadhyaya, op« cit«« p. 84. 
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however, represented inevi tably an unprecendented p o l i t i c a l 
c a t a l y s t . The rul ing party was now in a minori ty, while a 
formal coa l i t ion has not, so far , became imperative, inevi tably 
there was a greater l i a i son between Government and cer ta in 
Opposition groups within the Parliament* 
Cri t ic ism of Nehru's China policy mounted a f t e r 1961. 
In th i s period Nehru appeared as a prisoner of his own c r i t i c s * 
Mostly the Opposition par t i es followed a n a t i o n a l i s t - l i n e 
except the CPI,which only in the beginning was c r i t i c a l of 
his Tibet pol icy. Later on, only Swatantra proclaimed an 
a l t e r n a t i v e policy aimed a t bringing India c loser to the 
West. 
However, i t should not mean tha t there are no prospects 
for developing a strong democratic Opposition. The following 
measures may be conducive to give r i s e to effect ive Opposition 
in the Indian body-pol i t ik . 
The Opposition Par t ies should reorganise t he i r e l e c t o r a l 
system making i t less expensive and more c l e a r . They should 
publish t h e i r manifestoes and party mandates in a l l languages. 
They should develop a method through which corrupt ion, red-
tapism and indisc ip l ine could be eradic ted . They should se t 
examples of s incer i ty of work, in tegr i ty of policy and 
honesty of purpose. The Opposition par t ies should increase 
t h e i r membership and produce more e l ig ib le l eade r s . The 
past General Elections indica te t h a t the Opposition suffered 
1 . The Times of India (New Delhi) , 26-1-1970. 
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owing to scarc i ty of members whereas there was an 
abundance of candidates for the Congress Candidature, 
The pa r t i e s should endeavour to bridge t h e i r 
differences so as to obtain an effection and c lose-kni t 
e l e c t o r a l - a l l i a n c e . They should avoid and curb the 
defection-tendencies and encourage dedication and 
one 
responsibility. Such an amalgamation of Opposition is/of 
the keys to the emergence of more mature and balanced 
Opposition* 
The political parties which are organised on the basis 
of caste, religion, regional and linguistic affinities should 
be banned. The number of parties should be curtailed so as 
to give rise to a single organised Opposition party. In 
India, there are too many, ineffective and insignificant 
political parties who do not coalate for the fear of los?ing 
their separate identity. A single, two or three Opposition 
parties should be accorded legal recognition. There ought 
to be more consultations between the Government (the party-
in-power) and the Opposition Parties. The latter should 
remain ready with an alternate Government* 
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CHAPTER V 
SINO^ INDIA RiLATIONS MP THE BORDER^ DISPUTE 
INTRODUCTION; 
Communist China has emerged out of a c rue l , armed and 
long drawn revolution* India happened to be i t s adjacent 
neighbour. The two countr ies have got common border hence 
the dispute over the same, Nehru professed the pol icy of 
amicable settlement of disputes so he exhausted a l l means with 
regard to Sino-India border d i spu te . The Chinese mode of l i f e , 
2 Mao*s ideology and qiethods and open cloak and dagger i-diplomacyf 
have provided ainple evidence of t h e i r disregard of pac i f i c 
measures, India and China have been fr iendly countr ies even 
before they emerged as sovereign coiontries.-^ They had cu l tu ra l 
contacts , t r ade - r e l a t i ons and commercial t ies» India had 
complete f a i th in the Chinese proclamation of 'Hindi-Chini 
Bhai Bhai ' , which proved hallow l a t e r on. The leaders of these 
1. Romesh Thaper, 'The Problem. *, The Seminar No. h$, 
May 1963, p . 10. 
2. S.L, Poplai , '*Forei;ai Affairs ReT?orts". New Delhi, Indian 
Council of TAsrld Affairs , Vol.XII, No. I , Jan^l , I963, p . l . 
3 . • ' . . . , the h i s to ry of India i s a long h i s to ry of her 
r e l a t ion with the other countr ies of Asia" and among them, 
"an important p lace should be assigned to China- one of 
the oldest of c i v i l i z a t i o n s , though among the youngest of 
nat ions in the Western sense, aad now a growing for<ie. . ." 
The Hindustan Times. (New Delhi) , 17 .7 .60. Also see, 
Hindustan Standard^ 2^-.if,60,article by Trilok Kami, 
"Sino-India Rela t ions: An jinalysis"» 
If. Le t te r to the M i t o r , "Policy of Drift must s top" . The 
Hindustan Times,(New Delhi) , 25.11#6l with t h i s t a c t i c , 
Peking kept India in the dark and misled by wishy-washy 
slogans of »Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai*. 
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two countries used to go into raptures over the 5)000 years 
old Sino-India fr iendship. I t wae believed tha t the cu l tu ra l 
t i e s tha t existed between these two countr ies ruled out the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a major conf l ic t between them but l a t e r i t was 
rea l i sed t h a t ^the much talked about, century-old Sino-India 
amity was nothing but a myth. "When the Communist China came 
into existence, India was the f i r s t country to recognise i t 
on December 30, 19^9, within three months of i t s establishment. 
Nehru, during his v i s i t to Bri tain and jtoerica in 19^9> pleaded 
both the governments to accord recognit ion to i t . India had 
quite vociferously pleaded in the UN to give China, a permanent 
footing* 
Ind ia ' s pol icy of soft-paddling with China could not 
succeed. They claim to be a democratic people and socie ty , 
whereas, they had no experience of democracy of any kind-bhie 
l ibera l -wes te rn , emerging-Eastern, l i m i t e d - c z a r i s t , new or 
old Soviet. 
The era of Sino-India friendship commences with the 
signing of the Treaty of 195^> through which both the s t a t e s 
1. R. Prabha, "Sino-]Jidian friendship a myth", Sunday 
Standard^ (Bew Delhi) , 12 ,5a963 
2. The Seminar, on. c i t « . p , 10, In 1971, China i s given seat 
in the U.N.O, Also see, in a l e t t e r to Nehru, Chau-en-lai, 
expressed h is thanks to the Indian Government for i t s e f for t s 
at the 13th session of the United Nations General Assembly 
for res tor ing to China i t s rightfial p lace in the IMited 
Nations, Mhite Paper. No. I , p . 52. 
3 . News item, The Guardian (Manchester), 2#6.62, In 195^> 
Chau-en-lai, the Chinese Premier and J .L. Nehru, the Indian 
Prime Minister signed the Sino-Indian Treaty on Trade with 
Tibet, The t r e a t y out l ined a set pa t t e rn of f r iendly 
Contd. . . 
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pledged to l i v e in peace, enlarge the area of peace and work 
on an t i -co lon ia l l i n e s . In 1959i incurs ions , both minor and 
major s ta r ted to occur, i t was rea l i sed in the Indian Parliament 
tha t the Chinese assurances of t h e i r f a i t h in the Panchsheel, 
l u l l e d India into a fa lse sense of secur i ty . In I96I , these 
2 doctr ines appeared sham and dead as dodo to the Chinese. 
The Chinese admitted tha t the Fanchsheel was a mere tool of 
foreign pol icy then, Itj^id not cons t i tu te an abiding bas is 
of t h e i r foreign po l i cy . This was proclaimed openly in the 
episode r e l a t i ng to the dismissal of Chan g-¥e en t a i n , the Vice** 
Minister of Foreign Affa i rs . He was denounced as the opportunist 
(Continued from the previous page) 
r e l a t i o n s , the famous 5 p r i n c i p l e s , termed as Panch Sheel; 
"The Preamble of.•••• the J^reement dec la red . . • 
1. Mutual respect for each o the r s ' t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y 
and' sovereignCty; 
2. Mutual non-aggression; 
3 . Mutual-non-interference in each others i n t e rna l 
a f f a i r s ; 
km Equality and mutual benef i t ; 
5. Peaceful co~existence". The Panchsheel was to form 
the bas is of Ind ia ' s pol icy not only towards China 
but also towards other count r ies . 
1. Lok Sabha Debates. November 26, I959, Vol. XXXV, No.9 
Col. 1989. (statement by Kami S inghj i ) . 
2. Ed i to r i a l ly , ^ Dead as a Dodo", The Indian Broress 
(New Delhi) , 2 .12 .61 . 
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having propagated the erroneous view of peaceful co-existence 
in accordance with the Five Pr inc ip les and Bandung as the "basis 
•J 
of China's foreign pol icy . 
Nehru i s often c r i t i c i s e d to have been led as t ray 
by the Chinese designs of c o r d i a l i t y . Openly^ Nehru appeared 
to be misled by Chinese fr iendly gestures but he was appre-
hensive of malignancy. There was a gap between h i s publ ic 
ut terance and innermost fee l ing . He was dubious of t h e i r 
f a i th in co-existence. As ear ly as in 195^» in an interview 
to Taya Zinkin, Nehru said, "Whether thoy bel ieve in coexistence 
or not I cannot say. They pretend they do, and I must t r y to 
make them get more and more involved in ac t ing as i f they 
2 
believed in i t " . This was Nehru's innermost fear which he 
expressed p r i v a t e l y , whereas in publ ic Nehru never looked 
dubious of the Chinese p o l i c i e s . 
THE MC HAHON LINE AND THE SIMLA CONFERMGE; 
The nor th-eas tern border of India t h a t demarcates 
the t e r r i t o r i e s of India and China, i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y known 
as the Mc Mahon Line. I t was c lea r ly drawn in 1913-lif, with 
fu l l cooperation and consent of India, China and Tibet . There 
was no doubt tha t the Mc Mahon Line (so cal led a f te r Mc Mahon, 
the Br i t i sh representa t ive at the conference) merely confirmed 
1. M.L. iSondhi, "Indian Foreign Policy in a mult i -polar 
world", The Hindustan Times. (New Delhi) , 2 .12 .61 . 
2. Taya Zinkin, Reporting India. London, Chatto, 1962, 
p . 208. 
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the na tu ra l , t r a d i t i o n a l , e thnic and adminis t ra t ive boundary 
in the area. No boundary in the world have been as free from 
dispute , so well es tabl ished by t r a d i t i o n , so free from dispute 
2 
and adminis t ra t ion,as the India-China boundary. But the 
Chinese have de l ibe ra te ly challenged the l e g a l i t y of border 
settlement through t h i s customary l i n e . The f i r s t at tempt, 
by the Chinese to open the question of the de l imi la t ion of 
Sino*Indian boundary was made in a l e t t e r by Chou-Eh-lai, 
dated January 23, 1959j in response to Nehru's l e t t e r dated 
December 1^, 1958# Chou-ih«lai challenged tha t the boundary 
has never been delimited and also "no t r e a t y or agreement on 
the Sind-Indian boundary has ever been concluded.-* According to 
« * - » » • • • • I I I ! • ••••JM.I..III.—IIWI——•.! - „„., _ i . l _ _ _ . . , I ••—•I.—.111.1—.11 _ . I. — I , ,„HlW • • » • — > • • . • • 
1. Sino'*Indian Border Problem. External Pub l ic i ty Division, 
Ministry of EKternal Affairs , Government of India, New 
Delhi, 26.2.1962, p . 1 . Also see, Nevil le Maxwell, I nd i a ' s 
China War^  Bombay, Jaico Publishing House, 1971, p»107> 
"The Mc Mahon Line, of course, has never been demarcated 
(whether the Anglo-Tibetan notes exchanged in 191U- ajnoimt 
to the lega l de l imi la t ion ( i t a l i c s ) i s disputed between 
India and China, but t ha t the l i n e has never been demarcated-
i . e , marked out on the ground i s agreed by both p a r t i e s ) . " 
2. K. Gopalaswami, '•India China Boundary Question". I n t e r -
nat ional Studies.Vol. V, July 6 3 - i ^ r i l 6 ^ p . l 5 
3 . Mhite Paper. No. 1, p . 52 . "Sino-Indian bo\mdary has never 
been formally del imited". From 195^ to I968, the Government 
of India and Peking published XIV, White Papers which con-
tained the Notes, Memoranda and Le t te r s exchanged between the 
two governments. I t i s sa id , "A wrangling exchange of notes 
between Delhi and Peking has brought the two goverments 
only to unequivocal and barely c i v i l restatements of t h e i r 
opposed and deadlocked pos i t i ons" , The Times (London) 
8 .8 . I96 I . 
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Chou, the entire unsettled border was negotiable. Ghou-ai-lai 
gave certain justifications to undo the already negotiated 
border. He said that the conditions for its settlement were 
not . yet ripe then and the Chinese Government had no time to 
study the question. India reiterated its stand that the entire 
boundary was settled by custom and treaties. The Indian 
Government, maintained that the Mc Mahon Line was absolute, 
clear and infragile, and even marginal incursions by the 
2 
Chinese would not be resisted. In fact, the entire length of 
this border had been, "either defined by treaty or recognised 
by customs or by both and until the present controversy, no 
Chinese Government had ever protested against the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Government of India upto the customary 
border",-' 
In the meantime, the p o l i t i c a l s i tua t ion in Tibet was 
fas t de t e r io ra t ing . On March 31 , 1959» the Dalai Lama along 
with h is par ty entered India and asked for p o l i t i c a l asylum, 
which was subseijuently granted to him. This act of India was 
1. "The t r a d i t i o n a l border has been known from cen tur ies . It 
follows the geographical p r inc ip le of the watershed which 
i s in most places the cres t of Himalayan mountains. More-
over, in most p a r t s the boundary has the Sanction of 
^ e c i f i c in te rna t iona l agreements". JadlarChiri.a Border 
problem, op , , c i t , , p . 1, 
2. Maxwell, op. c i t . . p . 301, 
3 . India-China Border Problem, op.^ c i t . . p , 7# 
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per fec t ly in conformity with the rules of in terna t ional - law 
and the I5:iiversal Declaration of Human Rights- 1 9 ^ . This 
great ly enraged China and in r e t a l i a t i o n , Chou in h i s l e t t e r 
of September 19^9, challenged the en t i r e bas i s of the Mc Mahon 
Line.-* Chou argued tha t t h i s matter was not on the agenda 
of the Simla-Conference of 1913«1^, Tlpugh the o f f i c i a l 
publ ica t ions of the External Affairs Ministry, Government of 
India, i t was maintained t h a t , in the no r th -eas t , the 
t r a d i t i o n a l boundary was decided at a T r i p a r t i t e Conference, 
held in Simla from October I913 to July 191^, attended by 
the representa t ives of the governments of Br i t i sh India, 
Tibet and China. The correspondence between the Br i t i sh and 
Tibetan governments was kept conf ident ia l . In t h e i r jinnexure 
to the Note of the Indian Government dated November if, 1959» 
the Chinese government sa id , "the so cal led Mc Mahon Line 
was never discussed a t the Simla Conference, but was determined 
by the Br i t i sh representa t ive and the representa t ive of the 
Tibet l oca l au tho r i t i e s behind the back of the representa t ive 
of the Chinese Central Government through an exchange of secret 
notes at Delhi on March 2^, 191^, tha t i s , p r i o r to the 
signing of Simla Treaty". The note ended in a de f in i t e 
1. Quoted in Indian Note of 26,.if, 1959» T<hite Paper No.l . 
p . 68. 
2. The White Paper No#l, i s often l abe l l ed as ra ther undip-
lomatic . Maxwell, O P . , cit*^ p* IO6 
3 . Biswanath Singh, "Legality of the Mc Mahon Line", The 
Indian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science, Vol. XXVIII, 
January- June 1967j No.l , p . 163, 
k^ The. IndiarCaiina Border problem, op>. c i t . . p . 1 . 
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proclamation by Peking as to them, "The so cal led Mc Mahon Line 
was a product of the Br i t i sh pol icy of aggression against the 
Tibet region of China and has bever been recognised by any Chinese 
Central Government and i s decidedly i l l e g a l " . This stand of the 
Chinese Government was,however,regretted by Nehru in his l e t t e r 
to Chou, dated September 26, 1959* in the same l e t t e r the 
Government of India categoricsil ly held t h a t / ' t h e Mc Mahon Line 
was not an a rb i t r a ry iinposition on a week Tibet", and " I t 
formalised the n a t u r a l , t r a d i t i o n a l , e t h n i c and adminis t ra t ive 
boundary in the a rea .^ Through a l e t t e r , Chou l a i d claims to 
l a rge por t ions of ]jidian t e r r i t o r y , - ' but the Chinese log ic in 
challenging the l e g a l i t y of the l i n e was both fac tua l ly incorrect 
and l e g a l l y i r r e l evan t . On August 28, I96I , the Executive 
Committee of the Afro-Asian Council s trongly upheld the na tu r a l , 
h i s t o r i c a l and l ega l v a l i d i t y of the Indian pos i t i on , with regard 
to her border dispute with China and hoped tha t the p a r t i e s 
concerned would re so r t to negot ia t ion as a pac i f i c method to 
solve t h e i r d ispute .^ 
1, Miite Papers No.l , Vol* I I , p . 29 
2, I b id . . p . 38. 
3 , Biswanath Singh, ou* c i t . y p . I63 
^« Ihid.y p , 16^. 
5« The National Herald (Lucknow), 30«8»196l. 
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In the Simla Conference of 1913»*'1'+, the relevant 
question of Indo-'Tibetan boundary was discussed at large 
and at lengths The decision was agreeable to Tibet also, 
which was participating as an independent member, China 
then had accepted the capacity of Tibet to conclude treaties 
1 
with Britain and China, on equal footing* The British and 
Tibetan plenipotenciaries exchanged notes regarding this line 
on March 2^25* 191^» The Indian Prime Minister Nehru, in 
one of his letters to the Chinese Premier, dated March 22,19^9, 
pointed out that this line was drawn after full discussion 
and confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters. 
There was nothing to indicate the dissatisfaction of the 
2 
Tibetan authorities with the agreed boundary. The Chinese 
representative signed the docuiment without any reservation.-' 
The British government described the Simla Conference as an 
attempt to mend relations between China and Tibet. The 
government explained it in the Parliament that Great Britain 
played the role of the honest broker. The Simla Conference 
was an intricate exercise in diplomacy, power-politics and 
espionage, on the eve of Wsrld War I, ^  
'^* ^ ite Paper, No, II, p, 38, 
2. Ibid,. No, I, p, 56. 
3, Biswanth Singh, op, c i t . ^ p , 167 
h» Maxwell, op^ c i t . , p ,^7 
5. For details, see Aslastic Lamb, The Mc Mahon Line and 
Dorothy Moodman, Himalayan Frontiers, as cited in 
Maxwell, op, cit,« p, ^+7 
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As a reaction to the Chinese attitude, the British 
government sent a note on June 25> 191'+» asking China either 
to sign it or be devoid of the privileges of the above mentioned 
Tripartite C6nvention» The Mc Mahon Line was a matter between 
India and Tibet and both have signed and ratified it. It 
establishes the fact that the treaty between India and Tibet 
was not signed secretly. The Chinese claim of illegality of 
this Line is not justified because once a treaty, particularly 
a boundary treaty, is freely signed and ratified by the 
competent parties, it becomes binding and creates rights. 
The Chinese government^however^made a host of allegatiobs 
against the Mc Mahon Line and its legality. They called it 
the offspring of the escpansionist policy of the then British 
government in India. Historically speaking, it is an unsound 
argument. In fact, the Mc Mahon Line did not create any new 
border but only clarified the historic and traditional boundary 
between India and Tibet, which had been well recognised and 
was beyon^ dispute for centuries. It ran mostly along the 
crest of Himalayan ranges. The 191J+ convention only provided 
an additiohal sanction to an already existing traditional 
o 
frontier, '^ 
1. Biswanath Singh, op. cit,^ p. 167 
2. Ibid., p.l67. These facts are substantiated by relevant 
sources as Michells authoritative 'Report on the North East 
Frontier Of India' T.T. Coopers, The Mishnee Hills^ London, 
1873 and also from the map published by Peking Uhiversity 
in 1929. 
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Moreover, the Postal Atlas of China, 1917 showed 
approximately the correct alignment of Indo-Tibet boundary, 
east of Bhutan* The International Law does not concede to 
the J "theory of pillars"* The Mc Mahon Line was clearly 
delimited by Article 9 of the Simla convention, and runs 
along with the main watershed, as the analogy of the . 
quoted judgment of the International Court of Justice, its 
validity cannot be challenged on the basis of its not being 
marked on the ground by pillars. The Mote of the government 
of India to the Chinese government on February 12, i960 also 
2 
enunciated the principle of ]i)ternational Law on this point. 
The main objection of China was between outer Tibet and 
inner Tibet and inner Tibet and China. The M£ Mahon Line 
was clearly shown in the map initialled by all the three 
k 
representatives. It was not a secretly signed treaty, the 
Chinese Government, far from being in the dark about it was 
"aware"of it.'^  The Chinese "plea of error" and "ignorance" 
1. Ibid., p. I69 
2. White Paper. No.Ill, p.89 "... a watershed is the best 
of all possible natural boundaries. It is liable to no 
change and is readily recognizable.... the alignment of 
the northern boundary of India throughout follows the 
major watershed supports the fact that this became the 
boundary through custom and tradition". 
3. White Paper, No. II, pp. 38-39. 
h. News item. Guardian (Manchester), I3,2.1960(News by Olaf 
Caroe, Foreign Secretary of India from 1939-^5)• 
5. News item. The Times of India( Bombay), 15«2« 1960. 
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1 
was held void in the famous Preah Vihear case. This case 
held that the ignorance of China was contributed by China 
herself and not by the other two parties to the case. In this 
case, it was held, "It is an established rule of law that the 
plea of error can not be allowed as an element vitiating 
consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own 
conduct to the error could have avoided it, or if the circums-
tances were such as to put the party on notice of the possible 
"2 
errors# 
The Atch i son Treat ies Ser ies , XIV, 1929, published 
t h i s convention and the Mc Mahon Line was shown in the 
o f f i c i a l maps published from 1937 onwards. Since China did 
not rai-se object ions to i t , i t was inferred tha t china had 
I4. 
accepted i t . The Chinese maps from the 6th century A.D, t 
the present show tha t t i l l the beginning of t h i s century 
1. In terna t ional Court of Jus t i ce , Report of Judgement e t c . 
Case concerning the Temple of PreaJi Vihear, (Cambodia 
Vs. Thailand), Judgment of June 15, I962, I«C<J* Reports. 
1962, p , 2 ^ , 
2. I*C«J. Reporty. OP, c i t . . p , 2^, 
3 . Mhite Paper. Vol. I I , p . 39* 
U-, Biswanath Singh, op« c i t . . p .163 , Also see, India 
China Border Problem, OP. c i t . . p , 2 , " . . . China ne i ther 
protes ted against the boundary between India and Tibet 
nor did she seek modification of i t a f t e r the Simla 
Convention". 
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Sinkiang never extended even as far South as the Suen Lun 
which at present del imits Kashmir's f ron t i e r s in the north* 
The map "Central Asien", published in Leipzig in 1880 by 
Joseph Chavan also confirmed i t . Even the o f f i c i a l Chinese 
maps of 1893, 1917 and I9I9 showed the boundary in t h i s area 
2 
as depicted in o f f i c i a l Indian maps today. 
The Chinese government as l a t e as in I961-62, challenged 
the l ega l capacity of Tibet to enter in to the boundary t r e a t y of 
191lf«-^, The present Oiinese government i s not l ega l l y e n t i t l e d 
to repudiate the decision of i t s predecessor* She had ' • . • . . , 
1« Some fac ts about India-China boundary by K, Gopalachari, 
His tor ica l Division, Ministry of Scternal J t f fairs . The 
Hindu (Madras), 10*12«62, "In 1950 the Chinese Government 
expressed t h e i r g ra t i f i ca t ion over the des i re of the 
Government of India", to s t a b i l i s e the Chinese-India border 
and the government of India repl ied tha t the recognised 
boundary between India and Tibet should remain i n v i o l a t e . 
The Chinese Government questioned ne i ther the locat ion nor 
the recognition of t h i s boundary and the Government of India 
saw no reason to asstime that there was any doubt regarding 
the border. The only pre tex t for doubting the Chinese in ten-
t ion was the fac t -d i f fe ren t alignments were shown by di f ferent 
maps, India China Border Problem, OP. c i t « , p , 1^  
2, India- China Border Problem^ OP. c i t . , p . h 
3» Biswanath Singh, op#, cit..^ p , 172. The author owes 
t h i s point to 'Krishna Hao, 
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completely overlooked the v i t a l point t h a t the then 
Government of China had agreed to the attendance of 
Tibet as a fu l ly empowered th i rd pa r ty to the Simla 
Conference'*. The s t a t e boundaries were concerned with 
2 
permanent i n t e r e s t hence beyond s t a t e succession ot war« 
Even a f te r the ext inct ion of the l ega l pe rsona l i ty , 
the Mc Mahon Line created by the I91I+ Simla Conference 
cannot be rendered void, K. Krishna Rao congently argued 
•»•,,» the present boundary alignment had been establ ished in how 
well before the People 's Republic of China, came into exis tence . 
Consequently, as the People 's Republic of China could not 
s t a r t out with r igh t s than i t s predecessor possessed, i t 
could not r a i s e any fresh claim to Indian t e r r i t o r y " . In 
1959, the In terna t ional Commission of J u r i s t s examined the 
Tibetan Treat ies and concluded t h a t Tibet was a fu l ly 
sovereign s t a t e , independent of the Chinese control in fact 
k 
and in law. The Chinese claims branding the Treaty as based 
on l ega l myths and legends were groundless. I t was baseless 
to say that India, resor ted to a r b i t r a r y argumentation, 
1, News item, The Times of Indla^ (New Delhi) , 15.2.60 
2, Mc Nair, Law of the Treaties^ Oxford, I938, p .^^2 , as 
c i ted in Biswanath Singh's a r t i c l e , on. c i t .« p.173 
3 , Biswanth Singh, op, c i t . f p , 173. 
k, Satyanarayan Sinha, China Strikes^ London, HLandford, 
Press , 196^, p . 57. 
172 
• 1 
d i s to r t i on and slander in order to j u s t i fy i t s prnouncements* 
Communist China t i l l 1958 behaved in a way tha t confirmed 
t h e i r acceptance of the Mc Mahori Line. India exercised 
l ega l control over the North East Front ier Agency. Nehru 
very confidently assured the Lok Sabha that the Mc MaJion Line 
was our boundary, map or no map. India would not allow any 
body to come across t h a t boundary. In 1958) an o f f i c i a l 
magazine published a map of China which included a la rge 
chunk of Indian/terri tory in North East Front ier Agency, U.P. 
r, 2 
and Ladakh areas as p a r t s of China. Indian government, 
consequently enquired about t h i s car tographical aggression 
and the Chinese Government put for th i t s lame excuse tha t the 
surveys were not undertaken by the Chinese Government, I t 
was in the l e t t e r , dated January 23, 1959> tha t Chou-Bn-lai 
ra ised afresh the question of the e n t i r e India-Tibet boundary 
including the Mc Mahon Line and eventual ly l a i d claims to some 
90,000 square kilo meter of the Indian t e r r i t o ry* The Chinese 
diplomacy in regard to t h i s dispute i s marked by di ipl ic i ty and 
inconsistency, ^ Thus the India-China border i s not a 
complicated issue l e f t by h i s to ry , but one de f in i t e ly s e t t l e d 
by h i s to ry . The Indian alignment of 2,^ 400 square miles 
1. The Hindu (Madras), 30.^f. 19^2 
2. India«>China Border Problem, op. cit>, p. 6. 
3. Mhite PaDer. I, p. h? 
^. Biswanath Singh, OT3 . c i t , . p , 175, 
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boundary, the longest in the world, had been determined 
by geography, confirmed by tradition and custom, sancitified 
by treaties and reinforced by continuous exercise through 
centuries of administrative jurisdiction, appropriate to 
the areas concerned. It turned along the major and majestic 
water shed ranges, such as the Aglul, Musta, the Kun Lixn, 
the Kailash, the Zaskar and the crest of Himalayas which 
1 
cons t i tu t e a geological and geographical un i ty , M.H. Johson 
showed Aksai Chin, together with broad t e r r i t o r y in the 
north of the Karakaram Pass, within Kashmir in a map he 
2 drew on the bas is of h is journey to Khotan. The following 
can therefore be l o g i c a l l y summed iipj 
"(a) Ind i a ' s t r a d i t i o n a l f ron t i e r with China i s well-
known, being based on t r e a t y , agreement and custom. 
T i l l recent ly , no Chinese Government has ever 
challenged i t# 
/ 
"(b) The present controversy over the f ron t i e r arose 
because the Chinese government for the f i r s t time 
l a i d claims to extensive areas of Indian t e r r i t o r y 
in Premier Chou«Bn-lai's l e t t e r of 8th September 1959. 
"(c) The tension on the India-China border has increased 
in the l a s t three years because Chinese forces have 
been pushing forward to a s se r t t h e i r claims, 
1, K. Gopalaswami, "The India China Boundary Queijetion", 
In ternat ional Studies^ Vol, V, Nos, 1-2, July-April 
2# Maxwell, or>« c i t . « p . 27. 
17"^ 
«(d) The Government of India have s ta ted tha t i n s p i t e 
of Chinese provocations they wi l l always explore 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of peaceful sett lement 
Hegotiations on t h i s bas i s are tjnacceptable to the 
Government of India, But they are prepared to 
discuss with the Chinese Government ex i s t ing 
disputes and such minor r a t i f i c a t i o n s of tie f ron t i e r 
as may be considered necessary by agreement". 
TIBETAN REVOLT; 
The years between 1957-60 were marked by the eruption 
of the Tibetan revo l t , the a r r i v a l of the Dalai Lama and the 
2 f i r s t inc idents tha t occurred along the Sino-Indian border. 
On January 1 , 19^0, Mao-Tse-Tung proclaimed the 'Libera t ion of 
three mil l ion Tibetans from imper ia l i s t aggress ion ' , as the 
basic task of the People 's Liberation Army of China. The same 
year the Chinese troops entered Tibet. In May, 1951> Tibetan 
represen ta t ives in Peking signed a Seventeen Boint Agreement 
which provided for Chinese occiipation of Tibet , But the Chinese 
violated i t s provis ions , Jaya Prakash Narayan said tha t Nehru's 
t a l k of the two thousand year-old t i e s between China and India 
untarnished by the armed conf l i c t , created p o l i t i c a l myopia-^ 
1. India China Border Problem, o p . , c i t , , pp. 13-1^ 
2. W, Ven Eckel en, I nd i a ' s Foreiem Policy and the Border 
Dispute with China^ The Hague, Martinus-Nijhoff, I I ed, 
1970, p . 1. 
3 . Satyanarayan Sinha, op. c i t , , p . 61 . 
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1 
as the Indian government remained bl ind to t h i s rape of Tibet , 
Since the Tibetan revol t in March 1959i leading to the f l i g h t 
of the Dalai Lama to India, and the border inc idents a t Longju 
in the North East Front ier Agency in August and in Ladakh in 
October, India China r e l a t ions which had been played upon both 
sides as being based on Panchsheel, s t ead i ly de te r io ra t ed , a 
de te r io ra t ion climaxed in to a massive invasion of the Indian 
t e r r i t o r y in October I962. The peaceful po l icy object ives 
with China were upset because of the Tibetan imbroglio, which 
const i tuted for India, the f i r s t tough knot in i t s r e l a t i ons 
with China. Since then, the analysis of Ind i a ' s pol icy towards 
China became an analysis of Ind i a ' s po l icy towards Tibet,- ' 
The prel iminary phase of the boundary dispute with China 
terminated with Chou-Sn-lai 's meeting with Nehru in 1959* I t 
provided a sever t e s t i n g ground for Panchsheel-*^ the five 
p r inc ip l e s of Pee«6ful co-existence which India advocated as 
an o r ig ina l Asian contr ibution to in t e rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s . 
The confl ic t tha t emerged between India and China happened to 
be the f i r s t conf l ic t between a commianist power and a non-
L. 
aligned s ta te* Even during the Tibetan r evo l t , there was a 
1» Ibid*, p» "57-
2» Karunakar Gupta, "India China Relatt^ions". The Seminar 
No.50, October 63, p , I 3 , 
3 . Nareshwar Dayal Seth, " Ind ia ' s Policy Towards China", 
i " Indian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science, Vol# XXIX, No* 1 
January- March, I968, pp# lMf*if5» 
^, Eckel en, op, cit»^ p .?* 
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1 
hope tha t China may l i m i t her "expansionist aims" and s e t t l e 
down to a po l icy of peace, but China did not abandon i t s po l icy 
of expansionism. The boundary dispute with china arose from 
the Tibetan question* If China was not allowed to overturn 
Tibet, the re would have been neg l ig ib le common boundary between 
India and China*/ Tibetan question proved to be the genesis of 
conf l i c t . The ef for ts of the Indian Government to . s e t t l e 
2 
the TibetaJi question were repudiated by haughty rebuffs , 
China maintained tha t the question of Tibet was China's domestic 
problem and no foreign influence would be tolerated*"^ In the 
wake of Tibetan episode, India wanted to play the ro le of an 
5 
k 
"honest peace broker" but China scu t t l ed every such e f f o r t s . 
consequently India to le ra ted Chinese conquest of Tibet in 1950* 
On the eve of the Chinese annexation of Tibet, Nehru declared 
tha t India woiold not touch the s o i l of Tibet, This annexation 
of Tibet by China transformed the mi l i t a ry balance of power. 
By the t r e a t y of April 22, 1 9 5 ^ India off ic i j ja l ly recognised 
6 Tibet as the Tibet-region of China and set i t s seal of approval 
1. Nareshwar Dayal Seth, ouy c i t , , p . Ilf6. illso see Lok Sabhg. 
Debates, No.15, Vol. XXXIV, Ninth Session, Cols. 3808-9. 
(Speech by Raiiga). 
2. I b i d . , p . 1^7 
3» P.O. Chakravarti , Ind ia ' s China Pol icy. HLoomington, 
Indiana Iftiiversity Press , 1968, pp . 12-m-, 
h, Mahendra Kxjtmar, op. c i t . . p . 10^, 
?• I b i d . . p . 105 
6. Vftiite Paper. No, 1, p . ^ 
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over the conquest of Tibet, There was no longer a buffer 
state between China and India* The Chinese expansionist 
•J 
designs were c lear but India overlooked i t . il^art from 
the br ief episode about Tibet there was no point of serious 
dispute between India and China u n t i l the end of Korean war 
in July 1953« China emerged as a new powerful coxmtry with 
formidable power, able to face the ^ e r i c a n Challenge in Asia* 
2 India was to play second f iddle in the new balance of power. 
THE DISPUTE DSVELOPS: 
The change in Sino"Indian r e l a t ions since 1959» 
resuilting from the Chinese suppression of the revol t in Tibet 
and the Chinese moves along I n d i a ' s Himalayan f ron t i e r s , the 
react ions of India to these moves had been a source of grea ter 
concern and absorption to India than any other developments in 
the External Affairs.-^ The Sino-Indian border, covering 
12,2008 square miles , w^s generally unguarded* The area was 
remote and inaccess ib le to both New Delhi and Peking* In 1959 
t h i s s i tua t ion was transformed by the revela t ion of the communist 
Chinese claims to the aireas. Nehru described them to be over 
1. Sinha, op . c i t . ^ pp, 61-62 
2« Karunakar Giipta, "India China Relat ions" , Seminar« 
No.JOj October I963, p . 15, 
3« Norman D. Palmer, " India ' s Foreign Pol icy", The P o l i t i c a l 
quar ter ly . Vol. 33, London, 1962, pp.391-92* 
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50p00 square miles which had been an integral part of India since 
many decades and centuries. The Chinese claimed large areas in 
the NEFA, several small pockets of territory West of Nepal, and 
Alcsai Chin plateau in Ladakh, These areas were referred to as 
listem, Middle and western Sectors respectively. China claimed 
that only a customary and traditional border line existed and 
the border had never been defined by treaty or negotiations, 
India maintained that a frontier existed which had been established 
by custom, tradition and treaty* The Mc Mahon Line settled the 
Sino-India boundary on paper otherwise it was a fact that the 
2 
Sino-* Indian boundary had not been formally delimit ted. /liPolicy 
of peace and friendship based on negotiations and discussions, 
as instruments of pacific settlement was often mistaken for a 
forward policy by some foreign writers like Neville Maxwell.-^ 
The traditional line as recognised by China, differed from the 
frontiers claimed by India. It was the area between these two 
L. 
lines which was in dispute. 
1,"The Sino-Indian Border Dispute»•, Current Notes on Inter-
national Affairs. January-February, I963, Department of 
External Affairs, Vol. XXXIV, Nos* 1-2, p. 37 
2» White Paper. No. 1, p. 52 
3. Maxwell, op.eit., p.199* Also see, pp.201,205* In a crucial 
meeting on November 2, I96I, in which Nehru, Menon, J.Desai, 
Gen. Thappar, and B.N. Kaul were present new directives of 
forward policy emerged pp. 221, 223, 22lf, 233> 291, 303 and 
3^. 
hm Current Notes on International Affairs, OP. cit.^ p«38 
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The Chinese incursions into India began in June 195^ 
when their armed forces entered into the Barahoti area. In 
1956 also, the Chinese armed personnel entered the Nilong-Jadhang 
area and Shipkila. In 1959> a Chinese armed detachment entered 
the Spanggur area* In August, 1959» the armed Chinese patrols 
crossed the Thagia id-dge. The Indian government was taken aback 
by these incursions between 195^59* In retrospect, these 
incursions proved to be a smoke-screen to their major aggressive 
•1 
designs in the Aksai Chin a rea . In 1958 i t was noticed tha t 
the Chinese had constructed a lOO-miler road, connecting 
2 
Sinkiang with Tibet , The difference between the Indian and 
Chinese approach to the border problem was tha t India was ce r t a in 
and c lear as to how and where the border l i n e ran . She proclaimed 
her possession in unmistakable language and also showed her 
published maps to the world, unchanged throughout these years . 
However, the Chinese had been ambiguous, r e t i c en t and self-
a s se r t i ve . The stand of the Chinese government with regard to 
/ 
1. Satyana37an Sinha, OP. c i t . , p . IZ* Aksai Chin's l i t e r a l 
meaning i s the "desert of Mhite Stones". This land of 
frozen adventure was the backbone of Sino-India border 
d ispute . I b id . , p« 69 
2. K. Qopalachari, "The India-China Boundary Dispute", I n t e r -
nat ional Studiesy V, Nos.1-2, July- i ipr i l , 1963-6if, p . 3 8 . 
Also see, "Mr, Laxman Singh from U.P. was the f i r s t person 
in 195^ to inform the Government about the bui lding of the 
Aksai Chin Boad. As our Trade Representative, he used to 
v i s i t Tibet every y e a r . . . . he met some labourers who had 
worked on building the road". Kuldip Nayar, Between the 
Lines, New Delhi, 1970, p . 171. 
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the border l i n e was unconfounded as I nd i a ' s proposi t ion 
about the Simla Conference of 191^ was held equally va l id 
•1 
and legal in foreign press, 
THE THREE SBCTOIRS; 
In the Eastern Sector India claimed its areas in NEFA 
on the basis of the Mc Mahon Line, established in 191^ by the 
Indian and Tibetan and Chinese. The border of eastern Tibet 
was defined by this convention adjacent to Tibet, The line 
terminated in the East where the borders of Bhutan, Tibet 
and India meet and continued in the East as the Sino-Burmese 
border, China refused to ratify this treaty £ind also branded 
it illegal and 'as the one imposed on Tibet by Britain and 
declared that Tibet was not an independent nation to enter 
into a treaty of this sort. There were also differences of 
opinion between the Chinese and Indians with regard to drawing 
over 
of the Mc Mahon Line/Dhola C called Chedong by the Chinese) 
and Longju areas. The Chinese claimed that both these areas 
were north of the Line, whereas the Indian government claimed 
that they were south of it. The Chinese government contented 
that even if the Indian claims to the Mc Mahon Line were conceded, 
China had a right to these small areas, 
1, Editorially, The National Herald. (Lucknow), 11.6.62. 
2. "Sino-Indian Border Dispute, "Current Notes on International 
Affairs '. January- February 1963, Department of External 
Affairs, Canberra, Vol, XXXIV, Nos. 1-2, p. 38 
I 8 l 
In the Middle Sector the places in dispute between 
the two cover the aree^ of 2,0000 square kilometre. In 1957» 
these areas were showed as p a r t s of China, for the f i r s t time* 
In the Western Sector the t r a d i t i o n a l boundaries of 
Ladakh were recognised in a Treaty of 18^2 between the 
Br i t i sh au tho r i t i e s and the Raja of Jammu, In t h i s case a l so , 
China claimed that the t r e a t y was inva l id since China was not 
a pa r ty to i t . The Indian claim extended to the north of 
Himalayaxt watershed while the Chinese claim extended south 
of i t . This did not include south of the karakoram Range 
which was recognised by China and Pakistan as the boundary 
between Sinkiang and Pakistan held Kashmir The Chinese since 
1953, s t a r t ed showing t h i s area in China and also es tabl ished 
t h e i r outpos ts . 
Coming to the Climax of border dispute one i s urged 
to analyse the nature of Chinese diplomacy and the r e l a t i o n s 
with India since the two emerged as independent na t ions . The 
f i r s t phase of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s , beginning with China's 
recognit ion by India upto 1951 was the phase of contempt and 
h o s t i l i t y . Despite the Chinese being h o s t i l e , India presented 
a p i c tu re of good re l a t ions with the Chinese people and govern-
ment in cu l tura l and p o l i t i c a l f i e l d s , Tagore v i s i t ed China 
1, I b id . , pp, 39 - ' ^ 
2. Mahendra Kumar, "Sino-India Rela t ions" The Indian 
JburnHl of P o l i t i c ^ Scigncti| Vol, XXIV, No, I 
January-December, I96 I , p . 103. 
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in 192V, Nehru in I939 and CJhiang and h i s wife v i s i t e d India 
in 19^+2. Caiina was invi ted a t the Asian Relations Conference 
in 19^7 in Kew Delhi, However, the (3hinese did not f a i l to 
l abe l Nehru as the "running dog of imperialism". This period 
presented r e l a t ions of unique character . On Korean question 
the Sine-Indian r e l a t i ons were governed by Ind ia ' s des i r e to 
mediate between China and the West. In 1950-53, India played 
a s ign i f ican t ro le of a mediator for achieving t ruce in Korea. 
In 195^, India performed a commendable job in Geneva negot ia t ions 
on Indo«China. India fu l ly cooperated with China in solving 
the Korean c r i s i s . Ind ia ' s mediation in Korea and surrender 
of i n t e r e s t s in Tibet contributed «a great deal in re laxa t ion 
of i n i t i a l tension between China and India, with the r e s u l t t ha t 
China s ta r ted soft paddling with India. This d ispel led the 
impression tha t Sino*India r e l a t i o n s were not always based on 
ideological differences and differences of approach. This 
appealed to be an era of mutual intimacy and cordial t i e s which, 
beginning in 1951, climaxed in the signing of 195^Sino-Indian 
Agreement on Trade with Tibet, This marked the end of second 
phase. The th i rd phase ended in November-December 19^6 when 
Chou-ai-lai v i s i t ed India. With the signing of 195^ Treaty 
containing the Panchsheel doc t r ines , s t a r t ed the honeymoon 
period of Sino-India r e l a t i o n s . In 1956, Chou made a long 
v i s i t to India. The r e l a t i o n s were fur ther strengthened by the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n of Sino-India Agreement on Tibet on June 3 , 195^, 
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the signing of the Protocol a t Lhasa on April 1 , 1955> 
handing over of the exchange of various cu l tu ra l missions. 
C!hina supported Indian act ion in Goa. Both India and China 
reacted s t r o n ^ y to South-East Asian Treaty Organisation and 
other U.S. , sponsored secur i ty a l l i a n c e s . The goodwill during 
t h i s period w^' reciprocal* The next phase marked the .beginning 
of Sino-India differences. Now commenced the car tographical 
aggression and the Chinese game of mapsmanship. The Chinese 
government was not ready to abide by the KMT commitments and 
expressed the desire to revise the maps published by the 
Na t iona l i s t s . These maps in 1953> s t a r t ed showing l a rge p a r t s 
of Indian t e r r i t o r y within China (NEFA, Bhutan and Ladakh e tc») . 
in the same year Chou, though doubtful of the l e g a l i t y of 
Mc Mahon Line, told Nehru tha t in view of the present iSino-
Indian r e l a t ions he was prepared to recognise the Line» 
In 195^» China lodged a complaint tha t Indian troops have 
entered Barohoti* In 1956-57, three times the Chinese troops 
were found on Indian side of Ship-k i - la and only then, i t was 
f i r s t noticed tha t the Chinese have s t a r t ed bui lding a road 
connecting Sinkiang to Tibet .^ Indian government got aware 
of i t in 1958» However, Nehru and Chou agreed to s e t t l e minor 
1. Kihite Paper. No. I , p . 3 
2. Mahendra Kumar, oio. c i t . ^ p . 110, 
I8if 
differences through negot ia t ions . This per iod, during which 
India and China seemed to have patched up t h e i r differences 
and consolidated t h e i r f r iendship, also contained seeds of 
future t roub le . During 1957» the range of Sino-Indian 
conf l ic t s widened. The minor border incidents s ta r ted to 
take p l ace , the map controversy, Nehru's objections and 
Ghou's evaPive answers, culminated to boi l at the s l i g h t e s t 
p r e t e x t . The next phase s t a r t i n g from 19^7, continued t i l l 
1958. I t was free from 'tainor c lashes" . Indian publ ic opinion 
was adverse to the West and not to China. This was the period 
of l u l l and animated tension. '^ 
The next phase,which s ta r ted from July 1958 to March 
1959 caused concern as the clashes renewed at Barahoti, for 
which the two agreed to keep . demi l ia ta r i sed . Despite the 
Indian government's demand to change the maps, published by 
2 China in 1957» the Chinese government refused to do so on the 
3 
ground t h a t she had not as yet conducted the surveys This 
period was responsible for the emergence of s t r a ins in Sino-
Indian r e l a t i o n s . There were r a re gestures of goodwill but 
1« Ibid.J pp. 111-112. Also see, Notes Memorandum l e t t e r s 
exchanged between the Goverment of India and China contained 
in "White Papers" published by the Ministry of External 
Affairs , New Delhi. 
2. China P i c t o r i a l , :• 1^.2. I962 
3» Miite Paper. No. 23, November 3 , 1958, p .^7 
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reciprocal charges of a t tack and co\inter a t tack, Nehru 
wrote a l e t t e r on December 1^, 1958, to Ghou r e g r e t t i n g , 
the Chinese claims, to Which Chou repl ied tha t the Sino~ 
Indian boundary has never been delimited* In March 1959> 
demonstrations broke out in Lhasa, the Tibetan Cabinet 
declared independence of Tibet , the Seventeen Point.Agreement 
between China and Tibet-1951> v/as declared u l t r a vire^s, 
and Dalai Lama was given p o l i t i c a l asylum in India. I t 
was the period of de te r io ra t ion in r e l a t i o n s when the Chinese 
were reported to have crossed at Khinzemanne, NEFA, Migyitun 
and Longju, In the wake of 1959> India was reminded of the 
2000 years old friendship and the Chinese were in a mood 
to attack,-* The prel iminary phase of border aggression 
can be categorised in three s tages . During the f i r s t phase, 
the aim of the Communist Chinese diplomacy was, to win 
Ind ia ' s friendship and get Chinese claims approved over Tibet . 
During the second phase, the Chinese es tabl ished t h e i r m i l i t a ry 
pos ts in the unguarged Indian t e r r i t o r y , taking -undue 
advantage of Ind ia ' s f a i th in peaceful northern borders . In 
1. White Paper^ No. I, op. c i t . . p . 52 
2. Ibid. 
3» Satyanarayan Sinha, OP. c i t . . p . 6 3 , 
^ Ibid, y p . 7^, 
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the t h i r d phase, the Chinese leve l led v io lent accusations 
against India and occupied Ladakh. Their f i r s t conquest 
enhanced t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l appe t i t e . The Chinese were 
establ ishing t h e i r strong-hold over Daulat Beg Oldi, Aksai 
Chin and Qizil Jllga* Their aggressive designs had extended 
upto Chip Chap r iver at the Pangong Lake area in Ladakh. On 
May 1^, 1962, Nehru, r e i t e r a t e d the demand for the Chinese 
withdrawl in Ladakh, c rea t ing a no man's land of approximately 
11,300 Square miles. I t was l a t e r on noticed tha t the Galwan 
Valley incident proved to be the turning point in the h i s to ry 
of the Sino-Indian confl ic t in Ladakh. Nehru, in one of the 
Notes sent to the Chinese government mentioned t h e i r two 
intensions to consolidate the Chinese pos i t ion in the t e r r i t o r y 
occupied by them. I t s evidence was the building of a new 
road through the t e r r i t o r y , the s e t t i ng up of a new post and 
the general tempo of a c t i v i t y in the area . Secondly, they 
attempted to take advantage of the differences between India 
and Pakistan and between India, Bhutan and Sikkim^ T i l l 19^2, 
in Indian perception, China was seeking to u t i l i s e a new 
de l ibe ra te in t rus ion across the eastern boundary to bring 
the Mc Mahon Line within the scope of t a l k s tha t would lead to 
1, News item, The Times of IndiaCNew Delhi), 10.6 , I962 
2. Sinha, op. c i t . , p .76 . The National Herald (Lucknow) 
10.7.1962. Also see the Times of IhdiaCNew Delhi), 8.5^62, 
"Like a snake, the Chinese, having swallowed half of 
Ladakh, are determined to gorge up the r e s t " . 
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general negotiations* The crux of the Indian i n t e rp re t a t i on 
was the resolve that the Mc Mahon Line should not be open for 
renegot ia t ion . Dissa t is fac t ion was mounting in India with 
regard to the Indian government's delay in f u l f i l l i n g i t s 
promise to hold the Line ' i nv io la te . The Opposition openly-
declared that any meeting with the Chinese would be l abe l led 
as 'appeasement' . The Indian government's reac t ion , through 
her note of October 6, I962, ext r ica ted the government from 
•1 
the awkward dilemma into which it had been put in August I962. 
Even on March 21, I962, while addressing a news conference at 
New Delhi, Nehru did not rule out Arbitration as a method to 
2 
solve the Sino'-India border d ispute . 
CHINA INVADES INDIA 
The re l a t ions between India and China had de te r io ra ted 
since the rebel l ion in Tibet.- ' The Chinese refusal to recognise 
the Mc Mahon Line and Indian government's granting of p o l i t i c a l 
k 
asylum to the Dalai Lama added fuel to the f i r e . Three years 
1, Maxwell, ot)« c i t * . pp. 327«28 
2, The Pakistan Times (Karachi), 22,3«1962 
3, Eekelen, OP. c i t . . p . 93 , 
h, M i t o r i a l l y "Sino - Indian Relat ions" , The National Herald 
(Lucknow), 22,6,1967. The Sino-Indian Relations have 
been under s t r a in s of varying sever i ty from the time the 
Dalai Lama with his fellows escaped and sought refuge in 
India. 
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af te r the Chinese a t tack on the Kongka Pass in Ladakh, 
they laiinched a massive a t tack in the North East Front ie r 
Agency on October 20, I962. "When the aggression occurred. 
North Atlant ic Treaty Organisation stipported the aggressed, 
India* In one of t h e i r commtmiques, the Foreign and 
Defence Minister of the a l l i ance , expressed grave concern 
i 
over "the implications of such a Chinese action in As ia . " 
The Home Minister , Y.B. Chavan held an enquiry in to the 
aggression and l a t e r on declared tha t there were th ree fold 
motives of the Chinese aggression against India, . . . . . . i t 
wanted to show the world i t s mi l i t a ry might, i t wanted to 
force India to give up i t s postiire of non-alignment and 
rush to western powers for ass i s tance , giving up i t s 
friendship with the Soviet Union, and t h i r d l y , i t wanted to 
2 place a heavy burden on defence expenditure on India '• 
India and China did not agree about each o thers 
1. News item. The Plindustan Times. (New Delhi) , 16,12»62. 
Also see B l i t o r i a l l y , Parliamentary s tud ies . Vol,XII, 
No.9, September I968, p , 1 . , "That the in ten t ion may 
be to demonstrate the superior might of China to the 
smaller countries of Asian coTatinenc, to upset the 
apple-cart of Ind ia ' s planned economy, to d i s c r ed i t 
the non-communist path to socii l isra t h a t India was 
following". 
2. News Item, The Times of India (New Delhi) , 2^.1 .67. 
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versions of a t tack. India s trongly l abe l l ed C!hina as the 
aggressor and China did the vice-*versa* However, the 
i n i t i a l success of the Chinese troops suggest t ha t they were 
the ones who managed to attejck f i r s t with the advantage of 
surpr i se . On February 6, i960, the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Uhion emphatically declared, 
••One Cannot possibly ser ious ly think tha t such a s t a t e as 
India, which i s .. m i l i t a r i l y and economically weaker than 
China would r ea l ly launch a mi l i t a ry a t tack on China""' 
However, the Chinese managed to occupy Dhola and 
openly declared that they were not res t ra ined by the Mc 
Mahon Line, In the Western sector a l so , the Chinese penetrated 
1^ railes# Many of the Indian outposts were captured by them. 
The Indians had diverse views about China——as a giant power 
awakened from centuries of s leep, as a country teeming with 
blue an t s , as an ancient c i v i l i z a t i o n , as a spearhead of 
1» Sinha, ot>. c i t . y p , 77 . Also see, Maxwell, 
op.y clt^y p , if23, where India i s held as the 
aggressor , , 
2. Mitorially, The New Ibrk Times« (New York), 22,10,62 
ilso see. The Tehran Journal. ( Tehran), 2^.10. I962 
where China is outrightly condemned as an aggressor, 
3, The Pekini^  Review. (Peking), 8.11,1963 
^, Current Notes on International Affairs, op, cit., p.^1. 
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i n t e rna t iona l communism, as a t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m reproducing 
the tyranny of the Manchus and also as a menace to the 
neighbouring countr ies . As a r e su l t of the Chinese aggressive 
designs, the Indian government declared tha t " the Panchsheel 
doctr ine i s extinct*^ The White Paper No,II , manifested how 
the Chinese government had flouted the Five-Pr inciples and 
the Declaration of the Bandung-Conference,-' In Parliament 
a l so , there was vehement c r i t i c i sm of Ind ia ' s defence 
preparedness and defence and foreign p o l i c i e s . The Opposition 
demanded tha t the Chinese expansionism, should be curbed. 
In the wake of t h i s aggression, India had mi l i t a ry aid from 
a l l quarters* I t was a dividend of I nd i a ' s non-alignment 
po l i cy , China followed the po l icy of peaceful coexistence 
in the pas t as a garb to fos ter goodwill in Asia and acce le ra te 
the pace of i t s economic development. In order to i s o l a t e 
India, China befriended Paikistan and Burma. In I96O, China 
1. M i t o r i a l l y , The National Herald« (Lucknow), 30,10.62, 
2. The Hindu (Madras), 7,10. I962 
3* jjhite Paper No, I I , p .22 , 
k-» Bekelen, on, c i t . . p . 116, 
5, Sinha, OP. c i t , . pp, 89, 90 and 9 1 . This Sino-Pakistan 
b a i l was confirmed by a Pact , signed on March 2 , 1963* 
Bbwever, at the time of aggression, Pak is tan ' s support 
was with China* 
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carr ied the p r inc ip les of co-existence to an agrEement on 
the Sino-Burmese border, to prove tha t Ind ia ' s r e c a l c i t r a n t 
a t t i t u d e provided no accommodation. For t h e i r break-through 
in the North East Front ier Agency, the Chinese adopted the 
sk i l fu l techniques of deployment and i n i t i a t i v e . The ha te -
India and Nehru of I96I in China was e s sen t i a l l y d i rec ted 
towards crea t ing an impression among the countries of Asia 
and Africa tha t India was the main hurdle in the path of 
Asian-^AfricaJi so l ida r i t y . ^ T i l l November 18, I962, the Chinese 
launched t h e i r three-pronged drive on the Sela Bomdila and 
Chakoo sec to r s . They had t h e i r stronghold at Nathula, the 
centre of panoJ^a as the decisive Sino^India war was fought 
t h e r e . Nathula had s t r a t eg i c importance as i t also formed 
the gateway between India and Tibet. Before the hot war broke 
out between India <and China, an avalanche of correspondence 
seeking peacefiil settlement of borders took place in form 
of Miite Paper. 1#ien the war was taking p lace , the never-ending 
k 
war of p ro tes t notes was occurring simultaneously. On 
1. Basant Mitra, "Diplomatic Technique«" Seminar^ No.50, 
October I963, pp. k^h^» 
2. Sinha, cp. c l t . ^ p . 77^ 
3 . The Times of India (New Delhi) , 12.12.1961 
V. The New Ibrk TJjnes, 16 .7 . I962. 
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October 27, I962, Nehru demanded china to vd.thdraw at 
l e a s t to the pos i t ion held on September 8 , 1962, The 
res to ra t ion of September 8, pos i t ion was not the apple of 
discord, i t was expected to create a s i tua t ion in which 
t a l k s might occur. I nd i a ' s proposal was in response to 
i 
the '»three-point proposal" , made by China on October 2^,1962, 
for the cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s , by which both the s ides 
were to withdraw 20 kilometers from the •'line of ac tual 
control* . The Chinese government e3q)lained tha t for the 
purpose of 20 kilometers withdrawl, they were prepared to 
2 ' 
regard the Mc Mahon Line as the l i n e of actual con t ro l . 
The October 2^, I962 contained phrases l i k e , "Sino-India 
f r iendship" , "Asian-African s o l i d a r i t y " and "Asian Peace, "-^  
h. 
In ' 0 in te rna t iona l qua r t e r s , the Chinese "undeclared war" 
caused much concern. The Austral ian government commented 
tha t India was now 'paying the p r i c e of i t s i n s i s t e n t support 
of co*»existence". The U.S.S.R., i n i t i a l l y took a neu t ra l 
stand, and promised mi l i t a ry help to India and more MIGs, 
1. Kuldip Nayar, OT)». c i t . ^ p . l 8 0 . Also see l ^ i t e Papers, 
No. VIII, p . 1. 
2. Current Notes on In te rna t iona l Affa i rs , OP. c i t . , pp,Vl-^2. 
3 . Kuldip Nayar, OP. c i t . , p . l80 
^» The Hindu (Madras), 21.10. I962. 
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which were l i k e l y to sharpen "the ex i s t ing tension between Moscow 
and Peking". Among the non-aligned countr ies , the U.A»R« 
2 
was most ac t ive in finding some way to end the h o s t i l i t i e s . 
In Tehran a l so , there\'was condemnation of the Chinese agg-
ression ajid the fa i lu re of the non-alignment po l icy . However, 
when India was facing the Chinese menace, Nehru was not 
wi l l ing to abandon non-alignment.-' In one Press Conference, 
he openly declared, tha t one of the shocks ought to be the 
unquestioning sa t i s f ac t ion with the pol icy of non-alignment. 
The U.S.A., Great Br i ta in , ¥es t Germany and Malaya supported 
India and applauded non-alignment. The U.A.R. had suggested 
the Afro«Asian mediation. The U.S.S.R. expressed deep concern 
over the grave s i tua t ion and urged for an urgent cease - f i r e . 
ThuSjthe in te rna t iona l publ ic opinion sided with the Indian 
government's standi The Malayan Prime Minister , Tunku Abdul 
RahmaJi, who was labe l led as the neo- imper ia l is t stooge by 
3JQdia, favoured India over t h i s d i spu te . Mehru was not prepared 
to p a r t with the avowed foreign pol icy of India . He ca tegor ica l ly 
s t a ted , "Nothing can change the fundamentals of Indian po l icy , 
1. The Statesman (New Delhi) , 22.8.1962. 
2 . KTildip Nayer, ot3. c i t . , p . I98 
3 . The National Herald (Lucknow), 23.10.62 
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not even China's aggression India wi l l accept unconditional 
aid from whatever quarters she wi l l g e t . . . . there wi l l be no 
giving up of non-alignment. In Tehran,i t was s ta ted tha t t h i s 
aggression proved tha t n e u t r a l i t y can be ruled out by in t e rna t iona l 
2 
circumstances. The non-alignment was to continue as Ind ia ' s 
o f f i c i a l po l icy , i t was r ea l i s ed tha t i t was not expedient, 
I nd i a ' s f a i t h in non-alignment for future was conditioned by the 
following factors :-
(1) Not to be very vocal while supporting a country. 
The Chinese aggression was received as a shock. 
(2) Most of the support and aid t h a t India received 
came from the committed and aligned na t ions ,- on 
the contrary the non-aligned nat ions were l e s s 
"vociferous in siipporting India* 
C3) The government grew more sens i t ive to the charges 
of Opposition. The Opposition repeatedly 
clamoured^'Vhere were the recognised fr iends and 
u 
t h e i r support-^like Indonesia, Oiana, Egypt and 
Yugoslavia. 
ik) Ind ia ' s a t t i t u d e softened towards the Vest as the 
whole-hearted siipport tha t came from the western 
1» The Indian Eroress (New Delhi) , 25.10. I962 
2. The Tehran Journal, on. c i t . 
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bloc drastically affected the policy framers to 
relax and revise her policy towards the West. The 
stand of the U.S.S.R. was ambiguous. 
In consonance with the need of the hour, the state of 
1 
emergency was proclaimed in India. The Opposition asked the 
government to revise the pol icy in general . On the bas i s of 
past experience, the government had to evolve a po l icy as may 
succeed in curbing h o s t i l i t y of any kind. Both the Congress 
and the Opposition unanimously resolved to disrirpt diplomatic 
t i e s with China. However, the fundamental defect in I nd i a ' s 
China pol icy stemmed from Ind i a ' s weakness in gauging Peking's 
2 long terra aims. 
After an ominous l u l l at Ladakh and NEFA, on November 
22, 1962, the Chinese government offered a cease- f i re proposal 
to India .^ I t followed, as a consequence of which, the 33 days 
war Came to an end. There was ample controversy over the 
l i n e of Actual-Control, which was Septemba* 8, I962 pos i t ion by 
India and November 7, 1959 pos i t ion by China.^ T i l l November 25> 
1. The Times (London), 25.10. I962. 
2. Chakravarty, OP. c i t . . p . 151. 
3 . The Times (London), 20.10. I962. 
^. The New Ibrk Times ( New York), 23.11. I962. 
5. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) , 26.11. I962 
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the Ministry of External Affairs , government of India did not 
accept the Chinese cease- f i re proposal , as the acceptance 
of such a proposal by India would include, acceptance of Chinese 
control over large chunks of Indian t e r r i t o r y in Ladakh and 
key pos i t ions in NEFA, such as Khingemane, Dhola, Walong and 
Kibitoo,^ 
THE COLOMBO PROPOSALS: 
The need to br ing the two contending p a r t i e s to 
negot ia t ing tab les wq,s r ea l i s ed many a time. The f i r s t 
concerted effort was made by the six Colombo Powers on the 
2 i n i t i a t i v e of the Ceylonese Prime Minister,Mrs* Bandarnaike. 
I t was considered to be very s igni f icant i n i n t e rna t iona l 
quarters* On the eve of the Colombo Conference, December 10, 
1962, the Chinese Government again enquired of India i f she 
was ready to abide by t h e i r cease- f i re proposal* India,however, 
repl ied in the negat ive . The six non-aligned Powers intended 
to negot ia te only because they presupposed tha t the dispute 
const i tu ted a th rea t t o , "the concept of Afro-Asian Uhity," 
and a l so , "for the countr ies with p o l i c i e s of n e u t r a l i t y and 
non-alignment'*. So these six non-aligned count r ies - U.A.R., 
Gbana, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia and Ceylon - held t h e i r meeting 
1* ^Sundaif. Standard' (New Delhi) , 25*11. 1962* 
2. Kuldip Nayar, op. c i t . ^ p . 22V* 
3 . Guardian (Manchester), 27*3* I963 . 
197 
i 
at Colombo to consider the Chinese proposal of cease«f i re . 
The Colombo-Powers were re luc tant to offend China by a 
categor ical statement in support of India . There were two 
points on which the Chinese disagreed with the Colombo Proposals . 
One was tha t both India and China may es t ab l i sh c i v i l i a n pos ts 
in the no-man's land in Ladakh and the other was tha t the 
Indian army may move up to the Mc Mahon Line. In January I963, 
i t was c l a r i f i ed by the then Geylonese Prime Minis ter , Mrs. 
Bandaranaike, tha t the govermment of India was prepared to 
accept the proposals subject to have parliamentary approval. 
On January 25, I963, the Prime Minister , Nehru placed before 
the Lok Sabha the fu l l t ex t of the proposals together with 
cer ta in c l a r i f i c a t i o n s of the Neutral powers' i n t e n t i o n s , 
received from the Ceylonese Prime Minister . In fac t , "The 
Colombo-Proposals were used to lu re and l u l l India into-the; 
be l ie f tha t i t was poss ib le to ward off the Chinese menace 
through negotiat ions with Peking'*.^ 
In the spring of I963, Peking ou t r igh t ly refused to 
agree to the Colombo Proposals whereas India had accepted them 
without any reserva t ions . Moreover, the Chinese government 
1» White Paper. No. VIII, pp. 3I and 35. 
2. Ib id . 
3 . Sinha, on. c i t . . p . 93 , 
J+. Ibid, f p . 92. 
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rejected the reference of the border dispute with India 
to the International Court of Justice* They were not in 
favour of arbitration and finally had rejected the Colombo 
• 1 
proposals . Nehru i n s i s t e d tha t there would be no t a l k s 
u n t i l the Chinese Government accepted them in toto« I t was 
suggested tha t the acceptance of the Proposals was in favour 
2 
of I nd i a ' s secur i ty i n t e r e s t s . 
Later in 196U-, Chou i s reported to be ready for 
opening up the "direct negot ia t ions" , between India and China, 
"on the bas is of the Colombo Conference proposals" . He further 
added, »• . . . . rela;3!:ation of the Sino«Indian boundary question 
i s en t i r e ly possible provided India agrees to re turn to the 
conference t ab le without precondi t ions" . Chou's statement 
was cototained in the Chinese t ex t of an inter^giew he gave 
in Dacca to a correspondent of Associated press of Pakistan.-^ 
The prospects of the Colombo-negotiations were reduced 
to four a l t e rna t i ve s ; 
" 1« Address p r i va t e s t a t e communication to the two 
contending powers- India and China- appealing 
to them to come to a set t lement; 
1. The National Heraldt (Lucknow), 8 , 3 , I963 
2» Iqbal Singh, "India and China where do we go from here" 
(Part I I ) , The National Herald (Lucknow), 9 ,6 . 1963, 
3 . The Times of India (New Delhi) , 28,2, I96I+. 
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"2. Postpone the conference to an a l t e r n a t i v e venue 
with expanded membership; 
"3 . Pass resolu t ion in gengral terms propounding 
the philosophy of non-alignment and peace; and 
**k. To adopt a resolut ion , incorpora t ing the stand 
points of caiana and the U.A.H. 
Colombo Proposals died a l inger ing death as ne i the r India nor 
China had accepted them for reasons of t h e i r own. 
After some t ime, normalcy was res tored at the borders . 
Since I962 to I969, India and China had a s t a t e of r e l a t i ons 
coQ^jarabls to the cold-^war. The 1973-7^ t rend in both the 
quarters i s to revise t h e i r fr iendly t i e s shat tered through 
the d i rec t confrontation of I962. Mhat-ever may be the genesis 
and cohsequencGs of the Sino-India border d ispute , i t led to 
an enormous number of debates and discussions in the annals of 
Parliament» 
1. The Indian E?CDress(New Delhi) , 12,12« I962. For f u l l 
t ex t of the Document see The Hindu (Madras), IV.^ . I963 . 
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CHAPTER VI 
REBATES -.iq62 . A CASS STUDY 
INTRODUGTION 
The Sino-India border dispute has been discussed in the 
•the 
Parliament r ight from/very beginning. The columns of the 
Parliamentary Debates, almost every year are found r ep l e t e with 
references regarding t h i s immensely important d i spu te . From 
1952-59 the session represented a quie ter scene and the ci*-iticisms, 
and object ions , ra ised by the Opposition, appeared l e s s enquiring 
and l e s s pene t ra t ing . The general leaning or tendency wqs 
towards favouring the stand or postures adopted by Nehru and 
the Members generally endorsed h is views and convictions* The 
blind and unquestioning support and applause gave way to doubts 
and questions in 1959» when the news about the construct ion 
of Aksai Chin road was formally disclosed to Parliament. The 
Members of Parliament grew more and more concerned with and 
part icixlar about the secrecy with which the whole issue and 
i t s handling had been so far sorrounded, on the usual pre text 
t ha t pub l i c i ty was not in the publ ic i n t e r e s t . The number of 
questions ra ised, the fear of incursions, the demand for 
reor ien ta t ion of the en t i r e foreign pol icy s t ruc tu re , the 
des i re for more c lear -cu t and per t inen t statements and the 
number of no-confidence motions sharply increased during t h i s 
per iod. The year I962 witnessed the massive Chinese invasion. 
In the h is tory of the Parliamentary Debates, spec ia l ly the 
XcJc Sabha, i t was a year of special import. The scrut iny of 
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the debates of both the Houses, gives an impression that the 
Debates in the Popular House were more comprehensive, lively 
and informing than that of the Rajya Sabha. This Chapter aims 
at providing a detailed examination of the I962 Parliamentary 
Debates regarding the Sino-India border dispute, which illus* 
trates the actual use made of the instruments and the parlia-
mentary control already described in the Chapter III. 
In parliamentary life,the year 19^2, saw the resignation 
of V,K« Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, Nehru took over 
the Defence portfolio. Menon was a man of outstanding merit, 
vast energy, drive and purpose, in a sense, a dedicated person 
as was his successor. His brinkmanship was for more agile and 
•J 
as tu te than tha t of l a t e John Foster Dulles. He was eiuite well 
versed in foreign a f f a i r s . The overa l l considerat ion of the 
i ssue in the Rajya Sabha happens to look l i k e a repeated 
performance of what has been said and done in the Lok Sabha. 
The Hajya Sabha paid appreciable a t ten t ion to i t in 1959» 
through independent Motions. 
The f i r s t parliamentary process i s the Pres iden t i a l 
Address, delivered at the opening jo in t - sess ion of the Parliament. 
In 1962, i t peeped into the i ssue afresh. The President said, 
1. Frank Moraes, 'Peking Plans and Ind ia ' s Mistake ' , The 
Indian Sicpress, (New Delhi) , 11 .2 . I 96 I . J^so see 
Wellas Hansen, After Nehru l<flio. London , Hart Davis, I963,, 
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••India's uneasy r e l a t i ons with China remain unsolved. The 
Of f ic ia l s ' Report, which was placed by the Government before 
Parliament in I96I has not yet been published in China". He 
also referred the Indo-Tibet an Agreement of 1 9 5 ^ which was 
to expire on June 2, I962. The Parliament was informed tha t 
the Government of China had offered to negot ia te a new 
agreement to replace i t . The Government of India was believed 
to have rejected the l a t e s t Chinese p l ea for considerat ion 
of the 195^ Panchsheel Agreement and the Indo-Tibetan Trade 
•1 
Treaty separately from the boundary d ispute . The Indian 
Government asked for a reversa l of the aggressive p o l i c i e s 
pursued by China and for the res to ra t ion of a climate of 
peace on the bas i s of the s t r i c t observance of the Five 
P r inc ip l e s . ^ The reference was, however, scanty, i f not 
perfunctory and foresaw no s igni f icant or spectacular 
developments in the near fu ture . As usual the discussion 
followed on the Address by the President , during which Nehru 
disclosed to the Bbuse tha t so far as the s i t ua t ion on the 
border was concerned, since October I96I , there had been no 
material change. This House often l ea rn t about Ind ia ' s 
p ro tes t to China and about what they have done. They did not 
1. The Hindustan Times. (New Delhi) , l^*k, 1962. 
2. Lok Sabha Debates. Second Ser ies , Vol.LXI, No. 1, 
March 127 1962 XVIth Session, Cols. 20-21. 
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often receive the l a rge number of p ro t e s t s t h a t the 
GoveiB'inent received from China ^ about what they thought 
we did on the borders . He also admitted the i n a b i l i t y of 
the Government to answer a l l the questions t ha t were raised 
on the f loor , for the reason tha t they could be a help to 
the contending pa r ty , China* He, however, affirmed tha t i t 
was not h is des i re to conceal things from the House, "In fac t , 
we have given p r a c t i c a l l y everything. But, as i t has so 
happened tha t the information we give in the f loor of the 
House has been used against us by the Chinese government, 
so i t was necessary not to d isc lose every d e t a i l an the 
House"."' 
QUESTIONS IN THE 1Q62 LOK SABHA; 
The questions are the most br isk and important mode 
of securing information by the Parliament and thus the 
analysis of questions i a des i rable ^ d p e r t i n e n t . During 
the Ik days opening Session of the XlVth session of the Lok 
Sabha in 19^2, the number: of questions asked wasc as follows: 
1. Starred . . . 32^ 
2. Iftistarred . . . 513 
3 . Short Notice . 6^ 
1. Lok Sabha Debates. I l l Ser ies , Vol. I I , No. 13 , May 2, 
1962, Cols. 2072-73^ 
2. Resume, I I Se r i e s , Vol. LXII, No.l^, March 30, 1962 
Col. 2800. 
3 . For d e t a i l s see ilppendix«I, showing the pos i t ion of ques-
t ions ra ised in general and on the boundary question in 
p a r t i c u l a r . 
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The total time consumed in all activities was 78.3^ hours, 
out of this multitude of questions asked in the Lok Sabha 
only 5 questions were related to the meeting of the two 
prime Ministers and Air Space violations and the minor • 
incursions relating to the border dispute. In the Rajya Sabha 
three questions were asked with regard to the Chinese 
nationals* evacuation from India, wrong news leasing out of 
<Aksai Chin to China and the SinO'-Indian correspondence. Out 
of 6 short notice questions, none was with regard to it. 
The most important question which happened to be the 
second question in the session of 1962, was with regard to 
the possibility of incilrsions. This oral question No,2, 
raised in collaboration by 5 members, asked the Prime 
Minister to state th8;pace of further Chinese incursions, 
Nehru told the House that since his last Statement in 19^2, 
there had been one incursion of a Chinese border-*patrol, 12 
miles from the Chinese Check-Post on the Chip Chap river, 
about which India had protested to the Chinese on October 31, 
1961. The Government had asked them to abandon such incur-
sions on the Indian soil* During the same question P,C# Deb, 
enquired/Nehru if the Chinese had captured Longju, Nehru 
replied in negative. Brij Haj Singh added if India had 
vacated the possession of Longju, Nehru said, "so far as I 
know, I am not quite sure, it has not been taken possession 
1 
of by us". 
1. Lok Sabha Debates^ I I Se r i e s , Vol, LXI, No.20, March 
13, 1962, Cols, 50-5 2, 
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However, the House seemed to be at ease when Nath 
Pai, with an air of relief, said that it w^s the first 
opening session since long, in which they were not told of 
fresh incursions. The Parliament welcomed it. He doubted 
if it was the result of the fact that the Chinese had 
Captured all the land they claimed or due to the firm policy 
of the Indian Government. Nehru reaffirmed that the Chinese 
had not occiipied all they claimed in Ladakh or the Northern 
Sector. They claimed large chunks of territory in the NEFA 
areai which had not been so far captured by them. It was 
obvious that the policy that the Government of India had 
/ 
followed so far 4ndicated no reversal of the policy approved 
by the Parliament. This question and its answer covering 
the ..seven columns of the debate, mirrored the attention 
that the Members of Parliament have paid to this issue of 
national importance^ It also confirmed that the Members 
clamour for more information if they are less informed. 
During the I Session from April 19, 196'2 to June 22, I962, 
1637 oral and written starred questions were raised, 38^ +5 
were IBistarred and 2h were Short Notice Questions. On May 21, 
1962, Mrs, L. Menon, Minister of State for the Ministry of 
External Affairs, had to face an, "angry opposition" in the 
Lok Sabha while answering interpellations on the anti-India 
propaganda being carried on by the Chinese Hnbassy through 
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i t s Journal China Today. The Slpeaker, Hukum Singh 
quietened the angry Members of the Lok Sabha by proposing 
an ear ly solut ion through the Government. Hem Barua, 
"agi tatedly remarked", tha t the Government did not take 
not ice of what appeared in China Today, "unless i t s 
a t ten t ion i s drawn in t h i s House, i t does not work, i t does 
not function'*, Mrs» Menon, p a ^ ^ f i e d them by promising 
1 < 2 
the e a r l i e s t ac t ion . During t h i s period"angry scenes" 
and "strong feel ing of resentment"^ against the delay on 
the par t of Government were a regular feature of the Ifouse 
proceedings. The Times also reported tha t the "Angry 
opposition members, cal led on the Government in the Lok 
If 
Sabha. to take immediate ac t ion" . The Debate on the 
Chinese Bnbassy Journal, China Today was '*brief though 
exci t ing" .^ I t led to " . . . an almost h y s t e r i c a l excitement 
of an in ternecine warfare (of words) between the Government 
and the PSP Opposition in the Lok Sabha today (May 23, 1962). 
There was half an hour "full throated v i t r i o l i c eschange". 
1. The aLndustan Times (New Delhi) , 22.5 . 1962 
2. The Indian Broress^ (New Delhi) , 22 .5 . 1962 
3 . The Hindu (Madras), 22.5* 1962 
h. The Time3(London)^ 22.5» 1962 
^..The Hindustan Times. (New Delhi) , 2^«5« 1962 
6. The Indian Broress. (New Delhi) , 2^.5* 1962 
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On the whole, 17 questions were r e l a t ed to the border d ispute , 
out of these quest ions, mostly were with regard to the movement 
of t roops, the Chinese claim on an area of Pak-held Kashmir, 
f igures of Indian and Chinese c a s u a l t i e s , Technc^Sconomic-Survey, 
• 1 
Hospitals on border, construction of roads in NEFA, the Chinese 
note dated May 31 , 1962, and the set t lement of the Sino-Indian 
border d ispute . The ora l question No* 1325» ra ised on June 6, 
1962, was, however, pe r t inen t and de ta i l ed , ra i sed by Hem Barua 
and P,G« Barooah, with regard to the Chinese p r o t e s t against 
alleged Indian in t rus ion in to Longju, Nehru repl ied in the 
negative about the prospects of war by China Speaking at a 
News Conference a l i t t l e l a t e r Nehru said, "That i s a question 
a 
ofopinion S i r , I do not think any t o t a l war i ^ p r o s p e c t in 
view"*-* On June 1 1 , 1962, Nehru said tha t diplomatic t i e s woiild 
If 
s tay . He also analysed the nature of war as a "war of nerves^'. 
There appears to be a sharp contras t of opinion expressed 
publ ic ly on the f loor of the House and expressed p r i v a t e l y as 
a genuine feeling# To keep the morale of the publ ic high, 
Nehru negatived t h a t any aggression by the Chinese side i s 
1. For d e t a i l s see, Aif»penclxX>»2, enclosed therewith . 
2. Lok Sabha Debates, I I I Ser ies , Vol. IV, No.39, June 6,1962 
tS)is. 91UU«U6. 
3* The Statesman (New Delhi) , 12 .6 . I962. 
^. The Hindu. (Madras), 12 .6 . I962 
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imminent whereas, in reply to an interview held as ear ly as 
195^, Nehru gauged the Chinese i n t en t i ons . He s t a t ed , ' • . . . . . 
say in twenty years time, when they are strong and modern, 
then the p i c tu re would be quite d i f ferent and they wil l probably 
be a menace , . . . " On the contrary, on June 22, 19^2, the Deputy 
Minister in the Ministry of External Affa i rs , Dinesh Singh, 
affirmed the chances of immin3\t clashes between India and China. 
He was speaking in response to an o ra l question No«l637, ra i sed 
Joint ly by Bhakt Darshan and P« C, Barooah. On the pa r t of the 
Government of India i t was a c lea r cut acceptance of the iips 
and downs of r e l a t i o n s . Dinesh Singh ca tegor ica l ly admitted 
2 
tha t aggression was imminent » The question therefore a r i s e s 
why the Oovernment was not prepared to face aggression which 
i t had a n t i c i p a t e d / T h e Rajya Sabha's F i r s t Session continued 
from 1^-6-1962 to 11-5-1962, where 9 questions in general 
figure dealing with th^ Trade Agreement, Discussion on Indians 
in the National People 's Republic of China, the Chinese 
suggestion for common vigi lance over Air-Space regarding 
publ icat ion of cer ta in objectionable a r t i c l e s in the China Today. 
The questions raised and answered shed . no d i r ec t l i g h t on the 
border d ispute . 
1. Taya Zinkin, Reporting India . (London), Chatto and 
Wlndus, 1962, pp. 208-9* 
2. Lok Sabha Debates. I l l Ser ies , Vol, V, No.51, June 22,1962 
Cols, 12^27-31. Also see fhe Hindustan Times (New Delhi) , 
6 .8 , 1960t where Nehru assured the Parliament of a major 
confl ic t i f the Chinese made further encroachments. 
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In 1962 there was a tendency to furnish the Lok Sabha 
with day to day information. In a reply to a written question 
number ^h^ raised by Rishang Keishing, Nehru said that in 
NEFA, 317 miles h furlongs of all weather and fair weather 
motorable roads were constructed. The reply showed a sharp 
contrast to the concealment of information about the construction 
of the Aksai Chin road. 
During the II Session of III Lok Sabha which was held 
from August 6 to September 7) 19^2, 25 meetings were held, 
2 
the number of questions admitted was as follows: 
1, Starred . . . 869 
2, IMstarred « including s tarred questions 
converted in to unstarred questions -2508 
3, Short Notice Questions - 1^ 
The preceding Tables bear a testimony to the lack of 
i n t e r e s t or adequate appreciation of the gravi ty of the 
border dispute by the Mei;ibers of the Lok Sabha during the 
mid 1962 debates. There were l e s s e r i n t e r rup t ions during t h i s 
25 working-days session from August 6 to September 7, I962, 
Out of a t o t a l of 2 5 ^ unstarred questions 862 f e l l in ora l 
7 Category, However, only/questions per ta ined to the Sino-Indian 
1. Resume, Third Ser ies , Vol. 7 I I I , No.25, September 7,19^2 
Ctol. 6939. 
2. Ib id , , Col. 525^* 
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border dispute. ¥ithin its perview fell the topics like 
the Chinese attitude towards Indian Traders in Tibet, nature 
of dispute, the number of minor clashes between the forces 
of the two Governments, the police withheld by the Chinese 
on the border and the photographs of Indian border being 
taken by the Chinese, The period presented a dul3 picture 
of a l\iLled Lok Sabha, The situation on the border both 
diplomatically as well as militarily was fast deteriorating 
but there was not a single short Notice Question in Lok 
Sabha during this period, whereas on various subjects 1^ + 
Short Notice Questions were raised, replied and recorded. 
Side by side, in the Hajya Sabha, the next session 
commenced on lU-,6, I962 and ended on 26,6,1962, The record 
of questions raised in the Hajya Sabha indicated considerable 
interest with regard to China. There were 9 questions, but 
the questions hardly bore any relation to the border dispute. 
The highest number of questions in the Hajya Sabha was 
recorded during the following session of the Hajya Sabha 
falling from 6»8,1962 to 7.9. 1962. The questions ranged 
from anti-Indian propaganda in the Chinese newspapers to 
Indian students in China. There were eleven questions in all. 
1. For details see Appendix^ ^. 
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liiihen the aggression took place a special Session of 
Lok Sahha was held hut there was no alarming r i s e of 
questions during the next Session between November 8 and 
December 1 1 , 1962, However, not a s ingle question pin-pointed 
the border d ispute , 5 questions which were with regard to 
r e l a t ions as such were re la ted to the Chinese espionage-ac t iv i -
t i e s , Indian FO¥s in China, the Chinese propaganda, injured 
Jawans in the hosp i ta l s and Afro«Asian s o l i d a r i t y in Colombo, 
res i i l t ing in the Colombo-Proposals, The o f f i c i a l record of 
2 
questions raised and admitted was as follows: 
n starred ... 3^ 9 
2<t Iftistarred including Starred Questions 
converted as Ifristairred 853 
3* Short Notice Questions I j 
The Hajya Sabha's o f f i c i a l record also presen ts no 
be t t e r p i c tu re of i n t e r e s t , shown by i t s Members during the 
l a s t session of the year between 8«11»62 and 12»12.1962. 
During the end of I I I Session, on Noveijiber 22, 1962, 
Vishnu Karaath ra ised a question with regard to the cease- f i re 
on the Sino«India border. He vigorously asked for a discussion 
1. For d e t a i l s see Jtor>endix-IV, 
2. Lok Sabha Debates. Third Ser i e s , Vol. XI, No,26, 
December 11 , 1962, Col. ^39^* 
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on the Chinese Government's latest note of November 20, I962. 
But no discussion took place on that note and Kamath appeared 
satisfied with his oppressed opinion in the House. Nehru 
again liraitted the scope of parliamentary intervention by 
plainly telling that a detailed discussion on such matters 
wouM, not occur as only fundamentals were to be decided in 
the House, which is the forvm to urge views and make suggestions. 
The Government he added, drew Ib-S^ 'p^ th through the light 
shed by the Parliament, Bagri reacted to it and suggested 
that during sessions all matters should be first discussed 
in the House, This woiild also give satisfaction to the 
masses that on the boundary issue, the House had thoroughly 
guided the Government, However, this demand to hold public-
discussions on the boundary problem went iinheeded and the 
Speaker, Hukum Singh, concluded the question by refusing to 
2 
welcome any subsequent question or suggestion. The next day, 
on November 23, I962, Vishnu Kamath with greater vigour 
asser ted tha t the Parliament should l ay down the pol icy and 
p r i n c i p l e s , "It i s a l l the more necessary in t h i s context 
tha t Parliament should consider how far even a hypothet ical 
1. Lok Sabha Debatepy Third Ser i e s , Vol, X, No,12, Nov,22 
1962, Third Session, Cols. 2922-23, " . . before the House 
adjourns wil l the House have opportunity of, i f not 
discussing at l e a s t , expressing i t s views on the Chinese 
Government's note" , 
2. Ib id . , The Third Ser ies , Vol. X, No.12, No.22, I962, 
Third Session, Cols. 2922-26, Let ter exchanged between 
the Prime Minister of India and China i s placed in the 
Library. See No. LT-573/62, 
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acceptance of the proposal would mean or en t a i l a serious 
departure from the pol icy l a i d down in Resolution 
adopted unanimously . . . . by the HDUse» 
DMAND FOR GUMTS; 
The general discussion of pol icy and assessment of the 
work of respect ive Ministr ies i s also made through the 
motion on Demands for Grants. SuOb a discussion takes place 
only in the Lok Sabha. The Rajya Sabha i s cons t i tu t iona l ly 
denied the r ight to o r ig ina te or discuss such a motion. On 
May 12, 1962, the Demands of Grants for the Ministry of 
External Affairs were ra ised and discussed and the proceedings 
occupied no l e s s than 255 columns of the pr in ted debates 
(Cols- i(O35-^280) wherein the Opposition t r i e d to pu l l the 
l eg of the Government on the Sino-India border dispute , Nehru 
was vociferous in condemning Frank Anthony's demand to de-
nounce non-alignment. He said '•heatedly" tha t India would be 
damned and doomed i f she changed t h i s po l icy , " ^ i d s t 
thunderous applause", he declared "The whole idea i s ho r r ib l e , 
2 i n t o l e r a b l e . . . " The suggestion of Frank Jinthony to make an 
outr ight re jec t ion of non-alignment "surprised" Nehru.-^ All 
1. Ib id . . Third Ser ies , Vol. X, No, I 3 , November 23, 1962, 
Third Session, Col. 318U 
2. The Times of India. (New Delhi) , 15 .5 , I962 
3 . The Hindu (Madras), 15 ,5 . I962. 
2^h 
the members expressed their grave concern over the Sine-
India relations and demanded fj^ r an amelioration of relations. 
They urged the Government to make an early settlement of 
the border dispute, the Government in response reassured the 
House to resolve the dispute at their earliest* "What added 
to the excitement of the House", was Nehru's remark in 
Parliament that some Indian posts were established by the 
side of the Chinese posts. On May 13» 1962, this motion 
was not discussed, however, on May lU-, 1962,the Demands for 
Grants were approved without any cut. "In Lok Sabha today 
several members voiced their criticism against the Chinese 
Government's attitude to the border dispute. During this 
2 
debate, the members pleaded for su i tab le ac t ion . This Demands 
for Grants Debate was charged with emotions. There was 
considerable s t i r in the House and the Opposition p a r t i e s 
were divided in t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards the trend of the 
Chinese diplomacy and the pol icy of the Government of India 
in re la t ioh to i t * The focal point of the speech of Nehru 
was a pleading for or defence of the pol icy of non-alignment. 
"The border conf l i c t , however, occupied only a small por t ion 
of Mr. Nehru's a t t en t ion and tha t too towards the close of h i s 
1. K. Rangaswami, "Chinese Bang the Door" Ibid. 
2. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) , May 1^, I962. 
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reply to the debate on the Demands for Grants. Thus '*ihat 
occasioned a mild excitement was the open advocacy of 
r e t a l i a t o r y act ion against China* In shor t , the Demands for 
Grants Debate was a "sp i r i ted defence of Government's pol icy 
2 
of non-alignment" in which a "detailed reference" was made 
to the border dispute. 
PAPERS LAID ON THS T.ABL.3 
All important dociiments, letters, notes and memoranda 
are laid on the Table of the Lok Sabha and consequehtly placed 
in the Library. It is one of the parliamentary processes to 
bring the administration to^ Jbogj^  and lime-'light. However, this 
method does not bear any direct or indirect influence over the 
issue, as no formal discussion takes place over such papers. 
White papers were also laid on the Table on March 16, I962, 
covering the official correspondence between the Governments of 
India and China from December 3, I96I to February I3, 1962.^ 
During the Opening Session the Wiite Papers were the only 
k 
documents to be laid on the Table .. 
THE DEBATES ON MOTIONS. 
The Lok Sabha happens to be not only a committee to 
1. Ibid*. 20.5» 1962 
2. Ibid., 15.5* 1962 
3. Lok Sabha Debates. II Series, Vol.XLI, No.5, March 16, I962 
Col.691. 
h. See Appendix "'V 
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ven t i l a t e publ ic grievances or the watch-dog of the overa l l 
complex network of the administrat ive set-up but also a 
debating socie ty . The f loor of t h i s publ ic forum was 
occiipied by the elongated debates on the Sino-Indian border 
dispute in the l a t e r half of I962. Ebwever, the f i r s t half 
of 1962 presented a quiet scene. The concern tha t the 
Members of the Parliament showed to the dispute was more 
evidenced by other parliamentary modes such as questions, 
demands for grants and min i s t e r i a l s tatements . The specif ic 
motions were not designed to focus a t t en t ion d i r e c t l y on the 
border d ispute . During the opening session of the Lok Sabha 
from March 12 to 30, I962 and the F i r s t session from JSpril 9 
to June 22, I962, no separate motion was moved to discuss the 
s i tua t ion on the Sino-Indian borders . Though there were 
reported minor incurs ions , espionage a c t i v i t i e s , propaganda 
against the Governments of India and China, secret movement 
of troops and po l i ce -pa t ro l l i ng across the border, the debates 
of the Lok Sabha did not pay adequate a t t en t ion to i t . On 
July 18, 1962, while speaking at a meeting of the Punjab Civi l 
Secre tar ia t Snployees Union, the Defence Minister , Menon, 
admitted tha t the Chinese were a t b e t t e r ajid advantageous 
pos i t ion at present , «*He declared amidst cheers tha t on the 
northern border there are no p a r t s of our area where Chinese 
encroachments s t i l l exis ted" . After the aggression in Lad^kh 
1. The Times of India (New Delhi) , 19 .7 , 1962. 
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region, Nehru moved a Special Resolution in the Lok Sabha 
on August 13, 1962, over which a long discussion occurred 
from August I3 to llf, I962, covering 1^ -3 columns of the 
pr in ted debate. I t was a heated and emphatic discussion 
analysing the vips and downs of r e l a t i o n s , t r ac ing the past 
h i s tory of incurs ions . I t was the f i r s t annual assessment 
•1 
of the border s i tua t ion made in 1962. The House presented 
ajn iQDroarious sdene spec ia l ly over with-holding information 
from the Parliament and not taking i t in to confidence. There 
were repeated in te r rup t ions and the speeches of a l l the 23 
Members, who p a r t i c i p a t | d in the debate on August I 3 , I962, 
were marked by the volley of questions, regarding the l a t e s t 
s i tua t ion on the border and want of confidence in the House. 
The Opposition hurled c r i t i c i sm over the non-alignment pol icy 
and asked for a more s t r i c t stand with regard to China. However, 
the pol icy of the Government of India with regard to the border 
dispute was accepted and adopted the next day. Nehru rea l i sed 
the need to reassure the House of the u t i l i t y of i t s confidence. 
He emphasised the need of informing and consult ing the P a r l i a -
ment. In a vigorous tone, Nehru sa id , " . . . f i r s t of a l l nothing 
p 
can happen without t h i s House being i n fo rmed , . . . " Two subs t i t u t e 
1» Ibid*J Third Ser ies , ¥ol . Vi, No.6, August I 3 , I962 
Cols. lJ+77-1630. 
2. Lok gabha Debates^ Third Ser ies , Vol, VI, No.7 
August Iky 1962, Cols. 1778. 
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motions were moved and negatived and two more amendments 
remained unconsidered* The purpose behind this particxilar 
debate was such to create more faith in Nehruite policy. The 
speaker, Hukum Singh, concluded the debate by expressing 
staianch faith in Nehru that everybody in the House dittoed 
1 
and supported everything that had been expressed by Nehru» 
After August 1^, I962 till the masive invasion occurred 
the Lok Sabha did not move or discuss any new motion regarding 
the border situation^ The Cabinet as the Chief Executive, 
handled the problem and the Members of Parliament remained 
busy with •legislation'' and other domestic issues. In the 
wake of the Chinese aggression there was a general feeling that 
it, %ay be necessary to convene Parliament earlier than the 
scheduled time, though it is not too early to talk of a 
national government. Parliament will reflect the unanimous 
resolvef of the representatives of the people to repel Chinese 
aggression, making it clear that it is futile for her to seek 
2 
friends in Indi^ '»o However, on October 20, I962, when the 
aggression was launched no special session of the Parliament 
was convened, no debate was held, perhaps such general debates 
during an aggresssion would have been fruitless. On October 
U Ibid*., Col. 1782 
2. Efl i torial ly, *The Chinese Aggressors, The National Herald (Lucknow) 23«.10« 1962, 
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26, 1962, the President proclaimed the Siiergency under 
clause (1) of a r t i c l e 352 of the Const i tut ion, On November 
8, 1962, a separate motion was moved and the House approved 
of the Proclamation of Bnergency. '*There was a long burst 
of applause as Mr, Nehru warmly pra ised the courage and 
1 
endurance of the soldiers on the battle front", A long and 
passionate discussion took place lasting for 6 days in which 
166 Members participated covering a total of II08 columns 
of the printed debate. 
In the No•of members Time consumed Cols, Resolutions adopted 
month of spoken (Hbiirs) covered 
Hevember 
(1) 8 10 12,25-17.01 106-218 2 reso lu t ions moved 
by Nehru. 
12.53-17.36 386-500 Not concluded.^ 
12*11-19.25 633^830 Not concluded.^ 
12a2~20»l6 916-113^ Not Concluded.^ 
12.30«20,23 1253-1^52 I^ Iot concluded.^ 
12.01-17.39 1532-1680 Concluded. 19 Jtoend-
ments negated and « 
unanimously adopted, 
6 166 36,09 1108 Uianimously adopted 
1. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) , 9 .11 , I962 
2. I b id . . I l l Se r ies , Vol. IX, No.l , November 8, I962 
3 . Ibid.^ No, I I , November 9, I962, 
^* Ibid.« No. I l l , Nove^iber 10, I962., 
5. I b id . , No, IV, November 12, I962', 
6. I b i d . . Nov V, November 13, I962. 
7. Ib id , , No, VI, November 1^, 1962^ 
(2) 9 
(3) 10 
(If) 12 
(^) 13 
(6) Ik 
Ih 
25 
ho 
kh 
33 
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"The discussion tha t followed was not calculated to 
emphasise the gravity of the occasion. In ter rupt ion as during 
Mr. Nehru's speech also took away some of the seriousness t ha t 
•J 
t r i e d to invest the d e b a t e . . . . " . 
2 The f i r s t resolut ion amidst" thiinderous applause" 
adopted the Proclamation of Energency and the other one 
regre t ted the Chinese aggression on the Indian s o i l , appreciated 
the valour of the so ld iers and resolved to dr ive out the 
enemy. These reso lu t ions , however, did not approve the po l i cy 
of the Government of India. " . . • . amid cheers from a l l p a r t i e s " , 
Nehru said tha t India would meet the challenge with unflinching 
determination. His ut terance was greeted with applause, the 
"Opposition shouted" as well a s expressed i t s sense of appre-
c i a t i on . The Opposition also availed i t s e l f of every opportunity 
a t t h i s c r i t i c a l juncture and showed t h e i r reac t ion and resen t -
ment by tab l ing a no-confidence motion on account of Government's 
" inact ive and unprincipled foreign and defence po l i cy" . Due to 
ce r t a in procedural d e t a i l s the motion got abandoned. ISider the 
pressure of publ ic opinion Menon resigned on November 1, 1962.'^ 
During the Proclamation of Qnergency Debate, the Members used 
1. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) , 9 .11 , I962. 
2. The Indian EroressCNew Delhi) , 9 .11 . I962, 
3 . I b i d . . I l l Ser ies , Vol. IX, No.II , November 9, I962 
Cols. 385-500. 
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abusive language against the Chinese people l i k e Maurxa. 
said that the Chinese were/bloody race , opiumites and sons 
of Changez Khan. However, the Speaker, Hukum Singh, requested 
the m.embers to be calculated while de l ive r ing speeches and not 
to use abasive and unparliamentary language. Side by s ide , 
there were "uproarious scenes" and occasional " laughters" 
2 
in the House though a grave issue was under considerat ion. 
The beginning of the debate was pass ionate , speeches were 
heated and off and on in te r rup t ions were t h e r e . However, 
when t h e debate was on the verge of conclusion, l e s s i n t e r rup -
t ions were noticed and the noisy atmosphere of the House 
was replaced by calm and moderate speeches by the Senior 
Members. The pol icy of the Government of India so far pursued 
was approved on December 10, 1962, through a separate motion 
regarding the border s i t ua t i on , res i i l t ing from the invasion.- ' 
Date No. of Time Columns Motions moved 
speakers covered and adopted 
10.12,62 21 1 2 a 5 i to 5088-^228 Moved by Nehru, 
1 7 . ^ hours concluded and 
adopted the same 
day. 10 amendments 
were proposed.'+ 
1. Lok Sabha Debates. I l l Se r i e s , Vol. IX, No*III, 
November 10, 1962, co l . 801. 
2. Ib id . , Col. 6^2,([Shriraati Henu Chalcravarti' s Statement 
invi ted laughter in the Hous^ 
3 . For d e t a i l s see.Appfedicss.-^ 
\ , Lok Sabha pebates. Ill Series, Vol. XI, No,25, December 10, 
1962, "This House having considered the border situation 
resulting froi^J the invasion ot India hy China approves of 
the measures and policy adopted by the Government to meet 
it, ". 
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Nehru reviewed in the House, the s i t ua t ion of aggression 
a*" Sela and Wsilong, future of Golombo-proposaJ.s and date-wise 
assessment of the cease- f i r s t He narrated the contents of the 
l e t t e r s sent by him to the Chinese Government, which t i l l 
December 10, I962 had rejected the proposal for September 8, 
Status QUO ante» After the cease-f i re was declared, there were 
three major questions to be considered by the Government of 
India (1) To agree to the cease«fire , (2) to withdraw 20 
kilometers each from the Noverpber 7» 1957 l i n e of actual -
control and (3) to negot ia te the i s sue . 
Nehru, in fu l l put forth the past h i s to ry of incursions* 
Before September 8, I962, there was no ac t ive aggression in 
NEFA except in Longju. The Chinese Government repeatedly assured 
the Indian Government not to cross the Mc Mahon Line. Waen 
af te r the October invasion, the Chinese suggested u n i l a t e r a l l y 
to cease - f i re , India agreed to i t . However, India desis ted from 
re l iance on Chinese verd ic t s and endeavoured to curb t h e i r 
Nehru 
expans ionis t -des igns / re i te ra ted Ind ia ' s regard for non-alignment 
and fa i th in pac i f i c methods, Hirendra Nath Mukerjde praised 
Nehru and ca tegor ica l ly supported non-alignment, P.K. Deo 
considered October 20, I962, as the turning point of Indian 
h i s to ry , ending the chapter of d i s i l l u s i o n s . He did not 
support the Indian Government's September 8, 1962 stand. He 
proposed reappraisa l of non-alignment and suggested tha t India 
should be aligned with e i the r bloc, U.N.. Dhebar, Surendra Nath 
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Diwedi, A»P. Jain, Yajnik and Desappa, supported the 
Government policy. Surendra Nath further stressed the 
desirability of building a better military position. iUmost 
all the speakers hailed on the same strings. Frank jAnthony 
thought that the ceasefire was a calculated piece of Chinese 
diplomacy. Nehru was at his wits end with regard to implica-
tions in the spate of correspondence in the garb of the White 
Papers* The Lok Sabha would have been of immense importance 
had it discused the "White Papers at least in this crucial year. 
But these letters, notes and memoranda, exchanged between the 
two Governments, were never debated and discussed in separate 
motions. There was no demand as such to discuss them. On the 
Defence of India Rules Bill debate, a motion was moved by 
A.K. Sen on which an elongated debate occurred. Members of 
the Opposition, like H»N. Mukerjee, D. C. Sharma, U. G. Ghaudhry, 
A. G. Quha, H, Barua and xi.D. Pande, with genuine interest 
referred to the cease-fire proposal of the Chinese Government 
for consideration by the House, 
The Debate that took place during I962, had shed ample 
light on the nature and scope of interest which the Lok Sabha 
took in the border dispute* The debates and discussions were 
long enough to consume enormous time of the House but their 
standard was not low. They would have been more worthwhile 
22k 
if they had been held frequently as the crisis was developing 
and had been more concerned with failure and failings of the 
Government and suggestions for meetings both militarily and 
diplomatically, the Chinese aggression that was in the offing. 
The debates were in the nature of a post-mortem on what had 
happened and of course had no magic power to undo the decision 
of the Government, However, these debates were useful in the 
sense that they led Nehru to become more realistic in his 
idealistic diplomacy with regard to China and other disputes. 
The debates also pressurised Nehru to confirm the desirability 
of confiding more in Parliament, consult it more oocasiohally 
and furnish it with timely information. 
The Rajya Sabha debates during this period were less 
detailed. The longest debate occurred on 23,9.1962, where 
the Sino**India border dispute was referred occasionally. Most 
of the points were mere repetition of the Lok Sabha debate. 
On November 9> 1962, Nehru responded, as always, to the calmer 
atmosphere of the I]|)per House, As compared to November 8 debate 
in the Lok Sabh;j, Nehru was more restrained in the Rajya Sabha 
2 
in both voice and metaphor, 
CALLING ATTBNTION MOTIONS; 
The Parliament u t i l i z e s the mode of ca l l ing a t t en t ion 
motion to draw the a t t en t ion of the Government to any neglected 
1, Parliamentary Debates. Ha.iva Sabha. Official Record, 
Vol, XXXIX, No. 9, September 23, 1963, Cols. 162U-1791* 
2, The Times (London), 10,11,1962. 
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matter of urgent public importance. In response to such a 
Motion, the Government had to express its clarifications 
and justifications* This mode pinpoints an issue and 
focusses the interest of the members of Parliament to it. 
In the opening session of the Lok Sabha from March 12 to 
30, 1962, however, no such motion was passed. In the first 
session from iipril I9 to June 22, Hem Barua asked for such a 
motion pressurising Nehru to make a statement upon the reported 
decision of Pakistan and China to negotiate alignment of 
boundary between Kashmir and the Chinese Sinkiang, In 
response to such a motion, Nehru stated that the Chinese 
claimed that the borders between India and China were never 
demarcated. It was a false Chinese claim, Narayan Das asked 
Nehru, if the whole boundary had been discussed, Nehru replied 
that he could not exactly say. The Members of Parliament 
indicated more interest by raising a number of supplementary 
questions to the motion under discussion. However, the 
Speaker, Hukum Singh, asked the Members not to raise more 
questions. The time of the session was already alloted to 
discuss all the matters on the agenda. He had told the members 
-1 
that no more questions would be welcomed, P.K. Deo, tabled 
another motion on May 22 against the alleged entry of some 
of the Chinese in to Indian t e r r i t o r y , Smt, L. Menon, made a 
1» Lok Sabha Debates. I l l Ser ies , Vol, I I , No. 16, May 7 
1962, Cols. 2872-2870, 
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statement thereon, lAnd a l so , "Prime Minister Nehru assured 
anxious Members of Lok Sabha tha t there has not been any 
attempt for incursion by the Chinese along the Mc Mahon Line 
on NKFA except for a minor one at NEFA. In response to t h i s 
ca l l ing a t t en t ion notice by Rama Chandra Vilhat Bare, the 
SSP Members were intervening off and on. Hem Barua drew the 
a t ten t ion of the House to the reported in t rus ion in to Gorakhpur 
and Basti* On June I 3 , I962, P,C, Barooah called a t t en t ion 
of the Defence'^Minister to the reported move of the Chinese 
tanks and armoured vehic les , Indian a i r a t tacks in North 
Ladakh and the Chinese convoys of mi l i t a ry vehicles in southein 
Sinkiang to Qizil J i lga in occupied Aksai Chin, This was a 
c r i t i c a l Juncture when the "stormy scenes" were witnessed in 
the Lok Sabha* The P.S,P, member, S.N, Dwivedi remarked tha t 
the Prime Minister was surrendering the coimtry to the Chinese 
to which Nehru contended tha t the questions asked by some 
Members with regard to the borders, did not help building vp 
the morale of the country* This ' l ed to stormy scenes in 
Lok Sabha today marked by sharp and heated exchanges", "In a 
voice quivering with indignation", Nehru asked i f i t was 
proper to say tha t he was surrendering the nation to the 
Chinese ', "Tempers were frayed on both sides for near ly 15 
minutes", when the P .S .p , Members demanded Nehru to withdraw 
1» The Hindu (Madras), 23.6. I962 
2. Ib id . , Vol. V, No.Mf, June I 3 , 1962, Cols, 10563«10576, 
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his Statement that questions on border would l e t down 
the country^s morale* The Congress Members were equally 
agi tated over Dwivcdi*s observation tha t the Prime Minister 
was surrendering the country to the Chinese. "Despite the 
iSpeaker's repeated appeals for maintaining decorum, sharp 
exchanges continued for some time". Mhen Nehru said tha t 
the Members were not helping in bui lding morale, the"remark 
provoked loud p ro t e s t s from Mr. Dwivedi and other P.S.P. 
members". "Idlhile there were cheers from the Congress 
benches P .S .P . members stood en bloc angr i ly ges t i cu la t ing 
at the t reasury benches". "As the noise subsided, Nath Pai 
resented t h a t we are not i n t e re s t ed in breaking publ ic morale". 
He Said, "we are here to exercise our l eg i t ima te and elemen-
ta ry duty which j u s t i f i e s our presence in the House. Whenever 
wo ask for a simple information, the charge i s leve l led tha t 
we are in t e re s t ed in breaking the morale". Some Congress 
members t r i e d to "shout down" Nath Pa i . "I t was a matter of 
great regre t tha t the Prime Minister l o s t h is temper whenever 
cer ta in matters seemed to them leg i t ima te were ra ised in the 
House". On June 16, I962, there was furore over India*^s 
China po l i cy . "In tumult tha t broke out i n the Lok Sabha t h i s 
week on the ca l l ing a t t en t ion motions members from the t reasury 
1. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) , 1^.6. I962. 
2. Ibid. 
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benches glared balefully at their opponents'*. It was the 
first frontal P.S,P. attack. The iiproar was during reply 
to a motion on the reported movement of Chiness vehicles 
in the Chinese occupied territory in NEFA and Ladakh. 
On June 22, Bare called the attention of the Prime Minister 
to the reported occiipation by China of Indian territory in 
2 
NEFA» Nehru explained in the House, "In NSFA area there 
not 
has been/a single incursion etc., except for the fact that 
two years ago or three years ago there was thislangju 
incident and except for the fact that two officers-"^not a 
force—*-**came down half a mile to that village Rai.... He 
was sure that there had been no other incursion on the Mc 
Mahon Line,-* 
HALF-AN- HOUR DISCUSSION; 
The matters of urgent public icrportance are also 
discussed under this head in the Parliament. However, the 
Sino-Indian border dispute was never discussed through this 
process. In the opening session, no such discussion occurred. 
1. I b i d , , 17.6^ 1962 
2. I b id . , I l l Ser ies , Vol. V, No.51, June 22y I962 
Cols. " 1 2 ^ ^ - 1 2 ^ 8 • 
3 . I b i d . . Col, 12if9S» 
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During the First Session, nine such discussions took place 
but none of them had any relation to the problem under 
study. During the second session also,there was no dis« 
cussion on the border problem though there were five half-
2 
an.hour d i s c u s s i o n s . The h a l f - a n - h o u r d i s c u s s i o n p r o c e s s 
was, t h u s , not u t i l i s e d as a means t o focus a t t e n t i o n on 
the Sino-^India border problem. 
ADJ0I3RMSNT MOTIONS: 
A t t e n t i o n of t h e Government i s a l s o drawn t o a 
p a r t i c u l a r problem through a motion t o adjourn t h e House. 
These motions a re the bes t mode of v e n t i l a t i n g p u b l i c 
g r i evances . I t i s a p o i n t of s i ^ i f i c a n c e t h a t two adjourn-
ment motions were given n o t i c e by Nath Pa i and Yogendra Jha 
and f i v e c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n n o t i c e s by Nath Pad, Barooah, 
Krishna Pa l Singh, R,V. Bade, Mrs. Maimoona Sultan— r e g a r d i n g 
the Chinese ul t imatum, demanding t h e withdrawl of t h e Indian 
p a t r o l s from t h e two check p o s t s , were t aken t o g e t h e r . - ' 
During t h e f i r s t ha l f of t h e Lok Sabha Debates, the language 
of the newspapers appears t o be mild and l e s s comments a r e 
t r a c e a b l e . On May 10 , 1962, t h e Opposi t ion in the Lok Sabha 
1. Resume. Lok Sabha Debates . I l l S e r i e s , Vol. 7, No.51, 
June 22, 19&2, Col. 126lf7. 
2. I b i d . , Vo. VI I I , No.25, September 7, 1962, Col. 6937» 
3 . I f i id . t I I I S e r i e s , Vol. I I , No.16, May 3 , I962 , Cols . 
2lf57-60. 
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presented such a motion in resentment against the f a i l u r e 
of the Government to place before the House, the Note of 
the Chinese Bnbassy, df the same month. However, the 
Speaker dispel led such a motion. The House and the Members 
quelled themselves by showing t h e i r "resentment" against 
the anti-*social a c t i v i t i e s , a t t r i bu ted to the Chinese 
missions in India. Nehru repl ied to these motions seeking 
to know about the nature of the l a t e s t note of May from 
China* Nehru to ld "adieering Lok Sabha" tha t whatever 
may be the Chinese t h r e a t s , India would hold on i t s pos t s 
2 
in Ladakh and elsewhere. During the opening session thirty 
three motions were received and 12 were brought before the 
House.-^  During the first session from Jipril 16 to June 22, 
1962, ten such notices were brought before the House. One 
was admitted but leave was not granted by the House. One 
was ruled out of ordery for ten consent was withdrawn by 
the Speaker. For five minutes Hem Barua called for such 
a motion regarding reported Chinese incursion into Indian 
territory. The members of the Parliament expressed gratitude 
1. The Statesman (New Delhi), 11.?• I962 
2. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) k^^, I962. Contra. The 
Hindu, (Madras)« .^'^ . I962. "Nehru's statement in the 
Lok Sabha yesterday has been generally reported without 
any comment". 
3. Resume. II Series, Vol. LXII, No. 1^ +, March 30, 19^2, 
Col, 2800, 
U-, Resume. Lok Sabha peb^ t^es, III Series, Vol. V, No. ^1, 
June 22, 1962, Col, }26k8. 
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over the adjournment motion called by Hem Barua which 
furnished required and relevant information to the House 
about the improved border situation. During the II session^ 
2 
the situation obtained as follows: 
1, Brought before the House ,.. 1^ 
2, Admitted but leave not granted .... 1 
3, Ruled out of order ,,. None 
k. Consent withheld by the Speaker ,,. 1^ + 
However, on June 20, the Speaker withheld his consent to 
3 
such an adjournment motion* 
MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS; 
In the opening session from 12.3* 1962 to 30.3• 1962, 
no Statement on the 'Sino«Indian border dispute is to be 
noticed. Though 37 notices were received as statements made 
under Rule 197 calling attention to matters of Urgent Public 
L. 
Importance, 8 statements were made by the Ministers, where 
no statement was on the border dispute. First statement was 
made by the Prime Minister, in response to a Galling Attention 
Motion on May 7? 1962, regarding the border alignment by China 
1. Lok Sabha Debates^ III Series, Vol. V, No«U6, June 20, 
1962, Cols. 1193^37. 
2. Resume. Lok Sabha Debates. Ill Series, Vol. VIII, No. 25 
Col. 6939. 
3» Lok Sabh^ Debates. Ill Series, Vol» V, No. ^ , June 20, 
1962, Cols. 1193^36* 
k* Resume, Lok Sabha Debates. II Series, Vol. LXII, No.l^ 
March - 30, 1962, Cols. 2799. 
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and Sinkiang border on May 11, I962. Nehru madd a statement 
regarding the firing on an Indian Policeman from the Chinese 
Trade Agency in Kalimpong on March 22, I962. 
In the first session^ a spectaciilar rise is to be noticed 
in the number of statements when 600 notices were received 
2 
and 65 statements were made by the Minister, In the Rajya 
Sabha, from April 17, I962 - May 11, 1962, one statement of 
no significance was made. During the second session 358 notices 
received for it but only 23 were made.-^  On September 3, I962, 
Mrs* L, Menon made a significant statement regarding the 
establishment of 30 new posts in the Ladakh region by the Chinese 
troops. Ifowever, in the Hajya Sabha, no ministerial statement 
was made. On November 11, 1962, during the III Session, Nehru 
made a short statement in the Lok Sabha regarding the reported 
Chinese offer to ceasefire. He regretfully traced the develop-
ment that had occurred, China offered a unilateral cease-fire 
on November 21/22 and the forces were to withdraw on December 12, 
1962. The offer was in the air b«fc so far no official confirmation 
1. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol, II, N»v,22,jMay 11, 
1962; Cols, 39^1-62. 
2. Lok- Sabha Deb,c,tegj III Series, Vol. V, No,51, June 22,1962 
Col, 1261+8, 
3. Ibid,^ Vol, VIII, No, 25, September 7, 1962, Col,6937 
^. Lok Sabha Debates^ III Series, Vol. VIII, No,22, 
September 3, 1962, Cols. 5530-38. 
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was received. Ind ia ' s demand was to r e s to re the September 8 , 
1962, pos i t ion . This statement by Nehru was evaluated by 
Hari Vishnu^ Kamath who, on a demand of c l a r i f i c a t i o n and 
information suggested tha t the Parliament should remain in 
session t i l l the emergency l a s t e d . He sa id , "The Chinese 
Government seems to be adept at t h e i r game of fraud and decep-
t ion and when the s i t ua t ion could be so f lu id , I would request 
in 
you, the leader of the House wi l l agree, . . . t h a t / t h i s 
parliamentary democratic set iip, the P^rliamgnt of the Nation 
must continue to be in session and have the p r iv i l ege of 
advising and guiding the Government in t h i s emergency.' 
Reminding the House of the statement niade by Nehru, 
Vishnu Kamath r e i t e r a t ed tha t India would not negot iate u n t i l 
the land was cleared of the invaders , "and Parliament has had 
the p r iv i l ege of endorsing whole hear tedly tha t declara t ion 
and I hope tha t he wil l today give a ca tegor ica l assurance to 
Parliament, to the nation tha t he wi l l stand firm, by the pol icy 
which has been c lear ly enunciated by the Government and endorsed 
by the Parliament of the nation and there wi l l be no departure 
2 
from tha t pol icy*" The continuous i n t e r e s t showed by the members 
1» Ibid . t m Ser ies , Vol, X, No, 1 1 , November 21, I962, 
Third Session, Col. 2689H.2702, Also see . Ibid. Statement 
by Qhri Ranga and Ram Sevak Yadav in Cols. 2908 and 2695 
respec t ive ly . 
2. Ibid.T Col. 2691. 
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encouraged the government. Moreover, they urged the 
Governmentto take a l l aspects of the problems in to considera-
2 
tion vis-a-^ vis the confidence of the House. Nehru, though 
desirous to stand by the Parliament and guided by the general 
principles discussed in the House,was sceptical about the 
advisability of discussing the communications between the 
two Governments in the House.-* The general practice is not 
9h6. 
to discuss such communications as the White Papersy Protest 
Notes in the House. During t h i s p a r t i c u l a r statement per iod, 
one fact was noticed tha t the Speaker was not allowing the 
Members to express themselves beyond ce r t a in l i m i t s . He said, 
" I would ask hon, members to give only t h e i r react ions or any 
suggestion and not to press the Prime Minister to make any 
statement at t h i s t ime. That i s what I would advise hon,members 
tha t they should also r e s t r a i n themselves!' The members 
demanded to hold a secret session and d e s i r a b i l i t y of more 
parliamentary consul ta t ionsj^to which no a t ten t ion was paid . 
In the second session there were h Statements on the 
border dispute regarding the s i tua t ion in Ladakh, Ind ia ' s 
absence from the San Fransisco Peace-Conference and the 
1» Ib id . . Col, 2693 '»We a l l would l i k e to know, and everyone 
of us i s in te res ted in knowing what wi l l come off of these 
th ings" (statement by Tyagi), 
2» Ib id . , Col, 2693 (statement by Hem Barua). 
3 . Ibid.., Col. 2701. 
h. Ibid.y Col* 2692. 
5* Ibid.J Col, 2698 (statement by H.N. Mukerjee). 
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re«^establishment of 30 new posts in Ladakh by the Chinese 
t roops . PoK, Deo made a statement regarding inacurracy in 
the Prime Min i s te r ' s speech on the border s i tua t ion made on 
August l^ f^  1962* On November 20, Nehru made a very per t inen t 
statement regarding the s i tua t ion in NEFA and Ladakh. He 
regre t fu l ly informed the House of the f a l l of Bomdila and 
Ghushul* Through statements a lso , Nehru emphasised the oft 
repeated p lea of secrecy in foreign po l i cy . He said tha t 
despi te the des i re to make every th ing c lear to the House and 
keeping the Lok Sabha spec ia l ly informed of a l l developments, 
the Government had to adopt a pol icy of secrecy as disc losure 
i s not a regular p r a c t i c e , for foreign pol icy issueSo I t i s 
nei ther advisable nor f ru i t fu l but per i lous* The Speaker 
agreed to i t and asked" the Prime Minister to reply only those 
2 
questions as did not jeopardise the i n t e r e s t of the Nation* 
In fac t , the pol icy of secrecy i s one of the most important 
factor which r e s t r i c t the ro le of Parliament in foreign pol icy 
matterse 
The very next day, as a matter of information, Nehru 
made another statement regarding the development in respect of 
the Chinese aggression,-* Within 28 minutes he informed the 
1. Lok Sabha Debates. I l l Ser ies , Vol. IX, No.10, November 
20, 1962, Cols. 24^3-68. 
2. Ibid^. Cols a 2453-68 
3« Ib id . . Vol. X, No. 11, November 21, I962, Cols.2689-2702, 
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House of the Chinese Hadio broadcast to cease- f i re from 
mid-night of November 21/22, I962. The ceasef i re proposal , 
both ins ide and outside the Parliament, had been underrated 
in unf la t t e r ing terms. Some labe l led i t as the ultimatum, 
some called i t a perf id ious strategem, a Trojan horse sent 
in to our midst to s c a t t e r our reason, weaken our defences 
and a vicious t r a p . The withdrawl was to occur on December 
1, to which no o f f i c i a l confirmation had yet been received. 
The l a s t statement of t h i s period was made on December 7, 
1962, by Nehru about h i s v i s i t to Assam and "other mat te r s" 
from 12 .11 . hours to IZ^^k- hours. There was a vol3ey of 
2 questions on t h i s statement on border s i t u a t i o n . Obviously 
the term "other mat te rs" refer red to border d i spu te . In order 
to keep i t conf ident ia l , ambiguous term was used. Hem Barua, 
in response to Nehru's statement regarding s i t ua t ion in Ladakh 
and NEFA said, "I agree fccunpletely with you tha t the re are 
cer ta in matters of s t ra tegy tha t must not be disclosed in t h i s 
House, but at the same time, there are cer ta in matters tha t 
do not have any hearing d i r e c t l y on matters of s t r a t egy . Those 
things are to be disclosed here because the country i s anxious 
to know about them. The purpose of t h i s Parliament i s to 
1. Notes on Comments, "Ceasefire", Parliamentary Studies . 
Vol. VI, No.12, December I962, p . 6, 
2, Lpk Sabha Debates. I l l Ser ies , Vol.XI, No.23, December 
7, 1962, Cols. h737-^758. 
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voice the opinion of the country and to enlighten the 
country also in matters that do not directly affect the 
strategy or defence preparations... 
The overall objective analysis of I962 Parliamentary 
Debates leads to certain conclusions. The Parliament devoted 
enormous time to discuss the border problem. However, in the 
light of its gravity and being the very first dispute to be 
tackled by the Gtovernment of India, the time allotted to the 
issue was not sufficient. The Debates were not designed 
to set the guide lines for the foreign policy. Mere discu-
ssion over a fait accompli leads us nowhere. Long Debates 
presented a boring picture of the House where members dozed 
or hurled criticisms (and even chairs) 9M each other;,. The 
debates merely attempted the dispute in the general assessment 
of historical perspective, criticised certain failures of the 
Government. Throughout the year, however, only one specific 
motion was discussed otherwise the reference to the dispute 
was made here and there whenever the resolution regarding 
the international situation and the policy of the Government 
of India in regard thereto was discussed. There were occasional 
interruptions and laughter- . However, these debates and 
criticisms of withholding all relevant information from 
1« Ihid. y Vol. X, No. 20, I962, Cols. 2^ +58. 
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Parliament received s igni f icant a t t en t ion of Nehru. Before 
1962, Nehru was never so emphatic in assuring the House to take 
Parliament in to confidence. The discussions and pinpointed 
answers to questions were more informative and valuable than 
the day-long review of the en t i r e i n t e rna t iona l seene« Thus, 
in general foreign pol icy debates , the reference to the dispute 
was ra ther disappointing s ince the subject matter of a foreign 
pol icy motion was general . What one member said had l i t t l e 
or no relation to the preceding speeches. They appeared to be 
a mess of disconnected discourses . There were only a few 
noteworthy speakers , l ike Minoo Masani, Hiren Mukerjee, Nath 
Pai , Kr iplani , Asoka Mehta and Menon whose speeches sparkled 
with wit and wisdom. Their c r i t i c i sms were often per t inen t 
and construct ive and focussed a t t en t ion on the weaknesses of 
the minor or major pol icy decis ions . Most of the speakers 
were divided in t h e i r opinions. There was no organised and 
unanimous Opposition to the Government's po l icy . The 6-day-
discussion over the P res iden t ' s order of Proclamation of 
Snergency was of no a v a i l . What i s needed i s to ask the 
Members to be brief ajnd to the po in t , thereby curbing the 
f u t i l e length of t h e i r speeches. They should put forth 
cer ta in concrete suggestions and guide- l ines to the Government. 
One of the factors which l imi t the ro le of the Lok Sabha 
in t h i s dispute was the f a i l u r e on the pa r t of the Members of 
Parliament to hold discussion on the papers l a i d on the Tq,ble 
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with regard to the dispute. Had the Members paid due 
attention to and showed more interest in the dispute, 
side by side held discussion over the VJhite Papers, their 
contribution could have been lucrative and pertinent. However, 
occasional references were made to them in abxandance but 
no separate Motion was proposed to discuss them, 
Nehini had been at the height of his power and popularity 
until the Chinese aggression showed of nothing else than the 
'gentle colossus' had feet of clay, and, though he was spared, 
his close confidant and colleague, Krishna Menon had to leave 
the Cabinet. The I962 debacle caused a severe blow to his 
prestige and health and he could not be the same person again. 
His declining health and popularity enabled the Opposition to 
gave both credibility and respectability in the period before 
the Fourth General Elections. Incidentally the Parliament also 
gained in stature as the focal point of Indism political 
system. Nehru was more than usual on the defensive and 
deferential in his attitude towards the Parliament. But the 
Parliament could not overcome the in-built limitations of a 
parliamentary system. Besides, the charismatic personality of 
Nehru was too towering and dominating to be damaged or tarnished 
by those who were elected as his votaries. 
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CHAPTER ^  VII 
ROLE OF PAHLIAMSNT 
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION; 
The Parliament, the Iftiion Legislature under the Indian 
Constitution is constituted on the basis of bicameralism. 
Since the Constitution establishes a federal Government, the 
framers of the Constitution were unanimous for achieving a 
balance between the direct representatives of the people and 
the states as the units of federation* 
The Lok Sabha (or the Lower House of the Parliament) 
is directly eletted by the people whereas the Rajya Sabha 
(the TJp'per House), is indirectly elected* The Constitution 
provides comprehensive study of its structure. The President 
is an integral part of the Parliament which includes the above 
mentioned two Houses. It is in conformity with the parliamentary 
1. This elaborate description in the Constitution is 
vigorously criticised and commented upon by the Members 
of the Constituent Assembly and others like Sir Ivor 
Jennings in some Characteristics of Indian Constitution^ 
1952, Those who wanted to save the Constitution makers 
from this slur, Justify it on the ground of containing 
articles on state Legislatures also. Ambedkar said that 
Indian democracy was, "only a top dressing soil which is 
essentially undemocratic", and the ^Constitutional 
morality•• of which Grote spoke, was not yet effectively 
diffused through the people, it required an elaborate 
constitution, Constituent Assembly Debates. Vol. VII, 
Col. 38. 
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system. I t l ays s t r e s s on the int imate re la t ionsh ip and 
interdependence of the Executive and the Parliament. The 
Cabinet ftinctions as the grgmd Committee of the Lower House. 
The Parliament l e g i s l a t e s , controls and d i r e c t s i n t e rna l 
administrat ion and also controls the purse . Sovereignty of 
Parliament i s a p o l i t i c a l myth which i s derived from the 
•i 
p o l i t i c a l theory of Gbvernment, voting money. 
Though the foreign policy-making and execution, as a 
2 
r u l e , i s regarded the prerogat ive of the Executive, a measure 
of parl iamentary supervision and control e x i s t s . The foreign 
pol icy making i s an organised function of the Secre ta r ies , 
the Ministry of External Affairs , Divisional Officers, Commi-
t t e e s and Sub-committees of the Parliament and the Ministry of 
External Affa i rs . I t i s einnually disclosed and discussed in 
the Par l iament ' s open ing sessions by the President ia l -Address . 
This discussion and laying down the broad out l ines of pol icy 
in the House i s in conformity with the operation of the p a r l i a -
mentary system. The p r inc ip l e of Separation of Powers does not 
exis t in India hence the Parliament i s not "excluded' from 
1. N.N. Mullaya, 'Parliamentary Surveil lance of Administration 
The Bole of Committees, Parliamentary Financial Committees" 
Journal of Const i tut ional and Parliamentary Studies. 
Vol. I , No. 3 , July-Sept ember, 1967, p . 1% 
2, Parl iaments . Inter Parliamentary Ifeion, London, Cassel 
1966, p , 285* 
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sharing the responsibilities of the Executive and the Vice-
Versa* The Council of Ministers and the Cabinet, en bloc is 
1 
' c o l l e c t i ve ly responsible to the Lower House of the Parliament, 
The formulation and i n i t i a t i o n of foreign pol icy i s conducted 
by the Executive. In form of .^  Resolutions or Motions i t i s 
put for th the Parliament for approval. The Government has a 
free heard in implementing the approved pol icy and t h e Parliament 
has the p r i v i l ege of s c ru t in i s ing t h i s pol icy at a l l s tages . 
Ar t ic le 2'f6 of the Indian Consti tut ion empowers the 
Parliament to l e g i s l a t e on a l l aspects of foreign a f f a i r s . 
Item No.10 of Ar t ic le 2U6 in the Seventh Schedule says t h a t the 
Parliament would l e g i s l a t e on "Foreign Affairs ; a l l matters 
2 
which br ing the Union in to r e l a t i o n with any foreign country". 
This l i s t also includes the paraphernal ia of foreign a f f a i r s 
such as Defence, Naval, Mil i tary and Air-Force works, diplomatic 
consijlar and t rade representa t ions to the UNO and other i n t e r -
nat ional conferences, secur i ty of India, war and peace, foreign 
j u r i sd i c t i on , c i t izenship emigration e t c . 
1. The Constitution of India, OP. c i t . . p . 20, "The Council 
of Ministers sha l l be co l l ec t ive ly responsible to the 
House of the People". Ar t ic le 75. 
2. Ar t ic le 2 ^ ( 1 ) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) 
and (3 ) , Parliament has exclusive power to make laws 
with respect to any of the matters enumerated in Lis t I 
of the Seventh Schedule". The Consti tution of India. 1957 
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Since the parliamentary siq)ervision and control of a l l 
executive enactments i s i nev i t ab l e , the Parliament can execise 
the two way cont ro l . F i r s t l y , by conducting a de ta i l ed exami-
nation of governmental a c t i v i t i e s e i the r through prel iminary 
in te rvent ion i . e . before the pol icy i s proposed or adopted 
secondly, an expost facto supervision. In the context of 
foreign po l icy , i t exercises the l a t t e r kind of siqpervision. 
MEASURES OF INFLUENCE; 
As described in the Chapter I I I the f i r s t measure of 
influence i s the Question-Hour, I t can be qui te effect ive i f 
i t i s f l ex ib le enough. This procedure was introduced in France, 
spec ia l ly and p rec i se ly to f a c i l i t a t e the siipervision of foreign 
po l i cy . I t was rea l i sed t h a t the general debates would be 
dangerous due to t h e i r publ ic character and extempore nature 
of many statements. The procedure of Quest ion-Ho tir can lead 
to enquir ies and enlarge area of information, i t can not lead 
to debates . Pin-pointed questions r e l a t i n g to foreign a f f a i r s 
and pol icy can be useful enough. Sometimes the questions miss 
the important i s sue . They enable the Ministers to keep in 
touch with the public opinion. Questions, i f they repeatedly 
1. S.L. Shankdher, "Administrative Accountability to 
Parliament" Indian Journal of Public Administration. 
Vol. XII, No, 3» July-September I966, p.356. 
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hammer at a p a r t i c u l a r problem can act as cat.alyst and 
force the government to frame a de f in i t e pol icy . The procedure 
of Short Notice Questions and Supplementary Questions f a c i l i t a t e s 
the process . The Question-Ebur i s the most p r a c t i c a l way 
through which the Parliament gets the opportunity to sc ru t in i se 
the Executive decis ions . 
Debates on Motions and He solut ions regarding foreign 
pol icy are the next mode of parliamentary enquiry and discuss ion. 
The 1959 session debates confirmed t h a t there was unanimity 
over non-alignment. Minis ter ia l Statements keep the House 
informed of the l a t e s t developments in in te rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s . 
These statements enable the Government to discuss the t rends 
in Opposition. They also enable the Ministers to answer 
c r i t i c i sm and r e g i s t e r parliamentary support to them. There 
i s also scope for voluntary commniques, publishing repor ts 
and summaries, on which frxiitful discussion occurs. However, 
in India , the i n t e rpe l l a t i on system i s not in vogue. I t i s 
some sor t of i n i t i a t i v e of Parliament i t s e l f which i s quite 
e f fec t ive , as i t gives r i s e t o a general debate. I t culminates 
•J 
in motions approving the action of the Government, Minis te r ia l 
statements serve a va r i e ty of pu2T)0ses. When the Parliament 
i s in session these statements enable i t to be kept informed 
of the l a t e s t in te rna t iona l developments. They provide pub l i c i t y 
1. Parliaments, on. c i t . p . 287. 
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for explanations, elaboration of Minis te r ia l pol icy and 
create a focus of scrut iny for Minis te r ia l action# I t enables 
the Ministers to face c r i t i c i s m s . There i s one more "const i -
t u t i ona l r i g h t " in the hands of the Member of Parliament. During 
1966, the trend of Lok Sabha has shown tha t the Bouse has 
successfully establ ished the r ight tha t t i l l the No-Confidence 
Motion i s disposed off, no subs tan t ia l pol icy be admitted and 
debated in the House, During the debate on such a motion the 
Members at l a rge enjoy the r ight to question pol icy or any action 
1 
of the Government. 
Demands for Grants i s an ind i rec t kind of con t ro l . If 
a Motion regarding reduction of Grants and funds, to.ken or 
t o t a l i s approved, i t would amount to a Vote of Censure and 
necess i t a t e Cabinet res ignat ion . I t i s a device, which the 
Members of Parliament use to oblige the Foreign Minister to 
give explanation on specif ic p o i n t s . Budget Debate also brings 
the implicat ions of foreign pol icy to book. I t i s confined to 
the f inanc ia l implications of foreign pol icy carr ied out by the 
Qovem)ment. Thus in regard to such debates, the ro le of t he 
Indian Parliament becomes paramount. I t provides oppor tuni t ies 
for parl iamentary scrut iny over the Governments conduct of 
foreign a f fa i r s through i t s e s sen t i a l power over the foreign 
a f f a i r s by obliging the Ministers to seek approval of t h e i r 
1, Shankdher, op. c i t .y p.366 
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e s t i m a t e s . The record of Demandsfbr Grants does no t show any 
cut i n g r a n t s . A Want of Confidence Motion or a No-Gcnfidence 
Motion i s a d i rec t method of launching an a t tack on the 
Government* The Parliament can also exercise i t s siipervision 
through i t s fact finding enquiry-Commissions and Committees, 
A de ta i l ed account of the u t i l i z a t i o n of a l l these parliamentary 
processes has been deal t in the other chapter. 
PARLIAMMT AND IMTEHNATIONAL TRMTIESi 
Treat ies are the formal expression of the re la t ionsh ip 
es tabl ished between or among the s t a t e s . I t i s , in f ac t , the 
concrete embodiment of t h e i r foreign p o l i c i e s . In most Consti-
t u t i o n s , the Treaty-making i s a prerogat ive of the Sovereign 
body. Legis la ture , Without any prejudice to t h i s cons t i tu t iona l 
common place , each country seems to have evolved i t s own way 
for the r a t i f i c a t i o n of t r e a t i e s , agreements and p a c t s . There 
one 
i s no/system of r a t i f i c a t i o n . On the bas is of the seat of the 
actual treaty«%making power, the treaty-making can be categorised 
in to the following three types : 
( i ) The Chief of the Sta te may draw up and r a t i f y 
t r e a t i e s , l a rge ly unchecked by other branches; 
( i i ) The power i s divided between the Executive and 
the Legis la ture ; in general, the approval of the 
l a t t e r being necessaxy for r a t i f i c a t i o n of 
t r e a t i e s , 
( i i i ) A compromise, by which, l imi ta t ion i s placed 
on the Chief of the State in making cer ta in 
types of t r e a t i e s , 1 
1. A special correspondent, ••Parliament and In te rna t iona l 
Trea t ies" , Parliamentary Studies . Vol. XII, No.if, i ^ r i l 
1968, p . l ^ . 
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Art ic le 253 of the Consti tution s t i p u l a t e s , " . . . Parliament 
has power to make any law for the whole or any pa r t of the 
t e r r i t o r y of India for implementing any Treaty, Agreement or 
Convention with any other country or countries or any decision 
made at any in t e rna t iona l conference, associat ion or other body". 
Moreover, under Ar t ic le 2 ^ , the Paxliament i s empowered 
exclusively, to l e g i s l a t e upon "Ihter ing in to t r e a t i e s and 
agreements with f o r e i ^ countr ies and implementing of t r e a t i e s , 
agreements and convention with foreigp countries^ Since 
independence, India has entered into countless t r e a t i e s , agree-
ments, conventions and dec la ra t ions . The procedure of t r e a t y -
making s t a r t s with the Executive i n i t i a t i n g the nego t ia t ions , 
through appropriate diplorncttic channels and when the negot ia t ions 
mature, the agreement i s f ina l i sed and i s duly signed by the 
Chief of the Executive or i t s subordinate o f f i ce r . Such an 
agreement i s then placed on the t ab le of both the Houses and the 
Members are allowed to r a i s e quest ions. The procedure of formal 
r a t i f i c a t i o n does not operate here.-^ This i s also a Br i t i sh 
convention in o r ig in . In India, the s i lence of Parlisunent on a 
t r e a t y 
b ign i f ies approbation* To the extent i t has been so, i t has been 
the r e su l t of the happy experience of l eg i s l a tu re -execu t ive 
1. The Constitution of India, OP. c i t . ^ p .71 
2. IMd.., p . 1 ^ ; 
3. A special correspondent, I^ rlia««rt9,ry Studies, OP. . cit. 
p. 12. 
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r e l a t i onsh ip . On the bas is of the majority tha t the Government 
commands in the Parliament, i t makes a l l i t s decis ions 
acceptable to the Parliament. Barring a few ins tances , the 
Parliament in India has remained informed of the conditions 
leading to fresh agreements. I t has also enjoyed the power 
of discussion over a t r e a t y . The treaty-making process saves 
the time of the Parliament, as the Parliament only par takes 
discussions but does not i n i t i a t e , r a t i f y or decide. There i s 
an appreciable number of minor agreements over which Parliament 
could not form a Judgment except by going into the d e t a i l s of 
the provision of a t r e a t y . This i s an important fac tor t ha t 
an agreement, once signed by the Executive, can not p r a c t i c a l l y 
wait for Parl iament 's approval, which may cause unnecessary 
delay. I t has often been questioned how the Indian Consti-
tut ion,under which a l l matters bringing the Onion in to r e l a -
t ions with any foreign coiantry are subjected to complete and 
exclusive authori ty of Parliament, leaves the i n i t i a t i o n of 
treaty-making as an Executive-prerogative, 
THE PABLIAMEMIARY COmiTTEES AND THEIH ROLE: 
The Parliamentary Committees a lso function as cont ro l l ing 
and supervisory agents of Parliament. They are a medium of 
d i rec t contact of administrat ion with Parliament, G. Mavalankar 
made a speech before the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament 
on j ^ r i l 10, 19^0, wherein he explained tha t in a set-\ip of 
freedom where the Government had to be responsible to t he 
2 ^ 
Parliament, the Committees have four main objectives: 
'*(!) to associate with and train as large a nianber of 
members as possible, not only in the ways in 
which the administration is carried out but also 
to make them conversant with the various problems 
that Government have to meet from day to day; 
(ii) to exercise control on the executive so that they 
or do not become oppressive/arbitrary; 
(iii) to influence the policies of Government; and 
(iv) to act as a liaison between the Government and 
•J 
the general public". 
Parliamentary Committees are maniature of Parliaments On 
the working of the Parliamentary Committees no one would suggest 
that it Ehould question a policy laid down by Parliament. The 
Committees are not made to do so, neither have they done it» They 
serve only as instruments of Parliament. What they examine and 
question is the Government policies. The Government lays down 
the policy and the task of the Committees is to p.eep into policies, 
criticise, analyse and advocate alternative policies if desirable. 
CONSIEiTATIVii: COi-avIITTEEi 
After independence, the system of Standing Committee was 
2 
done away with and the informal Consultative Committees were 
n Hiren Muker;jee, India and Parliament. (New Delhi) , 
People 's Publishing House, I962, pp. I M D - 1 . 
2. S.S. More, Pract ice and Procedure of Indian Parliament. 
Bombay, i960, p.51*^. For d e t a i l s of Indian Committee system 
also see, W.H. Morris Jones, Parliament in India. (London), 
Longmans, 1957, pp. 308-315. 
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set up in di f ferent Minis t r ies and the major Departments of 
the Government. Before such a Committee was formed, there was 
a groiip of 25 Members of Parliament with whom Nehru used to 
have per iodica l meetings to consider foreign po l icy . In 
June 1969, t h i s innovation was attempted. The word 'informal* 
was dropped and the Consultative Committees were created for 
a l l Minis t r ies , 
OHGAMISATION; 
The Consultative Committee of the Ministry of External 
Affairs i s const i tu ted in such a manner tha t the en t i r e 
p o l i t i c a l mosaic of Parliament i s represented in i t . There 
are 20 members on the Consultative Committee, attached to the 
Ministry of External Affairs , 11 from the Lok Sabha and 9 from 
the Hajya Sabha. Hith regard to i t s functions Para I I of the 
'Guide Lines ' lays down, "Members of Parliament are free to 
discuss any matter which can appropriately be discussed in 
Parliament", Efforts have been made to curb i t s powers and 
inf luence, to the extent t h a t i t does not become more powerful 
than the Cabinet and the Executive i t s e l f . A l o t of care has 
been taken to prevent the Committee from becoming more effect ive 
than what the Executive considers necessary and des i r ab le . 
1. K.P. Misra, "Foreign Policy-Planning Efforts in India 
The I n s t i t u t e for Defence Studies and Analysis Journal. 
Vol. I I , No. If, April 1970, pp. 397-399. 
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The Committee includes people from all shades of opinion, 
belonging to different political parties, in proportion to 
their strength in the Parliament. The Foreign Minister is 
the ex**officio Chairman of the Committee. The 1970 Committee 
has got 32 members from both the Houses of Parliament, including 
the Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of State for 
the same. The Deputy Chief Whip is the in charge of the 
Commi^ -^ «»e and a-t- *-'^-^ beginning of every Parliament, he calls 
their n wice during each session, to advise 
the Extern^ itry on foreign policy problems. It 
is an extra-constit CL and purely conventional organisation. 
Other similar Committ ,, having some connection with foreign 
policy are the Gonsultl^ tive Committee for the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and 
the Ministry of Atomic Energy, The Consultative Committee of 
the Parliament for the Ministry of External Affairs in India, 
is a transmission belt between the Foreign Ministry and Parlia-
ment. It conveys the Government Official policy from one centre 
to another. Its Members receive detailed explanations about 
the policy. They are privileged to have significant say with 
regard to the same. In the functioning of this Committee, a 
new trend has developed. Though expected to meet twice during 
every session, it met twice between the summoning of Parliament 
after the Fourth General Elections,that is on October 27, I969 
and February 10, 1970, During its first meeting, the agenda 
2^2 
consisted of problems r e l a t i n g to Nepal and South-East Asia 
but with an uproar, i t deal t with the Habat-Fiasco. Even in 
i t s next meeting, excluding the agenda, i t discussed Ind i a ' s 
nuclear pol icy v i s - a -v i s Chinese s tance. I t reduced i t 
'Vlaying a r e l a t i v e l y ef fec t ive a g i t a t i o n a l , i f not consul ta t ive 
r o l e , in the making of I nd i a ' s Foreign Policy", There were 
other ac t ive Consultative Committeees. Most notable i s the 
Committee for the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the meeting of which 
was held on July 6, I969. The Committee put for th various 
suggestions, with regard to export promotion. Further , the 
Consultative Committee for the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, met on March 3 , 1970 and expressed resentment 
against the massive propaganda carr ied on by foreign missions 
in India* In the saflie manner, the Consultative Committee of 
the Ministry of Atomic Shergy in i t s meeting of March 3 I , 1970 
made the Government enquire into and prepare a report on the 
cost of developing nuclear weapons. This pressure exerted 
by i t , supports the view tha t the ro l e of Committees can only 
make a marginal difference to the generally l e s s ef fec t ive 
ro le played by our Parliament in t h i s regard. In the words 
of Chagla, the Committee i s , •*more of an agency for ge t t ing 
the p o l i c i e s accepted and meeting c r i t i c i sm than for influencing 
•j 
foreign pol icy" . In the 1970 Committee, the Members showed 
1* Bandyopadhaya, OP. c i t , . pp, I3J-6 
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balanced outlook. They were neither rash in youthfulness nor 
timid on account of their age. In exceptional situations also, 
the Members expressed their mature and well informed opinion , 
in the re-alm of foreign policy. Their educational qualifications 
were encouraging as the 90?S of the Members had the opportunity 
to have IMiversity education. The Members had a high parlia-
mentary experience, the majority of theni consisted of those 
who had seen the foreign policy from close quarters and were 
well aware of the Parliamentary Procedure and the working of 
its committee* 
A^e (?ro^ p 
Under kO 
Between 
Over 60 
1 years* 
kO and 60 
years. 
years. 
TABLE II 
Number 
5 
17 
8 
Percentage 
17 
2.7 
iiithout IJi iversity Eflucation 3 10 
With University Mucation 27 90 
Studied abroad. 8 27 
TABLE 111"* 
Parliamentary Experience: 
One term. 5 17 
More than one term 25 83 
1, K.P. Misra, or>. c l t . . pp. ^ 0 - 1 , 
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FINANCIAL CONTROL OF POLICY THROUGH COMMITTEES; 
There are three di f ferent Committees of the Government. 
1« Standing Finance Committee. 
2. Estimates Committee. 
3. Public Accounts Committee* 
These Committees are i n t e r - r e l a t ed* The F i r s t one has 
given a go^by due to which there i s a serious lacuna in the 
Parliament. Stipplementary Demands for Grants are often presented 
to the Estimates Committee. The Public Accounts Committee 
makes a post mortem scru t iny . In the absence of the Standing 
Committee, such demands escape the examination, the Consti tution 
wishes them to undergo. The work in the Committees i s more 
concentrated and effect ive than the work in the Bouse. There i s 
more s o l i d a r i t y and substance in the work of Committees. 
FACTORS ECLIPSING THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT; 
The above mentioned ways of control and supervis ion.of 
foreign pol icy by the Parliament are subject to ce r ta in l i m i t a -
t i o n s . The Parliament functions under lobbies and pressures 
from within and without* Nehru had h i s own 'persona l i ty -cu l t* 
and en;joyed the confidence of the masses. He was a l l in a l l 
while a r r iv ing at decisions* T;here was a d i s - jo in ted and 
disorganised Opposition in working. The Parliament i s not a 
body tha t plans th ings in i so la ted t r a n q u i l l i t y . The Members 
are not free or independent to decide the pol icy or i n i t i a t e 
i t a t tiny s tage. Their freedom i s impeded by t h e i r pa r t y -
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a f f i l i a t i o n s * The discussions of the Members are influenced 
by the Members'contact with each other* The extent of the 
influence of the organised pressures within Parliament depends 
tipon how important the Parliament i s within the system of 
Government i t operates and what pos i t ion does the Parliament 
occiipy c o l l a t e r a l l y in re la t ion to the Executive or Cabinet* 
In India, the Parliamentary system in p rac t i ce has es tabl ished 
the Cabinet as an i n s t i t u t i o n , weilding more power than Par l ia« 
ment. I t i s not Parliament which controls the Cabinet but i t 
i s the l a t t e r which i s more i n f l u e n t i a l . For the Congress-
Cabinet, i t was eas ie r to overpower the Parliament, due to 
i t s thumping ma;jority» Secondly, Nehru's un iversa l ly accepted 
charismatic pe r sona l i ty , h i s habit of taking decisions himself 
and the absence of strong Pressure Groups befiame more pronounced 
with regard to the Executive, which was the rea l decision-maker. 
Parliament i s l i k e a debating society and public forum. The 
Cabinet in India i s r e l a t i v e l y strong in pos i t ion but i t i s 
also sens i t ive to parliamentary pressures and accountabi l i ty . 
Parliament can be more ef fec t ive , i f the re i s strong Opposition 
with mul t i -par ty system. In India , despi te the mul t i -par ty 
system, a single Party dominated the p o l i t i c a l scene and the 
Cabinet made the Parliament subservient to i t s p o l i c i e s . 
The Parliament i s l e s s emphatic in affect ing foreign pol icy 
1» K*C. iWheare, OP» cit^^ p . 6h, 
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as i t s i t s i n t e rmi t t en t ly and i t s personnel keeps on chaJiging. 
The Cabinet also^ changes but the inner c i r c l e of the experts 
and sec re ta r i e s as well as the members of various Committees 
and t h e i r sub-divis ions, form the permanent Executive, The 
task of making and implementing foreign pol icy i s l e f t to the 
Executive and Parliament approves of the proposed pol icy as a 
rubber-stamp I a f te r discussing i t a t l ength . I t i s too clumsy 
and la rge a body to be convened during emergencies. Sefirecy 
in foreign policy matters i s the next factor tha t imposes a 
l imi t a t ion on the Par l iament ' s inf luence. The pol icy fratners 
escape to disclose i t even to t h e i r pa r ty members in the P a r l i a -
ment, Public discussion of the de l i ca t e in t e rna t iona l issues 
and confidential negot ia t ions -,wilL„ lead to harmfiil consequences. 
Hence, mostly deta i led and timely information i s withheld from 
the Members of the Parliament, on the ground of secrecy and 
p u b l i c - i n t e r e s t . Thus the Parliament i s u t t e r l y impotent 
i f the Government makes secret agreements. 
The Members of Parliament a l loca te l e s s time to the 
study of foreign a f f a i r s and pol icy . To most of them the 
problems affecting t h e i r const i tuencies are more important. 
There i s l e s s e r pressure from the const i tuencies to concentrate 
on in te rna t iona l i s sues . I t leads one to bel ieve tha t as 
compared to domestic i s sue s , the foreign pol icy a t t r a c t s l e s s e r 
a t t en t ion and time of the Members of Parliament, 
1. Peter G. Richards, Parliament And Foreign jilffairs. 
London, <Allen and Diwin, 1967, p ,163 . 
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The ha l l mark of foreign pol icy and diplomacy i s , 
negotiat ion re^ther than l e g i s l a t i o n , the chief fimction of 
the Parliament. Negotiation and diplomacy hardly involve 
l eg i s la t ion* The Members have ra the r a very l imi ted scope 
for i n i t i a t i o n and playing a decisive ro le in foreign pol icy-
making. Over-part icipat ion on the p a r t of Parliament in t h i s 
regard tends to hinder diplomacy. International events occur 
so suddenly tha t the pol icy decisions require immediate act ions 
in response to events abroad* Immediate and urgent decisions 
Cannot be taken by or in Parliament as i t i s a gigant ic body, 
consis t ing of people of diverse i n t e r e s t s and opinions. Pa r l i a -
ment finds i t s e l f at a disadvantage when i t t r i e s to deal 
with in te rna t iona l problems* I t i s more per t inen t and des i rable 
that the Cabinet Minis ters , who are the spokesmen of the 
National Government decide the po l icy , A smaller body i s more 
f i t to take measures of t h i s so r t . The force of Parliament 
behind them, f a c i l i t a t e s the quick approval of t h e i r proposed 
decisions and approved pol ic ies* The Indian Consti tution has 
empowered Parliament to l e g i s l a t e on foreign pol icy matters and 
foreign a f f a i r s , but i t f a i l s to provide i t any opportunity 
to give d i rec t ives or guide-l ines in foreign pol icy . The 
power to l e g i s l a t e leaves l i t t l e scope to control foreign policy* 
There has been a demand tha t Parliament should prescr ibe the 
object ives and guidelines of policy*^ 
1, Frank Morrmes.^The Duty of Parliament", The Indian Express (New Delhi) , 13.If. 196i+. 
2.'$8 
Often the criticism of the Members of Parliament, 
appears vain and for the sake of criticism of a policy they 
themselves endorset Speaking over an election gathering, on 
February 17, I962, 7.K. Krishna Menon expressed his concern 
over the useless foreign policy criticism. "He said that years 
after years. Parliament had discussed the policy..4n(J endorsed 
it. He told critics of policy that they were attacking not 
only peace in the world, but also the very decision they had 
1 
taken in Parliament", 
The efficiency of parliamentary measures of control i s 
often questioned, Mhile the debates on foreign pol icy occur, 
the Members of Parliament keep them res t ra ined and t h e i r 
difference of opinion i s expressed with l e s s zeal and zest . 
Their opinion ca r r i e s negl ig ib le value for e lect ion purposes. 
These measures are hardly calculated to haii5)er the freedom of 
action of the Government, which i s l e f t completely independent 
except for a few such checks and l i m i t a t i o n s , as a r i s e out of 
i t s p o l i t i c a l accountabi l i ty in general* 
Foreign a f fa i r s give r i s e to r e l a t i v e l y small amount of 
l e g i s l a t i o n , the greater amount of time i s devoted to t h i s 
subject i s spent on general foreign po l icy debates, questions, 
Minis ter ia l -s ta tements and ca l l ing a t t en t ion not ices and motions. 
1. National Herald (Lucknow), 19,2 . I962. 
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Choosing, sending and in s t ruc t ing the delegates to be 
sent to attend any in te rna t iona l conference f a l l s within the 
Executive domain only. Such cases are beyond the Parliamentary 
control . Attempts are made to include the Members of the 
Parliament in such delegations which can lead to construct ive 
collaborat ion or Parliament-Executive l i a i s o n . 
For efficiency in administering foreign pol icy and vcnlty 
of command and decis ion, i t i s more des i rab le tha t the Executive 
takes immediate decision but on grave na t iona l i s sues , discussions 
should beteken af te r proper parl iamentary consul ta t ion. Certain 
people suggest t ha t control of foreign pol icy by Parliament -^ich 
democratises i t , i s not feas ib le . The control of foreign pol icy 
by the Council of Minis ters , in a word "EKecutive** i s equally 
democratic^ Barring the area where the Consti tution s t i p u l a t e s 
the necess i ty of parliamentary l e g i s l a t i o n and cont ro l , i t i s 
more p rac t i cab le tha t the Ssecutive forms and dra f t s the po l icy , 
on which the Parliament puts i t s seal of approval* 
Taking into consideration the ro l e of Parliament Yis-a*"Vig 
treaty-making, we find that i t i s ne i the r l e g a l l y nor p r a c t i c a l l y 
poss ib le for Parliament to take pa r t in negot ia t ions leading to 
t r e a t i e s . I t i s simply the expost facto enquiry tha t the Pelrlia-
ment does into the contents of a t r e a t y . I t i s often objected 
on the demoratic grounds that the re i s no provision for the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n of t r e a t i e s by Parliament. In Czechoslovakia, 
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Denmark, S^donesia, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway and Switzerland, parliamentary author isa t ion i s a 
must before r a t i f i c a t i o n process . The Pres iden t ia l system 
tha t operates in the U.S.A., f a c i l i t a t e s the best example 
of the in tervent ion by a parliamentary body« Treat ies 
represent only a small proportion of the diplomatic measures, 
agreements and dec la ra t ions . Most of them are beyond the 
2 parliamentary au thor i sa t ion . Ihder the Indian federal system, 
the Units or s t a t e s can not enter in to any t r e a t i e s with the 
foreign countries* 
I t i s also noticed that the t r e a t i e s and agreements 
are subject to l e s s de ta i led scrut iny and survey by Parliament 
than other 'domestic a f f a i r s and l e g i s l a t i o n . The extent 
to which the treaty«making in India has been insula ted from 
the parl iamentary influence i s evidenced by the fact t ha t not 
a s ingle agreement or t r e a t y including those with China, Nepal, 
Sikkim and Pakistan, p o l i t i c a l or economic, had been o r i g i n a l l y 
discussed and debated in Parliament in advance. Important 
information about i t s contents has been withheld from Par l ia« 
ment on the ground of not being in the publ ic i n t e r e s t . The 
Panchsheel Agreement of 195^, was not placed before the Pa r l i a -
ment in broad ou t l ines . The Chinese skirmishes s t a r t ed shor t ly 
1. Parl iaments, op. c i t . . pp. 289, 90«91. 
2. I b i d . , p . 292. 
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after this Treaty of Trade was formally signed but Parliament 
remained oblivious of them till 1959» 
m.th regard to the functioning of the Parliamentary 
Committees, it is suggested that the Members do not meet in a 
spirit of discussion and understanding, which can be helpful 
in evolving sound national consensus on the main lines of policy* 
The whole idea of having a Consultative Committee gets,defeated. 
Its Members can be more instrumental in the policy-planning 
process by developing more understanding of all problems. The 
limited success that it attained is due to the fact that its 
Members discussed some specific matters. They had the occasion 
to extract a little more information than was hitherto available 
and the Government got the opportunity of educating Members 
on some issues. On the political level such a Committee can 
play aiBeful role in the process of foreign policy-planning. 
The Relations Committee of the Senate and the Forei^ Affairs 
Committee of the House of Representatives in the United States 
of America are perhaps the most influential and effective 
Parliamentary Committees of the world. Such a Committee-system 
cannot be transplanted in Indian Parliamentary -system. 
In order to expedite the business of such Committees, 
their structure and functioning should be improved. Its 
membership should be evaluated and analysed. The ceremonial 
sessions of the Parliament should be decreased as it is an 
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es sen t i a l condition to ameliorate Committee work. The 
Committees should be pat terned subject-wise and the scope of 
t h e i r work should also develop on an extensive sca le , ifd hoc 
and sub** commit tees should also be formed to deal with specif ic 
issues to which considerable a t ten t ion may be given. 
I t i s at the instance of the Executive tha t the parl iamentary 
pol icy i s evolved and given f ina l shape. There i s an int imate 
re la t ionsh ip between the Government and the Parliament because 
of which, i t i s the Government's po l icy with some minor changes 
here and there tha t i s approved of* 3ii the process of a r r iv ing 
at dec is ions , the Cabinet and Parliament help one another and 
i t i s at t h i s time tha t Parliament influences foreign policy* 
There i s an obl igat ion over the Cabinet to be a l ive to Par l ia* 
'ment's opinion, to an t i c ipa te i t s views and to be sens i t ive 
to i t s moods. The equilibrium in foreign pol icy i s maintained 
through the de l i ca te balance between the Cabinet and Parliament* 
The f i r s t r equ i s i t e to the e f fec t ive supervision of the 
Executive by Parliament i s to furnish i t with timely information 
regarding the foreign pol icy decisions* The Parliament has got 
a r ight to obtain a l l relevant information on the a c t i v i t i e s of 
the Government. However, i f the information can be of help 
to the enemy country, i t i s bound to be secret* In order to 
expedite parliamentary control over p o l i c i e s , i t i s also essen t i a l 
that a l l p o l i c i e s approved by Parliament should be s ta ted in 
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clear terras. As a matter of p r i n c i p l e , Parliament has not 
defined as to what our foreign pol icy should be. Almost in 
every session, Parliament debates I t , expresses i t s views, 
c r i t i c i s e s cer ta in act ions and reac t ions of the Government ,-
with regard to pol icy mat ters , but no de f in i t e reso lu t ion , 
spec i f i ca l ly giving d e t a i l s of our po l icy and s e t t i n g the 
guidelines to the Executive, has ever been passed. I t had so 
far debated and approved the pol icy , chalked out by the 
Government, In order to make Parliament more e f fec t ive , i t 
i s pe r t inen t tha t i t se t s cer ta in p r i n c i p l e s , which may form 
an e s sen t i a l ingredient of the po l i cy , defined and proposed 
by the Executive. In an era when the Executive ' d i c t a t o r s h i p ' 
i s gaining momentum and the convention of delegated l e g i s l a t i o n 
i s widening the scope of Exefiutive influence, Psirliament and 
i t s functioning needs a thorough enquiry to strengthen i t s 
hands., in dealing with foreign po l icy . The increased control 
of foreign pol icy by the Parliament would be in conformity 
with democratic supervision* The ru les of procedure under 
which the Parliament functions shoiild be revised s.o as to give 
more opportunity to parliamentary con t ro l . On the p l ea of 
general publ ic I n t e r e s t , i t i s often suggested tha t the publ ic 
debate of in te rna t iona l a f f a i r s and foreign pol icy during 
wars i s not advisable. With the r e s u l t , the Executive becomes 
correspondingly more powerful and the influence of Parliament 
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suffers a decl ine-India t i l l now faced many blows to i t s foreign 
pol icy- during the Sino*-Indian border dispute and the Chinese 
invasion, India-Pakistan war over Kashmir in 196^ and the war 
over Kutch in 1968 and the recent-Bangla Desh war in 1971* During 
the war periods Parliament receded in to background, in 19^8, 
when the Indian Parliament was in the recess and the world was 
on the brink of another wair^the Cabinet and the Prime Minister 
took important decis ions . In order to give a measure of ext ra-
ordinary control to Parliament, emergency session should be held. 
I t would democratise our foreign pol icy and encourage the 'na t iona l 
direct ion* and control of the same. During the Chinese invasion 
a l so , i t was per t inen t to enlarge the scope of parl iamentary 
cont ro l . 
In the Inter-Parl iamentary symposium at Geneva in 
November I965, the p a r t i c i p a n t s analysed the ro l e of Parliament 
under di f ferent categories namely^ as the siQ)rerae l e g i s l a t i v e 
body, con t ro l le r of purse and as a body cont ro l l ing foreign 
affsdrs and pol icy . An extensive discussion took p lace . On the 
one hand, there were arguments present ing a t h e o r e t i c a l and 
u n r e a l i s t i c pictvire of a Parliament, c losely associated with the 
conduct of foreign po l i cy . The other section of people emphasised 
tha t Parliament should be invested with more power, o ther than 
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approving or re jec t ing the most importsint p o l i t i c a l t r e a t i e s 
or conventions, implying the implementation of new in t e rna l 
l e g i s l a t i o n , exercis ing control through a l l the parl iamentary 
measures of cont ro l . 
PARLIAMMT AMD PRESS; 
in the Parliamentary l i f e the Press also plays a note-
worthy role* Parliament enjoys much p re s t i ge in publ ic due to "t^ 
Press* I t i s through public-opinion tha t Parliament keeps the 
Executive within reasonable l i m i t s . The Press i s often labe l led 
as an extension of Parliament and i t i s the Press which s t ru -
ggles to unearth the administrat ive f a i l i n g s . Official high-
handedness, Government's lapses and shortcomings and publ ic 
grievances are brought out by the Press . Due to the force of 
public-opinion, the Government tends to ident i fy i t s e l f with the 
genera l -wi l l . I t i s through the media of Press t ha t e f fec t ive , 
favourable or inef fec t ive public-opinion i s formed, about 
Parliament and the Government, Much ado can be ra i sed about 
minor and p e t t y misgivings and cairelessness on the pa r t of the 
Government. '*Mosf of the raw-material , for parl iamentary 
quest ions, motions, debates and discussions comes from the 
da i ly press and t h i s i s an important instrument on which a 
2 Member r e l i e s . ' ' The Press keeps the rank and f i l e informed 
1, Christ ian Deminice, "Parliament 's Role and Mission", 
Parliamentary Studies^ Vol, X, No, 9> September I966, p*1^ , 
2, Shankdher, op. c i t . , p , 368. 
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of what i s happening ins ide Parliament. This i s a two-way 
t r a f f i c which enables the press to maintain an important as 
well as strong l i n k between the Public and the Parliament. The 
administration i s alwg,ys sens i t ive to publ ic opinion. The Press 
i s an ind i rec t mode of control . I t does not hold any l ega l 
author i ty but i t can help to educate and arouse publ ic opinion, 
PARLIAMENT AMD THE SINO-IMDIAM BORDER DISPUTE; 
Despite the extensive debates over the Sino-Indian border 
dispute in Parliament, the ro le of Parliament has not reached 
\ipto the mark. I t s ro l e i s l imited by the information avai lable 
to i t from the Government sources. I t can influence the Govern-
ment or d i rec t i t only on the basis of the information fed to i t 
from the Parliament, Places in Ladakh, Longju, Barahoti, 
Bomdila, CJhusul and Aksai Chin, where the major war occurred , 
were mostly unknown and t h e i r locat ion i s d i f f i c u l t to ident i fy . 
Par l iament ' s contr ibut ion i s l imited to teaiporary excitement 
when India loses t e r r i t o r y or the enemy crosses the borders. The 
information can be e l i c i t e d to them to a very l imi ted extent 
for the obvious' reason of secrecy in such matters on the plea of 
publ ic i n t e r e s t . In the Consultative Committee, the Opposition 
Members t r i e d to seek information but they have to contend 
themselves with whatever Nehru reported to them. Though the 
Opposition often regre t ted the lack of t imely information, the 
feel ing among them was 'Pandit J i knows b e s t ' . The Members of 
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Parliament, generally speaking, took very l i t t l e i n t e r e s t in the 
in tens ive study of border problems, hence the absence of axiy 
sp i r i t ed and exclusive debates over the ¥h l t e Papers which were 
occasionally placed in the Library or l a i d on the Table. Had the 
members taken more i n t e r e s t in analysing the border problem in 
d e t a i l , t h e i r contr ibut ion would have been genuine and s ign i f i can t . 
I t i s also due to lack of p o l i t i c a l education of the e lec to ra te 
and the Members of Parliament in general . On most of the 
c r i t i c i sms , the Opposition was divided in i t s e l f . The p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s do not have a programme of educating t h e i r cons t i tuents 
on the issue of r e l a t i o n s of India with the outside world. 
Parliament was a s t o a g ^ ^ f CJongress in the l i g h t of i t s 
thujnping majority during the Sino-India border d i spu te . Moreover, 
in the presence of Nehru, nobody could dare exert greater control 
and inf luence. The foreign pol icy was/singleman's po l i cy . He 
was not prone to consul ta t ions , e i the r of the Members of Pa r l i a -
ment or h i s Cabinet colleagues. Moreover, the Sino-India border 
dispute was the f i r s t major foreign pol icy i ssue to be confronted 
by the Parliament ajnd Government. The ro l e of Parliament was 
neg l ig ib le so far as the border dispute was concerned but i t 
paved the way for more parliamentary indulgence. 
lEFLUaJCfi OF PABLIAMMT; 
From the discussion of various instruments of parl iamentary 
cont ro l , the ro le of various Committees of Parliament and the 
Ministry of External A f f a i r s , i t can conveniently be concluded 
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that the very nature of foreign policy-making leaves little scope 
for the Parliament to exercise; control. Parliament is more of a 
talking-shop, which is basically constituted to legislate. Due to 
its numerous strength it is not suited to make policy. Though, 
Parliament retains considerable power which no Government can 
afford to overlook, the expost"" facto nature of enquiry conducted 
by Parliament makes it effective to a limited extent. In a variety 
of ways, the Parliaiment remains concerned with foreign policy 
discussion. LengthCy debates occur during the debates on the 
Presidential Address, Grants of the Ministry of External Affairs, 
general and specific motions on foreign policy or separate disputes. 
Apart from them the Members are free to raise foreign policy issues 
through various kinds of other opportunities. Till I962 when 
Nehru's sway over Parliament was unparalled, Parliament's role 
and influence was not of much significance in addition to its 
being indirect. Views were vividly expressed on the floor of the 
House but they did not serve the cause of characterising public-
opinion, which can consequently influence the Government. After 
the Chinese attack Parliament grew more sensitive and critical 
of foreign policy decisions, defence preparedness and more cautious 
to the blows to India's status. Parliamentary consultations 
subsequently increased. Shastri grew more equivocal in consulting 
and informing the Members of Parliament on significant issues. 
The Congress showed signs of weakness after/1969 split till 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi consolidated her leadership and consequently 
the influence of Parliament began declining. To what extent 
Parliament would be an effective instrument of control, depends 
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on the stature of leadership. The gigantic personality 
of Nehru set forth a precedent in the realm of foreign 
policy. The role of President in this regard is negligible. 
In short, the Parliament exercises its influence on the 
Government through all the above mentioned means. Its 
primary business is to siipervise rather than to initiate, 
to legislate rather than to negotiate, to set up guidelines 
rather than to register them and to approve of the Governmental 
policy rather than to make it. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
India has followed the Westminster parliamentary 
model, the essence of which is the supremacy of Parliament* 
In the f ie ld of foreign policy-making and implementation, 
the supremacy of Parliament is maintained to a considerable 
ex ten t . The r o l e tha t the Parliament i s destined to play 
i s conditioned by cer ta in l imi ta t ions and inh ib i t ing 
f a c t o r s . This mammoth forum of discussion i s preoccupied 
with matters concerning domestic a f f a i r s . The ro le of 
Parliament i s largely shaped by the party in Power. 
Foreign policy-making i s cons t i tu t iona l ly an executive 
concern and i t i s too much to expect from the Government 
to place a l l d e t a i l s concerning foreign policy issues 
before an assembly consis t ing of numerous persons. 
Disclosure of information may open pandora's box and place 
the s t a t e in doldrums. Untimely leakage of information 
can never be in the broad nat ional i n t e r e s t tha t a 
government i s supposed to serve . Secrecy i s the hall-mark 
of diplomacy. Members of Parliament are repeatedly found 
clamouring for more and more information but they are 
de l ibe ra t e ly kept in the dark on the usual plea of not 
being in the public i n t e r e s t . In our country, i f the 
Parliament and i t s Committees want to pa r t i c ipa te fully 
in in t e rna t iona l mat ters , affect ing our posi t ion and 
using t h e i r influence and cons t i tu t iona l power continouslyt 
they should i n s i s t on a l t e r i n g the Rules of Procedure 
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in such a way and to such an extent tha t no policy i s 
considered worthy of implementation i f i t does not r e g i s t e r 
the general approval of Parliament. Our p o l i t i c a l system 
cannot claim to be Parliamentary, i f the Parliament does 
not a s se r t i t s e l f on important domestic and c ruc ia l 
in te rna t iona l i s sues . The oft-repeated plea of ' na t iona l 
in te res t* as a ground for secrecy i s hackneyed and i t should 
not be made an excuse for withholding necessary information 
from the Parliament* 
For the successful working of the Parliamentary 
system, the existence of s table Opposition i s a necessary 
ingredien t . The representa t ives of the majority and the 
minority pa r t i e s together cons t i tu te the Parliament. The 
Government and the Opposition function as the contending 
blocs with a t a c i t agreement tha t the majority i s to 
govern and the minority i s to serve as a watch-dog to 
check the high-handedness of the ru l ing pa r ty . Absence 
of unified Opposition in India has made the confusion 
worse confounded• 
The word Opposition is used here to indicate those 
•the 
Members of smaller pa r t i e s who do not belong to /pa r ty in 
power. During the period under study, the role of the 
Opposition was quite negl ig ib le owing t o fact ions and 
c l iques within themselves which paved the way for the 
Congress to enjoy un-interrupted p o l i t i c a l hegemony for 
two decades. Nehru's dynamism and charismatic leadership 
mainly contributed to the cohesiveness and popularity 
of the Congress. During the f i r s t decade of his r u l e . 
Z7^ 
there was hardly any Opposition to his policies. 
Despite the resentment in the Opposition about Nehru*s 
domination over foreign policy matters, no one tried to 
make him realise the supremacy of Parliament. Nehru 
was not in the habit of consulting either the Opposition 
or the leaders of his own party which caused irritation 
among both the quarters. The inability on the part of the 
Opposition to provide alternate programme, absence of 
electoral alliances at the national level and mounting 
differences within themselves including clash of 
personalities, further added to the confusion. In 1958, 
the Opposition alleged that the Government, on more than one 
occasion treated it shabbily, particularly on questions 
dealing with foreign policy^ 
Limitations apart, the members in Opposition had 
reflected their genius and calibre through their speeches, 
relating to foreign policy and border issue, that helped 
to keep the Government on its toes. The contribution 
of veterans like H. N. Mukherjee, M. R. Nasani, Nath Pai, 
J. B. Kriplani, H. N. Kunzru and others, cannot be easily 
underestimated. Undoubtedly many a time there were 
noisy and uproarious scenes in the House but there were 
calm and calculated scenes also. An objective study of the 
Parliamentary debates confirms that our Parliamentarians 
were blessed with the gift of the gab. There were many 
people in Opposition, who wasted the precious time of the 
House for the sake of Opposition. They gave unnecessary/ 
details while describing the international scenes, leg-
pulling of other speakers, more often beating about the 
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bush or playing to the ga l l e ry . Besides,there was a lso 
a category of those who happened t o be *pubiicity-hunting-
po l i t i c i ans , ' evoking popular sentiment t o remain in the 
l ime l igh t . 
The Sino-India Border Dispute was the f i r s t important 
matter considered in the his tory of I nd i a ' s Parl iament. The 
Parliament could not play a very effect ive r o l e in t h i s 
regard . I t has been inhibi ted by cer ta in factors which 
relegated i t to a l ess important posit ion over the Dispute . 
Most relevant being the oft-repeated fact tha t the foreign 
policy i s an executive concern. All major or minor 
decis ions are taken by the Government. This i s a cons t i t u t i ona l 
l imi ta t ion upon the Parliament and i t s r o l e . The d e t a i l s 
of the dispute were kept as secre t as the a c t i v i t i e s of 
the CBI. The decisions were taken, nei ther through public 
debates nor through open discussions in the House, but 
en camera through a complicated net-work of adminis t ra t ive 
se t -up involving the cabine t . Prime Minis ter , Minister of 
External Affairs , Sec re ta r i a t s taf f and Consultat ive 
Committee. The Cabinet was fully under Nehru*s con t ro l , 
who had the decisive voice* I t s members were often 
c r i t i c a l of lack of consul ta t ion with them. Pa r t i c ipa t ion 
of the cabinet in the process of consul tat ion would have 
created a new precedent. He was personally disposed t o 
negot ia te on the Boarder d i spu te . He believed tha t the 
Opposition to the fundamentals of s t a t e policy amounted 
t o opposition to Ind ia ' s independent s t a t u s . So far as 
the question of involvement of the Ministry of External 
Affairs as a whole was concerned, Nehru*s custom was t o 
inform them ra ther than consult them. The sub-Committee 
on Foreign Affairs seldom met. I t often acted as a rubber-
stamp which was generally informed than consul ted. Regarding 
the Sino-India Dispute, Nehru firmly believed in not opening 
h is mind too wide. 
The Sino-India border dispute was an acid t e s t on 
which the Members of Parliament showed sharp react ions and 
ra ised harsh c r i t i c i sm, taking the Government t o task* I f 
s e t t l e d into es tabl ishing the precedent of receiving 
timely information on a l l developments. During emergency, 
the power of Parliament decl ined. The Rules of Procedure 
are such that they impose a l imit on the scope of 
parliamentary indulgence. Discussing the border d i spu t e , 
the Parliament came accross many such c r i t i c a l moments. 
The speaker, Sardar Hukum Singh had t o check the members 
repea ted ly . 
The Dispute was tackled more through the exchange of 
l e t t e r s . Protest Notes and Memoranda in the form of White 
Papers, negotiat ions and diplomacy for which a debating 
society l ike Parliament i s not s u i t a b l e . Such an open 
public forum as the Parliament, i t i s most per t inent t o 
l e g i s l a t e on issues which have hardly got anything to do 
with a matter of such signif icance as the border d ispute 
or other i n t r i c a t e issues of foreign pol icy. 
The en t i r e Sino-India border dispute was considered 
in the Parliament under Nehru's protect ive umbrella. T i l l 
1959, Nehru was less pa r t i cu l a r in d isc los ing things t o 
parliament and seeking the seal of i t s approval . In 1959, 
the Parliament for the f i r s t time resented the lack of 
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information about the minor incursions accross the 
border, secrecy regarding the construct ion of the Aksai-
Chin road and the i l l e g a l occupation of Indian t e r r i t o r y 
in NEFA, Longju and Ladakh. In almost a l l the debates 
t h a t followed, Nehru grew more pa r t i cu l a r about the 
formality of informing the Parliament well in t ime. The 
occasional uproar in the House over t h i s concealment was 
su f f i c ien t to change the regular p r ac t i ce , Nehru's 
unquestioned sway over Parliament was not challenged so 
far , leaving aside the eclipsed posi t ion tha t followed 
the Chinese invasion, he had his gala time in the 
Parliament. The grandeur of the Parliament and the other 
Parl iamentaries was enhanced by his presence. His 
speeches, a f t e r 1959 and more par t i cu la r ly a f t e r the 
invasion, bore a c lear -cu t reference t o his in tent ion of 
securing the approval of the Parliament. He sang 
devotional enlogies in praise of Parliament and the v a l i d i t y 
of i t s ul t imate approval* His speeches also bore an 
impression that for the Government, i t i s not des i rab le 
and pract icable to come and seek the vote of approval on 
a l l the d e t a i l s of the d i spu te . He believed and impressed 
upon the Parliament tha t the Government can take fur ther 
decis ions in accordance with the generally accepted policy 
as generals do in the b a t t l e - f i e l d s when they move without 
consult ing the Government. The influence of Parliament 
gets paralysed during c r i s e s and emergency. This Dispute 
invi ted a mass of c r i t i c a l remarks over Ind i a ' s card ina l 
policy of non-alignment. Nehru accepted on the f loor of 
Parliament tha t we were l iv ing in a world of idealism and 
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t h a t the Chinese aggression has awakened us to r ea l i t y* 
Ashoka Mehta had once remarked tha t he was not against 
the policy of non-alignment as such, but was unhappy over 
the conduct of Covernment**s policy in the most v i t a l part 
of our foreign re la t ions namely the Sino-India border 
d ispute of 1962. After the 1962 debacle, in the agonising 
reappra isa l both of foreign and domestic po l i c i e s , there 
was a general d i spos i t ion to seek a scape-goat for the 
apparent f a i l u re of the policy of non-alignment in 
promoting nat ional secur i ty* 
None of the Pres iden t ia l Addresses provided a 
d i r e c t discussion of our policy with regard to China, 
From 1952 to 1956,this reference ,if a t a l l there was, 
was scant and neg l ig ib le . Since 1956 when the Government 
s t a r t ed get t ing information of minor incidents accross 
the borders , the Addresses included a s l i gh t reference t o 
the nature of r e l a t i o n s . During 1957-63, the Addresses 
abounded in such references, when the trend of r e l a t i ons 
de te r io ra ted and ul t imately resulted in the massive 
invasion of 1962. From 1963 to 1967, India and China 
were pos i t ive ly and apenly hos t i l e to each other and both 
indulged vociferously in hos t i l e propaganda against each 
o t h e r . In 1968, I nd i a ' s a t t i t u d e turned towards detente* 
The recent phase of r e l a t i o n s i s moving towards c o r d i a l i t y 
and our policy-makers are hoping against hope tha t our 
r e l a t ions w i l l improve in the near fu ture . Barring a 
few examples vihen the d ispute was considered in separate 
Motions, i t figured in the general foreign policy Resolutions 
and Motions. In general foreign policy Motions, the 
international situation was assessed and the foreign 
policy was mentioned only by courtesy. The irony of all 
these Motions was that they all ended in the approval of 
the foreign policy- However vociferous the criticism of 
the Opposition had been against the Government's policy, 
these motions could never be negatived. It also created 
an impression that the Motions were debated to approve of 
the policy and not to disapprove it. It is desirable to 
make the vague foreign policy resolution more concrete 
and definite. Parliamentary control over the executive 
must be more effective. There have been no specific 
resolutions indicating our relationship with other nations* 
Parliament has not exactly and precisely defined as to what 
our foreign policy was or ought to be in the light of past 
experience. The trends of policy had to be gathered from 
the diversified speeches of various Ministers made here 
and there without sufficient preparation. These speeches 
were not to the point and precise but emanated from them 
as vague arguments, personal opinions, unclear intentions 
and justifications. At the conclusion of a foreign policy 
debate, the Parliament passed omnibus motions that *the 
international situation is taken into consideration and 
the policy of Government of India in that regard is approved, 
It is also due to imprecise and ambiguous wording of the 
Government Resolutions that the Parliament had been less 
effective in enforcing what it wanted to enforce. The 
Substitute Amendment Motions spell out the intention of 
the Member of Parliament quite clearly but due to the 
thumping majority of the Congress, they always got negatived, 
After heated debates and prolonged discussions in the House, 
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the pol ic ies of the Government have always been 
a pproved• 
Question-House f a c i l i t a t e d the rece ip t of abundant 
information of the up- to-date developments of the border 
s i t u a t i o n . However, the t o t a l number of questions ra ised 
in connection with the dispute was not alarming. Some-
times there were unnecess^ary r epe t i t i on of questions 
seeking inforaiation already supplied through Debates, 
Adjournment and Call ing-Attention Motions and Min i s t e r i a l 
Statements. The reason for t h i s lack of information may 
conveniently be tha t e i t h e r the pa r t i cu l a r Member was 
absent or absent-minded and s lep t over the mat te r . Efciring 
the debate on the Proclamation of Emergency in 1963, the 
speaker drew a t ten t ion t o t h i s error* 
A cursory glance a t 1957-59 debates, mirrored the 
inherent resentment of the Members of Parliament regarding 
a number of c ruc ia l decis ions having been taken by the 
Government, without re fe r r ing the matter to the Parl iament. 
The glaring example was the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, 
which was signed before the Indo-Tibetan Treaty could be 
r a t i f i e d by the Parliament. Another instance beign Nehru's 
approval to accept the Colombo Proposals of 1962 in t o to 
without any reference to Parliament. The discussion t o 
consider the proposals followed the same month over the 
fac t that was already decided. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o say 
as to what difference had i t made if the Parliament had 
got a chance to discuss the Colombo Proposals a f t e r the 
Government had already discussed i t ? Some of the Members 
of Parliament made fur ther suggestions but i of no ava i l* 
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Nehru, however kept on assuring the House that the Government 
would do whatever the Parliament had decided. He did not put 
any such Motion tha t the Proposals of the Colombo Conference 
be pass-ed nor he placed any circumstances leading to i t 
before the House. I t approved of the Government's decis ions 
u l t imate ly due to the majority tha t the Congress enjoyed. The 
opposition viewed i t to be the very a n t i t h e s i s of democracy 
and t raves ty of parliamentary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . During i t s 
c ruc i a l debate, Nehru declared tha t he did not want to create 
a precedent tha t every matter be voted upon by Parliament* 
Broad or ien ta t ion and acceptance of policy by Parliament 
should su f f i ce . He further made i t c lear to the House t h a t 
the matter of accepting them in t o t a l was j u s t i f i e d in the 
l i gh t of delay from the Chinese s i d e . In f ac t , during 
emergencies i t i s enevitable for the Government t o take 
decis ions and conduct secre t discussions without any pr ior 
reference to Parliament. The reasons of urgency, complication, 
cont inui ty of work and secrecy demand i t . But during 
normalcy, the role of Parliament should not be glossed over 
and the practice should develop to es tab l i sh a proper l i a i son 
between the Parliament and Government over such important 
matters* 
The dispute was discussed in the Parliament as a 
formal i ty . During the elongated debates over i t , the 
Members resented the concealment pol icy . In 1964, P.K.Deo 
observed tha t i t was a t r i b u t e to Indian democracy tha t the 
Parliament was referred to a t every c r i t i c a l juncture r e l a t i n g 
to the d i spu t e . These de l ibe ra t ions should c rea te guidel ines 
for the Government. But, the Government asked them to put 
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their seal of approval on fait accompli* The Parliament was 
simply asked to endorse that policy as was acceptable to the 
Government. 
On the whole, the role of Parliament vis-a-vis the 
Border Dispute was not decisive. Nevertheless it has made 
the Parliament more vigilant in matters of foreign policy 
decisions* Undoubtedly through the various criticisms 
levelled against the Government on the border issue, the 
Parliament has quite successfully drawn the attention of the 
Government to many relevant problems and highlighted them* 
Nobody expected the Parliament to dictate foreign policy. 
The Parliament existed only to hold the Government accountable 
to it. The task of the Government was to defend it in the 
House. The Parliament proved to be the best forum reflecting 
public opinion which happened to be the life-blood of our 
democratic and parliamentary set up. The public opinion was 
largely shaped and modelled in the light of the tone of 
criticism in the House. The national public opinion has 
asserted itself quite unambiguously over the Government's 
stand, but it has little effect on the moves adopted by the 
Government. Despite all the hue and cry of the public and 
the Opposition, the proposed meeting of Nehru and Chou in 
April 1960 could not be prevented* 
At the same time the supremacy of Parliament cannot 
be ignored. The genius of the Government lies in striking 
out a just balance between the supremacy of Parliament and 
safeguarding national interest. The Indian Parliament could 
play a less significant part because of the overwork with which 
it was burdened. It allowed itself lesser time and opportunity 
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t o indulge in foreign a f f a i r s . Despite the fac t tha t the 
Parliament t r i ed sometimes t o intervene in foreign policy 
mat te rs , the centre of i t s a t t en t ion was confined to 
legislat4.on and supervision of the enormous net-work of 
administrat ive ma t t e r s . I t has become customary to conceal 
the gravity of case while report ing i t to the Parliament for 
the fear of public morale going down* Parliament i s a public 
forum and to give point-blank information about aggressions 
and wars would adversely affect the public mind. Nehru, for 
example, while replying to a question in August 1962 about 
the poss ib i l i t y of any Chinese invasion c l ea r ly said tha t 
such an invasion was not imminent merely to boost up public 
morale. But in the hearts of his heart he thought quite 
d i f f e r en t l y . In his pr ivate interview with Taya Zinkin, as 
ear ly as in 1954, Nehru prophetical ly observed, *you must 
remember tha t they have a lo t of work to do in China proper* 
But in say twenty years t ime, when they are strong and 
modern, then the picture would be quite d i f f e ren t and they 
w i l l probably be a menace*» 
I t is a lso noteworthy tha t the Members of Parliament took 
less pronounced i n t e r e s t in foreign a f f a i r s . They were more 
ac t ive ly involved in domestic i s sues . What in teres ted them 
most were the problems of t h e i r own cons t i tuenc ies , the 
solut ion of which would help them in the next e l e c t i o n s . 
This trend might have been e i t h e r due to t h e i r ignorance of 
foreign policy matters or lack of in t e res t in i t . Another 
reason was that they usually gave preference to associa te 
themselves more with the domestic a f fa i r s to improve the 
prospects of leadership in t h e i r respective cons t i t uenc ie s . 
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Foreign affairs were considered by most of them as the 
preserve of the Prime Minister or the Government to be 
dealt with skillfully by experts under the overall guidance 
of Nehru, 
There are examples when deliberate and concrete 
efforts were made in our parliamentary system to strengthen 
its hands in controlling the purse and the influence of our 
Parliament over administration, but negligible efforts were 
made to improve its position regarding foreign policy. It 
is essential in this regard that Parliament's ceremonial 
sessions be reduced to the minimum and the work of various 
Committees be speeded up and galvanised, encouraging 
different sections of Parliament to express their views and 
take active part, instead of leaving every thing to the 
Government. A code of conduct should be prescribed vigorously 
for the parliamentarians to avert cynical misbehaviour in 
House, which had increased manifold since the death of Nehru. 
Some of the Opposition Members like Hiren Mukerjee had also 
lamented over this pitiable state of degeneration. On the 
other hand. Opposition for the sake of Opposition should be 
discouraged. Foreign Affairs planning Committee had already 
been formed which takes into account all aspect of the policy, 
before finally approving it. A team of specialists should be 
set up to study and evaluate our China policy and to over-
come the appalling lack of information to the House. The 
Members of Parliament, who debate on foreign policy matters 
should be trained men who know their job and do not waste 
the precious time of the House in longwinded purposeless 
speeches. The intricacies of the foreign policy are the most 
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sens i t i ve area of Government and should be tackled by the 
' e x p e r t i s e ' and not the ' gene ra l i s t * , both in the Government 
and the Parliament. A sound foreign policy requires the 
continous appra isa l of the world around us , concentrated home-
work and a mastery over the a r t of diplomacy. Consequently, 
the Parliament wi l l have to depend on the guide l ines offered 
by the Cabinet and the lead given by the foreign Minis ter , 
under the over a l l d i r ec t ion and supervision of the Prime 
Minis te r . The foreign policy of a country can , in the ult imate 
ana lys i s , be sound and purposeful only i f there i s a mastery 
over foreign a f f a i r s and a proper appra isa l of foreign 
r e l a t i o n s . The Members of parliament, in general , do not possess 
t h i s essen t ia l prerequis i te and therefore have to remain 
doci le and cooperat ive. The i n i t i a t i v e and f ina l decision 
has to remain in the hands of policy-makers* 
•x-x-^-x-* 
Date of 
Sess ion 
MARCH 
12 
1 3 
14 
15 
16 
APPENDIX - I 
Quest ions r a i s e d dur ing the Opening Session of the XVIth Sess ion of 
Lok Sabha rega rd ing S ino- Ind ia Border Di¥>ute -Per iod 1 2 . 3 , 6 2 t o 30 .3 .1962 . 
S t a r r ed -Ques t i ons 
Ora l \ Wri t ten 
XX 
15 
34 
58 
73 
XX 
3 
3 
7 
17 
20 
23 
24 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30. 
102 
127 
150 
180 
219 
236 
267 
297 
315(a) 
7 
13 
15 
13 
19 
12 
9 
14 
9 
Unstarred 
Questions 
XX 
16 
54 
86 
121 
148 
196 
240 
258 
335 
376 
454 
496Ca) 
520 
Short 
Not ice 
Quest ions 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
2 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
3 . 4 
5 , 6 
Quest ions on S ino - Ind ia Border Dispu te 
XXX 
One Oral Quest ion n o . 2 r ega rd ing i n c u r s i o n s 
in C o l s . 50 -56 . 
36, on Alr-Soace Vio la t ion 
6 3 , on Air-Soace V io l a t i on 
XXX 
One Ora l Question No. 
in c o l s . 405-8 
One Oral Question no, 
in c o l s . 629-32 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
One Oral Quest ion no . 312 ( a ) r ega rd ing the 
meeting t h e Chinese and Indian Prime M i n i s t e r s 
in c o l s . 2595-6 . 
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APPENDIX - II 
Questions raised during the I Session of the III Lok Sabha 
from April 19 to June 22, 1962. 
Date of 
Session 
APRIL 
19 
21 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
30 
MAY 
1 
2 
3 
4 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
14 
16 
17 
18 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
28 
Starred-
Oral 
13 
59 
94 
147 
177 
210 
253 
290 
319 
353 
398 
433 
467 
514 
558 
632 
663 
X 
716 
760 
760 
814 
901 
944 
968 
1020 
1058 
X 
1093 
•Questions 
Written 
28 
21 
37 
14 
22 
24 
17 
11 
23 
28 
22 
20 
31 
33 
52 
17 
30 
X 
25 
33 
30 
24 
20 
9 
30 
25 
16 
X 
27 
Unstarred 
Questions 
(Written) 
19 
66 
126 
140 
182 
222 
249 
362 
451 
523 
637 
721 
772 
923 
1026 
1077 
1187 
X 
1283 
1362 
1502 
1601 
1659 
1779 
1888 
1938 
2025 
X 
2115 
Short 
Notice 
Questions 
1 
X 
X 
2 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
3 
4 
X 
5 
6 
X 
7 
X 
8 
X 
9 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
11 
X 
X 
Questions on the Border Dispute 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
One Written Unstarred Question number 741,regarding 
the construction of roads in NEFA in cols.2853-54. 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
3 Questions with regard to NEFA, Techno-Economic 
Survey and Hospitals» 
XXX 
Unstarred Question no. 1780,on Sino-India border 
dispute Col . 6081, raised by Vidya Charan about the 
cor rec t f igures of ca sua l t i e s of the Chinese and 
Indian personnel. 
XXX 
XXX ^ 
XXX VJ\ 
XXX 
CONTD. 
29 1135 
30 
31 
JUNE 
1 
4 
5 
6 
1184 
1215 
1215 
1216 
1286 
1321 
22 1637 
33 
17 
8 
7 
11 
23 
4 
2167 
2315 
2378 
2414 
2510 
2634 
2705 
3845 
12 
X 
13 
X 
X 
X 
14 
7 
8 
1 
1348 
1373 
1401 
8 
4 
13 
2786 
2935 
2943 
X 
X 
X 
12 
13 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
1428 
1449 
1480 
1509 
1523 
1552 
1575 
1605 
8 
19 
10 
4 
15 
10 
15 
16 
3043 
3144 
3213 
3293 
3422 
3501 
3636 (A' -c) 
3767(A-C) 
14-16 
17 
X 
X 
18 
19(a) 
20-21 
X 
22-23 
1 . Oral C^est ion no . 1129, r egard ing t h e march of 
t r o o p s i n t o Ladakh, c o l s . 7414-16, 
2 . Oral Quest ion no . 1122, r ega rd ing NEFA - Funds, 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
Oral Question no . 1325 - The Chjinese p r o t e s t 
a l l e g i n g Indian i n t r u s i o n i n t o Longju, c o l s . 9100-06 
j o i n t l y r a i s e d by Hem Barua and P . C. Barooah, wheri 
Hem Barua ' s doubts about imminent Chinese war were 
answered in the nega t i ve in c o l . 9106. 
XXX 
XXX 
Two Oral Quest ions n o s . 1399 and 1401, r ega rd ing 
Chinese News Agency*s charge a g a i n s t India and t h e 
s e t t l e m e n t of S ino- Ind ia Border Dispute in 
c o l s . 9920-22 and 9924-27 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
An important ques t ion d i s c l o s i n g the l a t e s t s t a t e 
of a f f a i r s , 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
Unstarred Question no. 3462, regarding alleged 
intrusion in NEFA in col, 11650. 
XXX 
Roads in Scheduled a r e a s and NEFA in c o l . 12185, 
One Wr i t t en Quest ion no . 1620, v i o l a t i o n of Chinese 
Ai r Space in c o l s . 12152-3 . 
One Oral Question no . 1636 rega rd ing s e t t l e m e n t 
of S ino - Ind ian border d i s p u t e in c o l s . 12426-7, 
One Oral Question no . 1630 - regardir ig China*s 
note d a t e d 3 1 . 5 , 6 2 , in c o l s . 12407-12, 
One Oral Question no. 1637 - Chinese threat of ,y 
Border clashes in cols. 12427-31, « 
The last question was about the possibility of 
negotiations with the Chinese Government, 
APPENDIX I I I 
Questions raised during the I I Session of Lok Sabha from 6.8,62 to 
7 .9 .1962 . 
Date of 
Session 
AUGUST 
6 
7 
8 
9. 
iO 
13 
14 
16 
17 
18 
20 
21 
22 
24 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
starred-
Oral 1 
13 
87 
102 
164 
182 
231 
288 
328 
377 
420 
449 
488 
531 
567 
590 
626 
657 
681 
710 
734 
Questions 
Written 
34 
34 
41 
8 
31 
39 
27 
26 
35 
17 
26 
30 
16 
11 
22 
17 
9 
15 
8 
9 
Unstarred 
Written 
Questions 
76 
214 
345 Si 
422 
538 
645 
725 
839 
939 
1089 
1253 
1426 
1510 
1626 
1733 
1803 
1896 
2100 
2072 
2143 
Questions on the Border Dispute 
X One Oral Question no. 9 inoo l s . 22-27, 
1 XXX 
Supplementaries on No. 1 xxx 
X 
x 
2 
X 
X 
3 
4 
X 
X 
5 
6 
X 
X 
7 
X 
X 
8 
XXX 
xxx 
One Written Question no. 311 about the Chinese 
a t t i t u d e towards Indian-Traders in Tibet . 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
Written Question no. 412 on Sino-Indian border 
dispute in c o l s . 2479. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
One Unstarred V/ritten Question no. 1942 in cols . 
4733-34 regarding the number of mi l i t a ry posts 
erected by the Chinese of Indian So i l . 
xxx 
xxx 
CONTD, 
to 
00 
•V3 
SEPTEMBER 
3 
4 
5 
6 
762 
785 
805 
837 
5 
10 
18 
12 
2209 
2261 
2371(A-J) 
2463 
9-10 
11 8. 12 
X 
X 
7. 862 15 2548 13, 14 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
Unstarred Question no 
border Police held by 
. 2414, regarding Indian 
Chinese in c o l s . 6412. 
One Starred Question no. 872, on Sino-Indian border 
dispute in c o l s . 6701-02 and one Unstarred Question 
no. 2547 regarding photographs of Indian border 
taken by the Chinese in c o l s . 6654-55* 
N.B. The s tar red wr i t ten questions are exclusively wri t ten ones however the r i s i n g 
number of the ora l questions includes a l l s ta r red questions including ora l and 
w r i t t e n . 
APPENDIX - IV 
Quest ions r a i s e d on S ino- Ind ia Issue dur inq 
November 8, - December 1 1 , 1962 
I I I s e s s ion from 
Dates S t a r r e d 'Quest ions 
Ora l Wri t t en 
Uns t a r r e d 
w r i t t e n 
Qjuestions 
Short 
Not ice 
Quest ions 
NOVEMBHl 
8 
9 
10. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
27 
28 
29 
30 
DECEMBER 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10 
11 
19 
48 
107 
142 
173 
174 
216 
234 
260 
288 
308 
338 
363 
1 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
15 
35 
16 
11 
6 
11 
4 
8 
9 
5 
12 
5 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XXX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
65 
164 
264 
298 
363 
424 
469 
526 
561 
641 
697 
771 
XXX 
857 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
872 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1 
XXX 
3 
X 
X 
4 & 5 
X 
X 
X 
8 & 9 
10 - 11 
12-13-15 
Quest ions r ega rd ing the borde r d i s p u t e 
One S ta r red Wri t ten Quest ion no . 26, r egard ing coun te r 
Chinese propaaganda in c o l s . 4 5 - 6 . 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
One Bnstarred Question no. 689, regarding espionage 
activities of the Chinese, col. 2684. 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
Indian POV/S to be released by the Chinese in Cols.366! 
SKX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
One Unstarred Question no. 870 regarding the Afro-
Asian solidarity and injured Jawans in Hospitals* 
(The Session continues on January 21, 1963). 
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APPENDIX - V ^ ^ ° 
JIECORD OF PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE 
(Lok Sabha.1962) 
A copy of each of the fol lowing papers was l a i d 
on t h e Table on June 19, 1962, 
1 . The Government of I n d i a ' s p r o t e s t da ted 10.5 .1962 
regard ing S ino-Pak i s t an border n e g o t i a t i o n s * 
2 . The Chinese p r o t e s t da ted 30,4«62 a l l e g i n g f r e sh 
Indian i n t r u s i o n s . 
3 . I n d i a ' s r ep ly dated 1 4 . 5 . 6 2 . 
4 . The Chinese p r o t e s t dated 20 .3 .62 a l l e g i n g f resh 
i n t r u s i o n by the Indian p e r s o n n e l . 
5 . I n d i a ' s r ep ly dated 2 1 , 5 . 6 2 . 
6 . The Chinese p r o t e s t dated 1 1 . 5 . 6 2 , a l l e g i n g i n t r u s i o n 
by Indian personnel in Spanggur r e g i o n . 
7 . I n d i a ' s r ep ly dated 21 ,5 .62 and counter p r o t e s t 
a g a i n s t a new Chinese post in Spanggur. 
8 . The Chinese note dated 2 6 . 4 . 6 2 , a l l e g i n g Indian 
i n t r u s i o n s in Ur i reg ion of China, 
9 . I n d i a ' s r ep ly dated 2 6 . 5 . 6 2 . 
1 0 . The Chinese p r o t e s t da ted 1 9 . 5 . 6 2 , a l l e g i n g Indian 
i n t r u s i o n in Longju a r e a . 
1 1 . I n d i a ' s r ep ly dated 2 8 . 5 . 6 2 , 
12 . The Chinese note dated 2 0 . 1 1 . 6 2 , r ega rd ing t r i -
j j nc t i on of borders of India-China and Burma and t h e 
Sino-Burmese boundary T r e a t y . 
1 3 . I n d i a ' s r ep ly dated 3 1 , 5 , 6 2 , 
1 4 . The Chinese note dated 2 1 . 4 , 6 2 , a l l e g i n g Indian 
i n t r u s i o n s * 
1 5 . I n d i a ' s r e p l y dated 6 6 . 6 2 . 
1 6 . I n d i a ' s note dated 27 .4 .62 regard ing Chinese 
post a t SUMDO, 
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17. I n d i a ' s reply dated 6.6.62 and 3 more notes 
thus brining the number to XXI. 
18. A note on publ ic i ty in connection with the Chinese 
aggression. 
19. The Chinese Government's note of 3.12.61, regarding 
renewal of 1954 agreement, between India and China on 
trade between the Tibet region of China and Tibet . 
20. The Government of India ' s reply of 15.12,61. 
2 1 . The Government protes t note to Chinese Government 
dated Jan. 25, 1962 regarding Violation of a i r space. 
22. The Chinese government's protes t ,da ted 24.1.62 
regarding v i o l a t i o n s . 
23. The. Government of India ' s reply dated 26.2 .62. 
24. The Government of India ' s reply to the Chinese 
Government's note 30»ll«6l , regarding v io la t ion of 
Indian t e r r i t o r y . 
25. The Government of Ind ia ' s pro tes t note dated 9 .3 ,62 , 
regarding v i o l a t i o n s , 
26. The Government of India ' s protest dated 10,3.62 
regarding v io l a t i on . 
27. Protest of Chinese Government dated 4 .1 ,62 , regarding 
v i o l a t i o n s , 
28. The Government of India ' s reply 10•3.62, regarding 
v i o l a t i o n . 
29. The Chinese Government note dated 26.2,62, 
30. The Government of India ' s reply dated 13,3,62, 
•) fr*#** 
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